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INTRODUCTION

Barring any unexpected developments, the 1979 session of
the Tennessee General Assembly will be requested to approve the

Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The proposed rules are
the product of a three-year study of the appellate procedure of
Tennessee and virtually every other jurisdiction, undertaken
by the Tennessee Supreme Court through its Advisory Commission on Civil Rules.' One of the principal purposes of the
rules is to set forth a comprehensive statement of Tennessee law
of appellate procedure. The rules regulate the availability and
method of initiating appeals from interlocutory orders and final
judgments,' security for costs, 4 and stays or injunctions pending

appeal,' review of bail orders and release pending appeal by the
state in criminal cases,' the scope of appellate review,' appeals by
1. The Commission's membership changed during preparation of the appellate rules. Serving on the Commission at one time or another were George
E. Barrett, Nashville; Richard H. Batson, Clarksville; Knox Bigham, Lewisburg; W. Harold Bigham, Nashville; Howell G. Clements, Chattanooga; James
M. Glasgow, Union City; Donald F. Paine, Knoxville; Thomas R. Prewitt,
Memphis; James D. Senter, Jr., Humboldt; Herbert R. Silvers, Greeneville;
Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Jackson; Joe W. Worley, Kingsport. The terms of James
D. Senter and Herbert R. Silvers expired early in the Commission's deliberations, and they were replaced by James M. Glasgow and Joe W. Worley. Knox
Bigham served as chairman until his term expired in June 1976. Donald F.
Paine succeeded him as chairman, and W. Harold Bigham was appointed to
take his place on the Commission. In addition to the members of the Commission and its Reporter, Justice William J. Harbison of the Tennessee Supreme
Court actively and faithfully participated in the Commission's deliberations.
2. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 9-10.
3. Id. R. 3.

4. Id.
Id.
Id.
7. Id.

5.
6.

R. 6.
. 7.
R, 8.

R, 13.
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poor persons,' filing and service of papers,' computation and extension of time, 0 motions, 1 the record on appeal, 2 briefs, 3 oral
argument, 4 the effect of error,"s publication of opinions," rehearing,17 costs" and interest on judgments," and a number of other
miscellaneous matters.'" Many of the proposed rules embody existing law, but there are also several significant changes both in
matters of detail and matters of more fundamental significance.
The present discussion will focus principally on rules of fundamental significance or unusual interest. Before discussing the
substance of the rules, however, it may be enlightening to sketch
the procedure followed in formulating them.
A.

The Rulemaking Process

The Tennessee Supreme Court is empowered by statute to
prescribe by rule "the practice and procedure in all of the courts
of this state in all civil and criminal suits, actions and proceedings. ' 2' The rules adopted by the court may not "abridge, enlarge
8.
9.

id. R. 18.
id. R. 20.

10.

Id. R. 21.

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. R. 22.
Id. R. 24-26.
Id. R. 27-30.

15.

Id. R. 36(b).

Id. R. 35.

16. Id. R. 37(b).
17. Id. R. 39.
18. Id. R. 40.
19. Id. R. 41.
20. For the sake of convenience, the text of the current version of the
proposed rules is appended to this article. These rules are a revised version of
the rules published in the South Western Reporter. See 554 S.W.2d No. 2, at 157 (1977) (advance sheet). The revised rules and Commission Comments will
also be published in the South Western Reporter for further comment and
criticism. The Commission comments accompanying the rules have been approved by the Advisory Commission.
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-112 (Supp. 1977). Another, older section of the
Code permits the supreme court to "make rules of practice for the better disposal of business before it." Id. § 16-311 (1955). There is some authority in
Tennessee to the effect that the supreme court has inherent procedural rulemaking power concerning its own procedures that belongs to the court alone
"without the control or revision of other governmental departments." Wood v.
Frazier, 86 Tenn. (2 Pickle) 500, 506, 8 S.W. 148, 150 (1888). But cf. Chaffin v.
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or modify any substantive right, and shall be consistent with the
constitutions of the United States and the state of Tennessee." 22
In addition, the rules may not take effect until approved by joint
resolution of both houses of the General Assembly." Any laws in
conflict with rules promulgated by the court and approved by the
legislature are declared by the rulemaking statute to be of "no
further force or effect." 4 The supreme court is also empowered to
appoint a commission "to advise the [court] from time to time
'25
respecting the rules of practice and procedure.
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the supreme court appointed the Advisory Commission on Civil Rules and requested
the Commission to draft a set of appellate rules. Since none of the
Commission's members had extensive experience in criminal
matters, the Commission decided in its preliminary discussions
to treat only civil appeals. Later, after a draft of a complete set
of rules was submitted to the supreme court by the Commission,
the rules were informally amended to include criminal appeals."
Robinson, 187 Tenn. 125, 213 S.W.2d 32 (1947) (absent enabling act, a court rule
that conflicts with a statute is invalid).
The desirability of judicial rulemaking has spawned a surprising amount
of literature in Tennessee. See Armistead, Shall the Supreme Court of Tennessee Be Given the Power to Regulate by Rules of Court All Evidence and
Procedure? No, 17 TEN. L. REv. 188 (1942); Coffey, Shall the Supreme Court
of Tennessee Be Given the Power to Regulate by Rules of Court All Evidence
and Procedure? Yes, 17 TENN. L. REV. 184 (1942); Coffey, A Challenge and an
Appeal to the Tennessee Bar, 15 TENN. L. REv. 698 (1939); Higgins, The RuleMaking Power of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, 8 TENN. L. REv. 184 (1930);
King, Shall the Supreme Court of Tennessee Be Given the Power to Regulate
by Rules of Court All Evidence and Procedure?No, 17 TENN. L. REv. 178 (1942);
Wicker, Shall the Supreme Court of Tennessee Be Given the Power to Regulate
by Rules of Court All Evidence and Procedure? Yes, 17 TaNN. L. REv. 168 (1942);
Wicker & Anderson, Regulation of Procedure by Rules of Court, 15 TENN. L.
REv. 758 (1939). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1001 (1969); Ashman, Measuring the JudicialRule-Making Power,
59 JUDICATURE 215 (1975).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-113 (Supp. 1977).
23. Id. § 16-114.
24. Id. § 16-116.
25. Id. § 16-118.
26. Justice William J. Harbison asked Judges William S. Russell and
Martha Craig Daughtrey of the court of criminal appeals to suggest revisions
that seemed desirable and necessary in order to incorporate appeals in criminal
cases in the initial draft of the rules submitted to the court. The Reporter made
extensive changes in the suggested revisions of the court of criminal appeals and
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The Commission worked almost exclusively from drafts of
proposed rules submitted by its Reporter. Before drafting a rule
for consideration by the Commission, the Reporter examined a
representative sample of the law of appellate procedure of other
jurisdictions and the law currently in effect in Tennessee. The
legal literature was also carefully studied. Proposed rules, often
accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, were circulated
among the members of the Commission. Copies of representative
statutes and rules from other jurisdictions were appended to
memoranda discussing rules of fundamental significance. The
drafts were then discussed and often revised several times. The
rules themselves, which reflect the experience of Commission
members from both rural and urban areas across the state," are
the single most significant contribution of the Advisory Commission. The time is not yet ripe nor the circumstances appropriate
to assess the quality of the Commission's product, but two aspects of the rulemaking process are deserving of special comment.
In the first place, the rulemaking process from its inception
was premised on the belief that the rules should be widely circulated prior to their submission to the General Assembly. Accordingly, preliminary drafts of the rules were submitted initially to
the appellate and trial bench, and thereafter, in September 1977,
a proposed draft was disseminated to the public at large. " All
comments, suggestions, and criticisms elicited thereby were carefully considered by the Commission and its Reporter, and some
rules were altered accordingly. A revised proposed draft, accompanied by the comments of the Commission, will be circulated
shortly for further comment and is reproduced at the end of this
article. The rules have unquestionably profited from comments
received to date, and it is to be hoped that the openness of the
rulemaking process has helped create the understanding and
sympathetic endorsement that is indispensable to the rules' success.
A second noteworthy feature of the rulemaking process was
the commitment of the Commission to a workable, wellin other rules as well. Justice Harbison and Judge Russell then made the final
revisions. This informal procedure was considered adequate based on the belief
that civil and criminal appeals are largely indistinguishable.
27.

For the membership of the Commission, see note 1 supra.

28.

See note 20 supra.
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conceived set of rules in the face of predictable controversy. Some
of the rules are controversial and were so within the Commission
itself." Procedures that are simply familiar become procedures
that are indisputably right.30 "Familiarity, alas, breeds undeserved respect . . . . Intellectually we subscribe to improvement,
but when it materializes it is a jolt to our customary ways, and
we are likely to cancel our subscription."'" With rare exception,"
the desire to avoid controversy did not dissuade the Commission
from remedying the defects perceived in existing practice.
B.

The Need for ProceduralReform

The current law of appellate procedure in Tennessee is the
product of intermittent and uncoordinated legislative and judicial activity extending over more than a century, 3 One result is
that the law itself is scattered throughout numerous sections of
the Tennessee Code and the rules and decisions of the appellate
courts. Another result is a body of law that, even to the initiated,
is complex, technical, incomplete, dated, and occasionally arbitrary. To the novice the law is inscrutable. Consequently, the
merits of a case on appeal often become obscured by procedural
concerns.
Roscoe Pound, in a now classic speech 4 delivered to the
American Bar Association in 1906, highlighted the need for appellate procedural reform by a semiempirical and quite revealing
comparison of the English and American case reports:
29. Proposed rule 3(e), eliminating the new trial motion as a prerequisite
to review in jury actions, and rule 24(f), eliminating the requirement of approval
of the record by the trial judge, proved most controversial, at least with the
bench.
30. See Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HaRv. L.
R~v. 1, 7 (1956).
31. Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm of Reason, 7 UTAH
L. REv. 157, 161, 166 (1960). Or, as Holmes said, "Ignorance is the best of law
reformers." 0. HOLMmS, THE COMMON LAW 78 (1881).
32. For example, the Commission did not alter the existing law on scope
of review of determinations of fact in civil actions because it was deemed inexpedient, among other reasons, to do so. See text accompanying notes 226-301 infra.
33. See Harbison, Tennessee Appellate Procedure and the Uniform Administrative ProceduresAct, 6 MEM. ST. U.L. Rav. 291, 302 (1976).
34. Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration
of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
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One may search the recent English reports in vain for a case
where an appeal has miscarried on a point of practice. Cases on
appellate procedure are wanting . . . . On the other hand, our
American reports bristle with fine points of appellate procedure. . - . All of this is sheer waste, which a modern judicial
organization would obviate. 5
A comparable study conducted in 1942 of Tennessee appellate
decisions revealed numerous instances of "sheer waste":
The topic of appeal and error occupies more space in our Tennessee digests than any other topic. In a majority of the American states there are more decisions on the subject of corporations than on the subject of appeal and error. But in Tennessee
appeal and error occupies three times as much space in our
digests as corporations or any other one topic. An examination
of a recent volume of the Tennessee Appeals Reports, Volume
24, shows that 13 per cent of all the points decided by the Court
of Appeals of Tennessee in the opinions reported in that volume
are questions of appellate practice. An examination of a recent
volume of the Tennessee Reports, Volume 176, shows that 10 per
cent of all the points decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in the opinions reported in that volume are questions of
appellate practice.'
Appellate procedural problems continue to beset counsel and the
courts. For example, of the last one hundred reported decisions
of the Tennessee Supreme Court available at this writing, nine
raised questions concerning appellate procedure."
35. Id. at 410.11. Pound's research revealed the following statistics:
More than four per cent of the digest paragraphs of the last ten volumes
of the American Digest have to do with Appeal and Error. In ten volumes of the Federal Reporter, namely volumes 129 to 139, covering
decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals from 1903 till the present,
there is an average of ten decisions upon points of appellate practice
to the volume. Two cases to the volume, on the average, turn wholly
upon appellate procedure. . . . The state reports exhibit the same condition.
Id.
36. Wicker, A Comparison of Appellate Procedurein Tennessee and in the
Federal Courts, 17 TENN. L. REv. 668, 669 (1943).
37. The decisions surveyed were those in volumes 541 through 551 of the
South Western Reporter, second series.
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The Purposes of Procedural Reform

Given the shortcomings in existing law, the proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure have a number of remedial
objectives. One essential purpose is to set forth in a single place
a comprehensive and coherent statement of the fundamentals of
appellate procedure. It probes too deeply perhaps to observe, as
Learned Hand did nearly fifty years ago, that the chief difference
between the state of nature and a civilized society is the acceptance by the latter of some "public, fixed and ascertainable
standard of reference by which conduct can be judged and to
which in the main it will conform."3 8 But much can be said for
establishing procedural rules, good or bad, that are readily accessible and that clearly, concisely, and precisely define the standards to which the participants in the appellate process are expected to conform,
Another primary purpose of the rules is simplification of the
law, There is little if any contemporary value in preserving the
three current methods of review from a final trial court judgment.
The writ of error" and simple appeal"0 are descendants of the
historic division of review in actions at law and review in equitable actions;" the appeal in the nature of a writ of error42 is a byproduct of the influence of appeal and error upon each other."3
Ironically, the principal utility of the writ of error today is as a
salutary device permitting review otherwise unavailable because
of noncompliance with the technical requirements of review by
appeal or appeal in error." The distinction between the technical
record and bill of exceptions," the distinction between the bill of
38.
39.

Hand, Ls There a Common Will, 28 MicH. L. REv. 46, 52 (1929).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-601 (1955).
40. Id. § 27-301. See generally Comment, Tennessee Procedure-The Sim.
pie Appeal, 35 TENN. L. REV. 642 (1968).
41. See text accompanying notes 52-66 infra.
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-306 (1955).
43, R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 80-84 (1941).
44, See, e.g., Ward v. North Am. Rayon Corp., 211 Tenn. 535, 366 S.W.2d
134 (1963); Burcham v. Carbide & Carbon Chem. Corp., 188 Tenn. 592, 221
S.W.2d 888 (1949); cf. Hamby v. Millsaps, 544 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 1976) (writ
of error unavailable if appeal in the nature of a writ of error perfected); Crowe
v. Birmingham & Nw. Ry., 156 Tenn. 349, 1 S.W,2d 781 (1928) (same); Turner
v. South Pittsburgh Lumber & Coal Co., 14 Tenn. App. 297 (1931) (writ of error
unavailable if appeal perfected).
45. See Comment, The Bill of Exceptions in Tennessee, 25 TENN. L. REV.
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exceptions and wayside bill of exceptions," and the mode of preparation of the bill of exceptions' 7 are further instances of complexities rooted in a largely forgotten history with little contemporary
justification. Similarly, many of the prerequisites to empowering
the appellate court to review the merits of the trial court's judgment, most notably the prayer for an appeal and granting of the
prayer,48 are senseless technicalities whose purpose of providing
a record of the intent to appeal can be more simply fulfilled."
Finally, rule 1 states that the rules "shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
proceeding on its merits." In a meaningful sense, rule 1 lies at the
heart of all the other rules since it depicts the spirit in which the
rules are conceived. That spirit views procedure not as a battle
of "bright or dull wits . . .on witless technicalities"N0 but as a
practical means to an end. Other rules reflect this same spirit. For
example, rule 36(b), dealing with the effect of error, provides that
"[a] final judgment from which relief is available and otherwise
appropriate shall not be set aside unless, considering the whole
record, error involving a substantial right more probably than not
affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial
process."'" Similarly, rule 36(a) directs the appellate court to
246 (1958). Compare Duane & Co. v.Richardson, 106 Tenn. 80, 59 S.W. 135
(1900); Powell v. Barnard, 20 Tenn. App. 31, 95 S.W.2d 57 (1936), and TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-104 to 107, -113 (1955 & Supp. 1977), with Darden v. Williams,
100 Tenn. 414, 45 S.W. 669 (1898), and TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-110 to 112 (1955

& Supp. 1977).
46. See, e.g., Overturf v. State, 547 S.W.2d 912 (Tenn. 1977); Comment,
supra note 45, at 258-60.
47.

See TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 27-109 to 110 (Supp. 1977); Comment, supra

note 45, at 252-53, 256-57.
48. See, e.g., Russell v. State ex rel. Willis, 222 Tenn. 491, 437 S.W.2d 529
(1969); Duke v. Scott, 216 Tenn. 391, 392 S.W.2d 809 (1965); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 27-310 (1955); Wicker, supra note 36, at 673. But see Honeycott v. Nabors,
197 Tenn. 300, 271 S.W.2d 859 (1954) (neither prayer for an appeal nor granting
of the prayer prerequisite to filing record for writ of error).
49. Wicker, supra note 36, at 674; see text accompanying note 130 infra.
50.

R.TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 15 (1970).

51. See Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 Thx. L. Rv. 126,
146-47 (1927):
The problem of prejudicial error is a problem in professional psychology....

The only permanent and effective cure for technicality in this respect is a better conception of the purpose of all procedure. In England
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"grant the relief on the law and facts to which the party is entitled
or the proceeding otherwise requires" and empowers the court to
"grant any relief, including the giving of any judgment and making of any order."
Ii.

SOME UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS OF THE RULES

A.

The Purpose of Appellate Review

Any attempt to draft the rules necessary to achieve these
ends must make certain assumptions concerning the purpose of
appellate review, the adversary theory of litigation, and the role
of judicial discretion. In his informative and provocative article
published in this journal, 2 Professor Edson Sunderland traced
two entirely different theories of review, one that grew up and
flourished in actions at law and another that prevailed in equitable actions.
The institution of the jury and its exclusive right to find the
facts resulted in two methods of review in actions at law. Questions of fact were reviewed by attaint.1a Essentially attaint was a
proceeding directed against the original jury (although the original litigants were also parties) in which a second jury with more
members passed upon the same issue. If the attaint jury reached
a finding contrary to that found by the original jury, the original
jury stood convicted of perjury and was punished, often quite
severely. Professor Thayer's research disclosed that
the convicted juryman lost all his movable goods to the king; he
in the year 1924 not a single case from the King's Bench Division was
reversed for error in admitting or excluding evidence. That simple fact
explains why the intricacies of practice no longer annoy the English
lawyer. And it explains the success of the whole judicial establishment.
Procedure has become a practical means to an end. Its rules are no
more exacting than efficiency requires.
See also text accompanying notes 501-53 infra.
52. Sunderland, A Simplified System of Appellate Procedure, 17 TENN. L.
REV. 651 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Appellate Procedure]. The most comprehensive discussions of criminal and civil appeals are L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939); R. POUND, supra note 43. Other writings by Professor
Sunderland discussing the theory of review in legal and equitable actions include Sunderland, The Scope of Judicial Review, 27 MicH. L. REv. 416 (1929)
(hereinafter cited as Judicial Reviewl; Sunderland, supra note 51.
53. J. TIHAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAw 137-59
(1898).
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was imprisoned for a year at least; he lost his lex terrae and
became infamous. . . It came also to be expressed as a part
of the judgment that their wives and children should be turned
out of doors, and their lands laid waste."
Additionally, although according to Professor Sunderland only
incidentally, attaint resulted in a reversal of the previous, false
verdict and its replacement by the verdict of the attaint jury."
Questions of law were decided by the judges and were reviewed by proceedings in error, which were based upon a theory
similar to that of attaint. Proceedings in error were viewed as
new, senicriminal proceedings
directed against the judge . . . based upon a new cause of action
arising out of the wrongful act committed by him in rendering
his false judgment.
The common-law proceeding in error did not operate as a
review of the merits of the judgment. The question never arose
as to whether the judgment was just or unjust, nor did the
proceeding ever involve an inquiry as to what the true judgment
ought to be. The sole question was, did the judge commit an
error? Such error might be great or small; its consequences
might be serious or trifling, but an error was an error and the
judgment must fall."
On the other hand, Professor Sunderland noted that
the judges . . . enjoyed certain privileges which were denied to
the jury. While attainted jurors were both fined and imprisoned,
the judges got off with a fine; and while the jurors had to stand
or fall on the merits of their verdict, the judges could defend
their judgments by means of a duel. But lest this give too great
an advantage to brawny appellants, and encourage too free a
recourse to proceedings in error, penalties were provided for unsuccessful applicants. The Assizes of Jerusalem which were typical of the time, required the party seeking to falsify the judgment to fight the whole court, including the judges and witnesses. Under such conditions losing parties were inclined to let
matters drop, particularly in view of the fact that the county
often kept a doughty champion in its employ to represent the
court in such emergencies."
54. Id. at 151.
55. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 651.
56. Id. at 652.
57. Judicial Review, supra note 52, at 417.
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This view of proceedings in error as an accusation against the
judge prevailed until the reign of Edward I (1272-1307) when for
the first time there arose the idea of a complaint against the
judgment rather than the judge.
The common-law theory of review helps explain many familiar procedures and practices. For example, formal assignments of
error, still in use in Tennessee," developed "because seven
hundred years ago the judge was held to be entitled to know what
were the charges against him . ... -"" Similarly, issues not raised
before the trial judge could not be argued on review because there
was no wrongdoing of which the trial judge could fairly stand
accused," Moreover, no error could be assigned on questions of
fact because the jury determined questions of fact in actions at
law, and any error regarding the facts was thus no fault of the
judge."
The theory of review in equitable actions differed markedly
from the theory of review at law, While actions at law divided
decisionmaking between the jury, which found the facts, and the
judge, who declared the law, in equitable actions the chancellor
decided both law and fact questions.' 2 This unified trial procedure in equity permitted full review of the entire case and enabled
the appellate tribunal not merely to search for errors but to render
whatever judgment ought to have been rendered. 3 Thus, review
58.

See TENN, SuP. CT. R. 14; TENN. CT. APP. R. 12. But see TENN. CODE
§ 40-3409 (1975) (no assignments of error necessary in criminal cases taken
to the supreme court). See generally Note, Appellate Practice-Sufficiency of
Assignments of Error, 12 TENN. L. REv. 293 (1934).
59. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 651-52.
60. Millar, New Allegation and Proof on Appeal in Anglo-American Civil
Procedure,47 Nw. U.L. Rav. 427, 428 (1952); Judicial Review, supra note 52, at
421-22; Sunderland, supra note 51, at 140; Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in
Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. Rav. 477, 490-91 (1959); Note, Raising New
Issues on Appeal, 64 HARV. L. REv. 652, 655 (1951).
61. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 653.
62. Id. at 655.
63. Professor Sunderland observed:
If the upper court had the power to determine the merits of the case,
it became less important to know whether an error had been committed
than to know how it could be rectified. In a proceeding in error the
entire aim of review was to affirm or deny the existence of error; in a
true appeal that problem became merely preliminary to the really basic
ANN.

question of what the right decree should be.
Judicial Review, supra note 52, at 420.
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at law was a search for error while review in equity was concerned
with rendering the correct decree.
Over time these two theories of review influenced one another. Most notably, "the technical concept of a proceeding in
error, which restricted review to the exact points passed upon by
the trial judge, exerted a restraining influence upon the development of the appeal." 8' Thus the equity appeal, unlike the Continental European appeal," did not permit new questions to be
raised on review." At least a partial explanation for this profound
influence of the common-law theory of review lies in the adversary theory of litigation.
B.

The Adversary Theory of Litigation

The adversary theory of litigation includes the principles of
party presentation and party prosecution." These principles describe a process in which the parties initiate litigation and are
responsible for raising the issues, discovering the relevant evidence, and moving the litigation forward. The judge's role, on the
other hand, is limited to deciding only the questions when and
as presented to him by the parties. 8
Many reasons, some historical and others of a more contemporary flavor, have been advanced in justification of the adversary system. It has been said that the adversary system is the
most effective means of ascertaining the truth; 9 that the moral
force and acceptability of judgments is greatest in an adversary
system; 0 and that putting the parties in charge of litigation assures a motive for thorough preparation, 7' prevents the useless
64. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 654.
65. Id. at 653.
66. Id. at 654-55.
67. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2 (2d ed. 1977); Millar,
The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 18 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1923).
68. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 67, § 1.2; Millar, supra note 67;
Rosenberg, The Adversary System in the Year 2000, 1 PROSPECTUS 5, 16 (1968).

69. P. CAMRNGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS
ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 390-91 (2d ed. 1977); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
supra note 67, § 1.2, at 5; E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 3 (1956); Rosenberg, supra note 68, at
15.
70.
71.

JAMES & G.HAZARD, supro note 67, § 1.2, at 5.
Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 16,

F.
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consumption of the time and money of the state in investigating
matters not disputed by the parties, 2 and "spares the court from
the embarrassment of errors or omissions it may make in its investigation or direction of the case."'" On the other hand, undue
emphasis on the adversary quality of litigation subverts "the very
idea of justice . . . [which] is that the party with the better case
on the factual and legal merits deserves to prevail, and ..
ought
to .

These opposing considerations are most graphically at work
when an appellate court perceives a basis for decision that has not
been raised by the parties, a matter discussed more fully in a
subsequent section. 6 It seems somewhat unfair to base a decision
upon a ground that losing counsel has not had an opportunity to
rebut. But to refuse to consider an issue not raised by the parties
"would be to render automatons of judges, forcing them merely
to register their reactions to the arguments of counsel at the trial
level."" Such refusal would seem particularly inappropriate in a
criminal appeal in which court-appointed counsel fails to raise a
matter readily apparent and clearly requiring reversal of defendant's conviction.
It is unrealistic to expect that the interests furthered by the
adversary system and the interest of deciding appeals correctly
under the law can be reconciled in the abstract. The most desirable approach in this and other areas as well is to grant to the
appellate court sufficient discretion until experience makes perceptible guidelines for restraining and shaping the court's exercise of its discretion.
C.

The Role of Judicial Discretion

Any discussion of judicial discretion is likely to conjure up
images of two types of judges. One invariably is capricious and,
worse still, a dullard; the other is impeccably fair and possessed
of rare genius. Too often forgotten is the honest and conscientious
72.

Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVmENCE at 10 (1942).

73, Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 16. See generally P. CARINCTON & B.
BABCOCK, supra note 69, at 389-94.
74. Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 16. See generally Morgan, supra note 72,
at 10-11; Pound, supra note 34, at 404-06.
75. See text accompanying notes 183-214 infra.
76. Rentways, Inc. v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342, 349, 126
N.E.2d 271, 274 (1955).
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judge of reasonable competence who, in the loneliness that envelopes the thoughtful decisionmaker," seeks whatever guidance
is practically available to resolve the perplexing problem facing
him. This personalization of judicial discretion serves as a helpful
reminder that, notwithstanding Law Day speeches to the contrary, this is a nation not of laws alone but of laws and men." "It
goes without saying that the effectiveness in operation of all rules
of procedure. . . depends upon the capacity and character of the
tribunal enforcing and using them."'" Moreover, it becomes
equally apparent upon reflection that laws cannot be written for
the dull or dishonest:
No legislation can endow a judge with intelligence or integrity,
and no legislation can create a procedure which a fool or a crook
cannot pervert to his blundering or sinister purpose. It would,
therefore, be as foolish as it would be futile to frame a code. . .
to be administered by an incompetent or dishonest judge.1
The proposed appellate rules were drafted on the theory, therefore, that they will be administered by honest and reasonably
competent judges. But even honest and competent judges may
not legitimately lay claim to unfettered discretion:
This pattern and ideal of reasonable regularity-in contrast
to "certainty" of outcome or "universality" of rule on the one
hand and to "free discretion" or "arbitrary" choice or patternlessness and the like on the other-this pattern and ideal of
reasonable regularity is marbled through the muscle of a good
deal of law-government in the way fat marbles through a steak
to make and keep it tender. Reasonable regularity is indeed the
77. See Schaefer, Appellate Advocacy, 23 TENN. L. REV. 471, 475-76
(1954):
The judges who are deciding your case, must, each for himself, reach
his conclusion, and he does it in that peculiar atmosphere of loneliness
that surrounds a judge. I don't mean that we don't have friends and I
don't mean that some of us aren't popular, but when he reaches your
case and he has to consider it, and when he measures it against the
pertinent provisions of statute and of constitution, and against all our
heritage of common law and equity decisions and when he reaches his
conclusion, he does it alone.
78. Jones, Political Behavior and the Problem of Sanctions, in W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, AnwINISTmAnVE LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 1031 (6th ed. 1974).
79. Morgan, supra note 72, at 7.
80. Id. at 8.
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principle which comes close to drying up the bubbling flood of

words about rule and discretion, whether in the appellate court
or in any other activity of law-government. The matter comes
to this: no discretion has any business to be truly unique in
exercise.
To be right discretion, to be lawful exercise of discretion
(though there be neither rule nor precedent nor likelihood of
repetition), the action so far as it affects any man or group
adversely must be undertaken with a feeling, explicit or implicit, of willingness, of readiness, to do the like again, if, as, and
when a like case may arise.'
Rules of court seeking to facilitate the "rightful" exercise of discretion require an awareness of the significance of granting discretionary judicial power, the reasons for doing so, and the need for
setting forth guidelines to help shape and restrain its exercise.
In his insightful article on judicial discretion,"2 Professor Rosenberg distinguishes between discretion that is decisionliberating and discretion that is review-limiting. Decisionliberating discretion refers to a freedom of choice that permits the
court to consider the circumstances of the individual case, a freedom that will be circumscribed in greater or lesser degree by
articulated guidelines. Review-limiting discretion, on the other
hand, is concerned with the hierarchical allocation of decisionmaking between trial and appellate courts and describes the intensity of appellate scrutiny of trial court decisions. Oftentimes,
review-limiting discretion "gives the trial judge a right to be
wrong without incurring reversal.'""
The principal reason for granting decision-liberating discretion is to permit
more compassionate and more sensitive responses to differences
which ought to count in applying legal norms, but which get
buried in the gross and rounded-off language of rules that are
directed at wholesale problems instead of particular disputes.
Discretion in this sense allows the individualization of law and
81. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION; DECIDING APPEALs 217
(1960).
82. Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretionof the Trial Court, Viewed from Above,
22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635 (1971).
83. Id. at 637.
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permits justice at times to be handmade instead of massproduced."8
All rules of law necessarily speak in somewhat general terms."
This is so because, flattering as it would be to believe otherwise,
"no draftsman or body of draftsmen, be they ever so wise and ever
so ingenious, could possibly foresee all the new situations and all
the variations of old situations which will be presented in the
future."" Moreover, in order to be workable and manageable,
rules must not be overburdened with qualifications, exceptions,
specifications, and provisos. 7 An overly detailed statement of the
law might well retard healthy growth." Thus general rules are
necessary but must not be blindly followed or else "justice as
individualization"'" is sacrificed. "'Justice as individualization'
is a fact of law's life. One who fails to see the constant interplay,
in practical adjudication, of general rule and concrete case is
missing what may well be the main event.""' Decision-liberating
discretion, therefore, is essential to secure the individualization
that justice requires.
Review-limiting discretion, on the other hand, has been justified by a variety of reasons. These include the need to preserve
scarce judicial resources, the need to maintain trial court morale,
the need to accord to judgments needed finality, the impracticability of formulating a rule, and the unique advantage that the
trial court enjoys of perceiving directly matters that cannot or can
only inadequately be conveyed by the written record,9 Professor
Rosenberg convincingly argues that "[tihe common vice of the
first three reasons-economy, morale uplift, and finality-is their
failure to provide clues as to which trial court rulings are cloaked
with discretionary immunity of some strength, and which are
not."' 2 Only the last two reasons-the impracticability of formu84. Id. at 642. See generally Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It
Justice, 49 CAuF. L. Rtv. 615 (1961).
85. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence,74 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 105152 (1974); Pound, supra note 34, at 398.
86. Morgan, supra note 72, at 12.
87. Id.; Pound, supra note 34, at 398.
88. Morgan, supra note 72, at 12.
89. Jones, supra note 85, at 1051-53.
90. Id. at 1053.
91. Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 660-65.
92. Id. at 662. But see Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the
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lating rules and "the superiority of [the trial court's] nether
position"'"-provide a basis for determining which trial court rulings should be committed to the trial court's discretion and are
therefore appropriate reasons for conferring review-limiting discretion. And if review-limiting discretion is conferred, it becomes
additionally necessary to appreciate the "gradations of discretion, ranging from the toughest, most impenetrable varieties to
types that are too flimsy to ward off any appellate scrutiny that
looks askance at the trial court's ruling.'"'
The reasons for drafting general rules conferring some measure of judicial discretion, however, do not justify ignoring the
lessons of experience; although justice is individualized, the law,
in order to be just, must also be evenhanded. As Professor Davis
has argued"6 and others have demonstrated in the administrative
law context, 7 unrestrained discretion is a threat to the evenhanded administration of justice. Although, as Llewellyn observed," lawful discretion may be exercised without rules, the
absence of rules "makes inconsistent, arbitrary, or capricious decisions possible"" and, less dramatically but no less importantly,
leaves the honest and competent judge without the guidance that
would ensure consideration of those factors typically relevant.
Many of the proposed rules, therefore, explicitly permit the exercise of discretion but seek to restrain and shape that discretion
Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507 (1969); Magruder, The
Trials and Tribulations of an IntermediateAppellate Court, 44 CONELL L.Q. 1
(1958); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L.
REV. 751 (1957).
93. Formulating rules may be impracticable "because of the diffuseness
(if circumstances, novelty, vagueness, or similar reasons that argue for allowing
experience to develop." Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 663.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 650.
96. K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTIcE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).

97.

E.g., Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal DiscretionaryAdjudication

and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1293 (1972); Sofaer, The Change-of-Status

Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
349 (1972); Thomforde, NegotiatingAdministrative Settlements in SEC BrokerDealer Disciplinary Proceedings, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 237 (1977); Thomforde,
Patterns of Disparity in SEC Administrative Sanctioning Practice,42 T-ENN. L.
REv. 465 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Patternsof Disparity]. Professor Davis has
also made a less exacting demonstration. K. DAVIS, POuCE DISCRETION (1975).
98, See text accompanying note 81 supra.
99, Patterns of Disparity, supra note 97, at 466.
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by setting forth helpful guidelines insofar as experience has made
them perceptible.' 0
D.

The Need for Ongoing ProceduralReform

The central role of experience in the law was summed up best
in Holmes' oft-quoted aphorism: "The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience."''
No man or group of men possesses infallible prescience. Only experience will help illuminate
the wisdom or the folly of the proposed rules. Furthermore,
"[uinless revivified, the modern new procedure will soon become
as hard and unyielding as the old systems to which reform was
directed.'112 The need for ongoing procedural reform, therefore,
seems evident. But while the importance of ongoing reform is
seldom denied, mechanisms generally have not been developed to
analyze experience systematically and continuously and to alter
existing law in light of this experience." ' Whatever may be true
generally, however, the mechanism is available in Tennessee, in
the form of a continuing rules commission, to examine the proposed appellate rules critically and continuously with an eye toward their improvement.' 4 Moreover, the work of this commission will be facilitated by proposed appellate rule 46, which permits the Tennessee Supreme Court to amend or make additional
rules governing appellate procedure without the need for securing
repeated legislative approval. 05 A continuing rules commission,
100. E.g., PROPOSED TEm. R. Ap. P. 9(a) (grounds for interlocutory appeal by permission from trial court); id. R. 10(a) (grounds for extraordinary
appeal by permission on original application in the appellate court); id. R. II(a)
(grounds for appeal by permission from intermediate appellate court to supreme
court); id. R. 13(b) (grounds for considering issues not presented for review); id.
R. 14(a) (grounds for considering postjudgment facts in the appellate court); id.
R. 39(a) (grounds for rehearing).
101. 0. HOLMES, supra note 31, at 5.
102. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural
Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 493, 507 (1950).
103. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REV. 113 (1921).
104. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
105. Both the proposed Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
proposed amendments to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, submitted to
the General Assembly in 1976 and 1975 respectively, failed to gain legislative
approval. The criminal rules were finally approved in the 1978 session. Some of
the difficulty in gaining legislative approval might have been avoided if the rules
had been widely circulated for comments, suggestions, and criticisms prior to
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meeting at definite intervals, may well prove to be an indispensable mechanism to ensure just and up-to-date procedural rules for
Tennessee. ' "
While the proposed appellate rules are best viewed as provisional, always open to improvement, it is likely that most of the
rules, if subsequently approved by the legislature, will be the law
for a long time to come. It seems appropriate, therefore, to discuss
the rules-their scope, organization, and content-in some detail
so that they may profit from further informed criticism.
Ill.

SOME NOTEWORTHY FEATURES OF THE RULES

A.

Scope and Organization of the Rules

The rules govern all proceedings from initiation until final
disposition in the Tennessee Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
and Court of Criminal Appeals,' 7 including the rare situation in
which the court of appeals directly reviews administrative proceedings."" The current rules of appellate procedure of those
courts will be replaced by the proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, although the intermediate appellate courts are
authorized to make and amend rules governing their practice as
long as such rules are not inconsistent with the proposed rules.'"0
Moreover, most of the provisions of the Tennessee Code dealing
with appellate practice and procedure will be repealed or
amended. Finally, the current version of Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 62 on stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment will be
replaced by a new rule 62 and an additional rule 65A on the form
of security and proceedings against sureties.
The rules are organized under eleven titles, which need not
their submission to the General Assembly. The rulemaking power of the United
States Supreme Court has also suffered, at least in part, from its failure to
permit an opportunity for public comment. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power
of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 677-85
(1975). For a discussion of another cause of the unwillingness of Congress to
approve rules submitted by the Supreme Court, see McGowan, Congress and
the Courts, 62 A.B.A.J. 1588 (1976). See generally J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF
COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977).
106. Clark, supra note 102, at 507-08.
107. PROPOSED TFNN. R. App. P. 1.
108. Id. R. 12; see Norman v. State Bd. of Claims, 533 S.W.2d 719 (Tenn.
1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-147 (Supp. 1977).
109. PROPOSED TENN. R. A P. 45.
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be described, and are arranged essentially in a chronological fashion so that, for the most part, proceeding consecutively through
the rules provides a step-by-step description of the evolution of
the appellate process. In this respect, as well as in others, the
proposed rules differ significantly from the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, although some rules are modeled after the federal rules. The federal rules are an obviously appropriate source
of guidance since they are the product of extensive study and
careful review." ' Moreover, to the extent the proposed Tennessee
Rules of Appellate Procedure track the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, it is necessary to learn only one body of law, not two,
and to this extent the proposed rules serve the convenience of
practitioners. But it is incorrect to assume that the proposed rules
are identical to the federal rules. A number of considerations
explain this divergence. In the first place, the needs of state
courts differ from the needs of the intermediate federal courts of
appeals. For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court, as a court
of last resort, needs guidelines to shape the exercise of its discretionary review of the final decisions of the court of appeals and
court of criminal appeals."' Second, the prior practice within a
state and the availability, selection, and qualifications of supporting personnel-court reporters, court clerks, and the
like-also create unique demands."2 Third, many of the federal
rules are simply susceptible to improvement, and other approaches to some problems appear to be preferable. Finally, some
areas of fundamental significance, including the appropriate
scope of appellate review, are not treated by the federal rules, yet
they seem appropriate topics of rulemaking.
In urging a simplified appellate procedure, Professor Sunderland identified three fundamental problem areas: the method
and scope of review, the contents of the record on appeal, and the
organization and jurisdiction of the reviewing tribunal." 3 Of these
areas, only the organization and allocation of subject-matter ju110. Ward, The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 28 FED. B.J. 100,
101 (1968).
111. See PROPOSED TENN. R. App. P. 11(a).
112. For example, in drafting rules concerning the record, it was necessary
to adjust for the fact that in civil actions there are no official court reporters in
Tennessee. For the situation in criminal actions, see TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 402029 to 2043 (1975).

113. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52.
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risdiction among the appellate courts" 4 are not covered by the
proposed rules. The rules do establish guidelines, however, for the
exercise of the supreme court's discretionary review of final deci114. The allocation of subject-matter jurisdiction between the supreme
court and court of appeals is a hodgepodge. For cases directly appealable from
the trial court to the supreme court, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-2723 (1973)
(removal of public officers); id. § 14-1412 (licensing decisions of the Department
of Public Welfare); id, § 16-408 (Supp. 1977) (constitutionality of a statute or
city ordinance the sole determinative question, right to hold public office, workmen's compensation, state revenue, mandamus, in the nature of quo warranto,
ouster, habeas corpus where realtor being held under a criminal accusation or
rendition warrant issued by the governor); id. § 29-311 (1955) (disciplinary
actions involving attorneys); id. § 39-3019 (1975) (injunctions in obscenity actions); id. § 49-1417 (1977) (teacher tenure); id. § 50-1018 (workmen's compensation); id. § 50-1325 (unemployment compensation); id. § 52-931 (licensing
decisions of the Department of Agriculture); id. § 52-1405 (confiscation of drugs
ordered by the Commissioner of Safety); id. § 52-1508 (seizure or condemnation
of vending machines and commissaries by the Commissioner of the Department
of Agriculture); id. § 53-3417 (decisions of the Pollution Control Board and
Commissioner of Public Health); id. § 53-4313 (decisions concerning solid waste
disposal); id. § 57-209 (Supp. 1977) (decisions by beer boards); id. § 58-1908
(final determinations under Mineral Test Hole Regulatory Act by the regulatory
board); id. § 65-230 (decisions of Public Service Commission); id. § 67-3123
(seizure or confiscation of contraband goods under Tobacco Tax Law by Commissioner of Revenue); id. § 70-333 (decisions under the Water Quality Control
Act of 1971 by Water Quality Control Board); id. § 70-2524 (1976) (decision
under the Safe Dams Act of 1973 by the Commissioner of Conservation). Some
of these provisions will be affected, to an extent not yet fully known, by the
Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, id. § 4-507 to 527 (Supp. 1977), and
the recent amendment to that Act directing that appellate review be to the court
of appeals, not the supreme court. Id. § 4-524. See generally Symposium, The
Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, 6 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 143
(1976). Review by the supreme court of cases finally determined on demurrer
or other method not involving review or determination of facts or on stipulation
was recently abrogated. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-408 (Supp. 1977).
Appeals in criminal actions present little problem since all first appeals are
to the court of criminal appeals except for "any case wherein the sole and single
question for determination involves the constitutionality of a state statute or
municipal ordinance." Id. § 16-448. It would seem desirable to follow this same
pattern for civil appeals. See Harbison, supra note 33, at 295. If, on the other
hand, more types of cases are appealed directly to the supreme court, "some
consideration should be given in the future to having only a single appellate
court, with sufficient staff and membership to handle all types of cases." Id. at
296. See also Sunderland, The Problem of Double Appeals, 17 J. AM. JUD. Soc'v
116 (1933). For a comprehensive discussion of the court structure in Tennessee,
see Le Clercq, The Tennessee Court System, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. Rtv. 155 (1978).
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sions of the intermediate appellate courts" ' and provide for the
transfer of cases appealed to the wrong court." ' In addition to the
areas identified by Professor Sunderland, other areas of significant concern include the timing of appellate review, the parties
entitled to appeal in criminal actions, the effect of an appeal on
the enforceability of a judgment, the effect of error, and opinion
writing and publication.
B.

Method of Review of Final Trial Court Judgments

The proposed rules greatly simplify existing practice by establishing one method of empowering the appellate court to review a final judgment of a trial court from which an appeal lies
to the supreme or intermediate appellate courts." The only steps
required of an appellant are filing and serving a notice of appeal'
within thirty days after the date of entry of judgment."' Failure
of the appellant to take any other step does not affect the validity
of the appeal but provides a basis for whatever action the appellate court deems appropriate, "which may include dismissal of
the appeal."'2' Even noncompliance with the service requirement
is not necessarily fatal, since under rule 2 the appellate court may
suspend the requirements of any rule for good cause. On the other
hand, nothing in the rules permits the extension of time for filing
notice of appeal beyond the thirty-day period,' although under
PROPOSED TENN. R.APP. P. 11(a).
116. Id. R. 17.
117, Id. R. 3(d).
118. Id. R. 3(e).
119. Id. R. 4(a).
120. Id. R. 3(e).
121. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure currently permit the district court to extend the time for filing the notice of appeal up to 30 days upon
a showing of excusable neglect. FED. R. APP. P. 4; see 9 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACnCE 204.13 (1975); 16 C. WGrHT, A. MILLER, F. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN,
FEDERAL PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 3950, at 365-67 (1977); Comment, Ad Hoc
Relief from Untimely Appeals, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 97 (1965); Annot., 26 A.L.R.
FED. 569 (1976). See also ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.13(a)(3) (1977) [hereinafter cited as APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS] (late appeal appropriate
"upon a showing that extraordinary circumstances prevented and on such terms
may be just [sic], taking the appeal on time, except where permitting the late
appeal would unfairly disturb another party's reliance on the finality of the
judgment"). A proposed revision of federal appellate rule 4 would permit an
115.
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certain circumstances an otherwise untimely appeal may be
taken by first securing relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02,122 and certain specified, timely post-trial motions in
the trial court terminate the time for filing notice of appeal. ' The
extension for good cause if a motion to extend is made within 30 days after entry
of judgment, and thereafter (but within 30 days after expiration of the time
otherwise specified) an extension requires a showing of excusable neglect. The
proposed revision sets forth other limitations not relevant here. See COMMITTEE
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES,

PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF

APPELLATE

PROCEDURE

(1977)

[hereinafter cited as

PROPOSED FEDERAL

AMENDMENTS].

The Tennessee Advisory Commission rejected a provision similar to current
federal rule 4. The Advisory Commission thought a late appeal would be appropriate only if the appellant did not know when a judgment had been entered.
This problem arises, particularly in nonjury actions, because under TENN. R.
Civ. P. 58.02, a judgment signed by the judge is considered entered for purposes
of an appeal when it is filed with the clerk. No notice of the filing need be given.
On the other hand, the federal rules require that every judgment be set forth
on a separate document and is effective only when entered in the civil docket.
FED. R. Civ. P. 58; see 6A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTiCE
58.03 (1974); 11 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRActrCE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2785 (1973). Moreo-

ver, the clerk is required to serve notice immediately upon entry of a judgment,
although lack of notice of entry does not affect the time for appeal or authorize
relief for failure to appeal within the time allowed except as provided in appellate rule 4. FED. R. Cirv. P. 77; see 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 77.05 (1975);
12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3084 (1973). The
Commission concluded, however, that the 30-day extension permitted by federal
appellate rule 4 was not an adequate remedy, since entry of the judgment may
first be discovered after that time. Besides, TENN. R. Civ. P. 60.02 is available
to provide needed relief in such circumstances. See Jerkins v. McKinney, 533
S.W.2d 275 (Tenn. 1976). It should also be noted that the premature filing of a
notice of appeal does not generally affect the validity of the appeal. PROPOSED
TENN. R. App. P. 4(d). See also Grundy County v. Dyer, 546 S.W.2d 577, 579
(Tenn. 1977). Moreover, in order to guard against relief from an otherwise late
appeal, proposed rule 4(a) permits any party to serve notice of entry of an
appealable judgment. See Fed, R. Civ. P. 77 & Advisory Comm. Note, 5 F.R.D.
491-92 (1946).
122. See Jerkins v. McKinney, 533 S.W.2d 275 (Tenn. 1976).
123.

PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 4(b) provides in part:

In a civil action if a timely motion under the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party: (1) under rule 50.02
for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict; (2)
under rule 52,02 to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether
or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is
granted; (3) under rule 59.03 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4)
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proposed rules expressly abolish the three present methods of
review of final judgments-review by simple appeal, writ of error,
and appeal in the nature of a writ of error.' While the writ of
error does serve a salutary purpose under existing practice,125 the
need for such a mechanism should be substantially eliminated by
the simplicity of taking an appeal merely by filing and serving
notice of appeal. Moreover, the availability of the writ of error for
up to two years after judgment 2 robs judgments, at least in civil
actions, of some of their needed finality' and may well prompt
needless appellate review undertaken for the purpose of thwarting
later recourse to the writ of error.2 Also abolished are the prayer
for an appeal and the requirement that the prayer be granted;'
the filing of a notice of appeal better serves the purpose of providing a record of the intent to appeal.'13
The rules additionally eliminate any requirement of moving
for a new trial as a prerequisite to review in jury cases. 3 ' Ideally,
new trial motions serve the laudable purpose of reducing the
number of appeals by affording the trial court an opportunity to
under rule 59.01 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall
run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or
denying any other such motion.
Similarly, PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 4(c) provides:
In a criminal action if a timely motion or petition under the Tennessee
Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by the defendant:
(1) under rule 33(a) for a new trial, (2) under rule 34 for arrest of
judgment, or (3) under rule 32(f)(1) for a suspended sentence, the time
for appeal for all parties shall run from entry of the order denying a new
trial or granting or denying any other such motion or petition.
124. Id. R. 3(d).
125. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
126. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-605 (1955).
127. See Phillips, Civil Procedureand Evidence-Tennessee Survey 1970,
38 TENN. L. REv. 127, 180-81 (1971). In civil actions review by writ of error is
limited to the technical record unless the bill of exceptions is filed within the
time specified in TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-111 (Supp. 1977). Tucker v. Hundley,
61 Tenn. App. 1, 452 S.W.2d 658 (1970), noted in 38 TEN'N. L. Rav. 109 (1970).
In criminal actions the appellate court, upon a showing of good cause, may
permit the bill of exceptions to be filed at any time. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-111
(Supp. 1977).
128. Appellate review is most likely to be sought if all parties desire a
definitive judicial resolution of the litigated matter.
129.

PaoPosEn

130.
131.

Wicker, supra note 36, at 674.
PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 3(e).

TENN.

R. APP. P. 3(e).
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correct any harmful error. It can also be argued that fairness
requires providing the trial court a final opportunity to correct its
errors. Realistically, however, new trial motions are seldom
granted and typically only increase the cost and delay final disposition of litigation.'"
New trial motions are not abolished. The parties are afforded
the option of either moving for a new trial or taking an immediate
appeal. The trial court's power to grant a new trial on its own
initiative under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 is also
unaffected. New trial motions will continue to serve unique purposes. In actions turning on the sufficiency of the evidence, a new
trial motion affords a distinct advantage since the scope of review
by the trial court of a jury verdict is broader than that of the
appellate court reviewing the same case.

'

Moreover, in some

circumstances a new trial motion will be a mechanism for gaining
appellate review. For example, if there is jury misconduct, a new
trial motion permits evidence of the misconduct to be included
in the record. Without such evidence there can be no appellate
review because the appellate court, with rare exception, is limited
in its review to those facts set forth in the record.'34 In this type
of situation, then, the new trial motion serves as the means by
which the evidence necessary for appellate review is included in
the record. The mere making of the motion itself, on the other
hand, does not broaden or limit the scope of appellate review. In
the language of proposed rule 3(c), "[tlhe scope of appellate
review of questions of law and fact shall not be limited by making
or failing to make a motion for a new trial."
132.
VOLUME

D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF
143-46 (1974); D. MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPEALS: ENGLISH PRACnCES ANT)

AMERICAN REFORMS 85-86 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL APPEALS];
Wicker, supra note 36, at 674.
133. The trial judge, acting as the thirteenth juror, may set aside a verdict
with which he disagrees; no such extensive power to set aside a jury's verdict
resides in the appellate court. See, e.g., Dykes v. Meighan Constr. Co., 205
Tenn. 175,326 S.W.2d 135 (1959); Note, Procedure-TheTrial Judge's Function
as Thirteenth Juror, 23 TENN. L. REv. 328 (1954). See also D. MEADOR, supra
note 132, at 143-44. The trial court may also possess a greater latitude to grant
additur, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1330 (Supp. 1977), or remittitur. See id. §§
27-118 to 119 (1955).
134.

25 infra.

PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 13(c); see text accompanying notes 215-
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C.

Scope of Review

The term "scope of review" is typically used indiscriminately
to describe a number of distinguishable concepts. While proposed
rule 13 retains the term in its caption, it distinguishes (1) the
questions of law that may be urged on appeal, (2) consideration
of issues not presented for review, (3) facts that may be considered on appeal, (4) findings of fact in civil actions, and (5) findings of guilt in criminal actions. In addition, other rules eliminate
the review-limiting effect of the technical requirements of existing law. For example, by requiring only filing and service of notice
of appeal to empower the appellate court to review a final judgment," ' the rules eliminate the review-limiting effect of the failure to make a motion for a new trial"' or the late filing of the bill
of exceptions. 37 The abolition of assignments of error in rule 3(h)
may permit review currently denied by an overly exacting demand for specificity.'s Finally, proposed rule 36 on relief and the
effect of error treats the distinguishable question of the appropriate standard for identifying error as harmless or prejudicial' 3 and
the related concepts of waived, invited, and cured error."10 The
following discussion will focus on the scope of review as defined
by proposed rule 13.
1.

Questions of Law that May Be Urged on Appeal

Rule 13(a) provides: "Any question of law may be brought
up for review and relief by any party. Cross-appeals, separate
appeals, and separate applications for permission to appeal are
not required." Three aspects of this rule are particularly noteworthy.
First, the rule provides only that any question of law may be
brought up for review and relief, not that the appellate court must
pass upon every question or that it must grant relief. The pro135. See text accompanying notes 117-23 supra.
136. TENN. SuP. CT. R. 14(5); TENN. CT. APP. R. 12(5).
137. See note 127 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 493-95 infra.
139. PROPSED TENN. R. App. P. 36(a) provides in part: "Nothing in this
rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for
an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to
prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error."
140.

See text accompanying note 141 infra.
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priety of granting relief is governed by rule 36, which does not
require that "relief be granted to a party responsible for an error
or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to
prevent or nullify the harmful effect of error."'' In addition, in
determining whether relief is appropriate, the appellate court
with rare exception is limited to those facts established by the
evidence in the trial court and set forth in the record, as well as
those facts that may be judicially noticed."2 Not every question
of law, therefore, will justify consideration or relief by the appellate court. In both of these respects the rules simply codify existing practice and procedure.4 3
The second noteworthy feature of rule 13(a) is its rejection
of the use of the notice of appeal as a review-limiting device. In
the federal system the notice of appeal has served to limit the
questions of law that may be urged on appeal in two principal
ways. First, under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure the
notice of appeal must specify "the judgment, order or part thereof
appealed from,"'" This requirement, designed to simplify appeals by making the notice of appeal the only jurisdictional step
to a valid appeal, has on occasion been interpreted as limiting the
questions an appellant may urge on review to those affecting the
judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from."' Foman v.
Davis'" is a striking and somewhat bizarre illustration. In that
case, in an action to enforce an oral contract not to make a will,
the district court entered judgment on December 19, 1960, dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the oral agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. On December 20, plaintiff filed motions to vacate the judgment and to
amend the complaint in order to assert a quantum meruit theory.
Notice of appeal from the judgment of December 19 was filed on
141. See generally Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved (pts. 1-3), 7 Wis. L. REv.
91, 160 (1932), 8 Wis. L. Rav. 147 (1933). In all other circumstances, the rule
provides that a party should be granted the relief to which he is entitled.
PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 36(a). But see text accompanying notes 183-214
infra.
142. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 13(c).
143. See, e.g., TENN. SuP. CT. R. 14(4); TE.NN. CT. APP. R. 12(5).
144. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c).
145.

9 Mooms's FEDERAL PRACTCE

146.

371 U.S. 178 (1962), rev'g, 292 F.2d 85 (1st Cir, 1961).

203.18 (1975).
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January 17, 1961. Thereafter, on January 23, the district court
denied plaintiff's motions of December 20, and on January 26
plaintiff filed notice of appeal from denial of the motions. On its
own motion, the First Circuit dismissed the appeal insofar as
taken from the December 19 judgment. "7 The court of appeals
reasoned that the motion to vacate should be treated as a motion
to alter or amend a judgment filed pursuant to rule 59(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.148 Since a motion under rule 59
suspends the time for filing notice of appeal,' the court concluded that the notice of December 20 was premature and ineffective.' In addition, the notice of appeal of January 26 was ineffective to permit review of the judgment of December 19 because the
notice did not specify it was being taken from that judgment as
well as the later orders denying the motions.' Thus plaintiff's
appeal of the December 19 judgment was dismissed even though
plaintiff's intention to appeal was patent and defendant suffered
no prejudice from plaintiff's "inept"' 52 attempt to appeal. The
highly technical decision of the court of appeals was ultimately
reversed by the United States Supreme Court.'
The second way in which the notice of appeal has operated
as a review-limiting device in the federal system is by limiting the
right of the appellee, in the absence of his own notice of appeal,
to urge error in the judgment.' 4 The rule in federal practice concerning cross-appeals,'" as set forth in the classic case of United
States v. American Railway Express Co.,' is that
147. 292 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1961).
148. Id. at 87.
149. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).
150. 292 F.2d at 87.
151, Id.
152. This characterization of plaintiff's effort is that of Justice Goldberg.
371 U.S. at 181.
153. Id. at 182.
154. See 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 204.11[2]-[5] (1975); 15 C.
WRoIrr, A. MILE, & F. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3904
(1976); Stern, When to Cross-Appeal or Cross-Petition- Certainty or
Confusion?, 87 HARv. L. Rnv. 763 (1974); Note, FederalJurisdictionand Procedure-Review of Errors at the Instance of a Non-Appealing Party, 51 HAR. L.
REV.

1058 (1938).

155.
MILLER,

156.

204.11[21 (1975); 15 C. WIGHT, A.
9 MooiE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE § 3904 (1976).

& F.

265 U.S. 425 (1924).
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a party who does not appeal from a final decree of the trial court
cannot be heard in opposition thereto when the case is brought
here by the appeal of the adverse party. In other words, the
appellee may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his
adversary, whether what he seeks is to correct an error or to
supplement the decree with respect to a matter not dealt with
below."I

As a corollary, an appellee need not appeal in order to "urge in
support of a decree any matter appearing in the record, although
his argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the
lower court or an insistence upon matter overlooked or ignored by
it.""'" The rule that a party may not attack a judgment without
himself appealing is not limited to the cross-appeal context and
"may operate to prevent an appellee from attacking so much of
the judgment as is favorable to a party who has taken no appeal,
or to prevent a party not involved in the appeal from benefiting
from its result."'5 0 The term "separate appeal" is typically used
in reference to an appeal that is "neither the first appeal nor a
cross-appeal."' , 0

The proposed Tennessee rules reject both of the reviewlimiting aspects of the notice of appeal that have arisen in the
federal system. It is important to keep in mind the extremely
limited information conveyed by the notice of appeal. Under proposed rule 3(f), which differs somewhat from its federal counterpart, " ' the notice of appeal needs to specify only the party taking
157. Id. at 435.
158. Id.; see Langnes v. Green, 282 US. 531, 535-39 (1931). A distinguished commentator has expressed concern that three more recent decisions of
the Supreme Court, Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 437 (1973); Brennan
v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512, 816, 521 (1973); and NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 52 & n.4 (1972), threaten the well-established
principles set forth in the text. Stern, supra note 154. However, the Supreme
Court even more recently has reaffirmed the rule set forth in American Railway
Express. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479 (1976) (per
curiam). See generally 9 Mooat's FEDERAL PRACTICE
204.11(31 (1975); C.
WRIGHT, TnH LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 523 (3d ed. 1976); 15 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER, & F. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCDURE § 3904 (1976).
159. 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 204.11[2], at 931 (1975).
160. Id.; see 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILaER, F. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, FED-

ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCwURE § 3950, at 367 n.17 (1977).
161. See note 165 infra.
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the appeal, the judgment from which relief is sought, and the
court to which the appeal is taken.' 2 Neither the issues presented
for review nor the arguments in support of the issues are set forth
in the notice of appeal. These matters need not be set forth until
the later brief-writing stage."3 The principal value of the notice
of appeal is simply to declare in a formal way an intent to appeal;
and as long as that intent is clear, no purpose is served by rigidly
limiting the questions an appellant may urge, as the First Circuit
did in Foman.'" The limited purpose envisioned for the notice of
appeal is reflected in a sentence added to rule 3(f) after the proposed rules were initially published for public criticism: "An appeal shall not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the
notice of appeal." Moreover, the unrestricted right to bring up
any question of law under rule 13(a), combined with the simple
and single directive that the notice of appeal designate the judgment from which relief is sought, should militate against the
narrow review that has resulted in the federal system in situations
in which only a part of the proceedings below is designated in the
notice of appeal." ' The limited purpose served by the notice of
appeal also suggests that failure to serve a copy of the notice of
appeal as required by rule 5 should be inexcusable only if some
prejudice beyond the mere absence of notice of the appeal is
suffered thereby.'
Cross-appeals or separate appeals are also unnecessary to
obtain review and relief. As one student commentator acutely
observed, "[Ilt is not unreasonable that the appellee, without
the necessity of also appealing, should be able to enlarge his
rights, when forced into the appellate court."" 7 Federal"' as well
as state"9 experience has demonstrated the difficulty of formulat162. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 3(f).
163. Id. R. 27.
164. See 9 MoORE's FEDERAL PRAcrcE 203.18, at 754-55 (1975).
165. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) requires designation of the "judgment, order or
part thereof appealed from."
166. Cf. APPELATE COURT STANDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.13(a)(2) (upon
good cause, late appeal permitted unless unfair result would obtain because of
reliance on finality of judgment).
167. Note, supra note 154, at 1067.
204.11[31-[5) (1975); Stern,
168. See 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
supra note 154; Note, supra note 154.
169. See Note, Cross-Appealsin Maine: Pitfalls for the Winning Litigant,
25 ME. L. R.v. 105 (1973).
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ing and applying a test concerning the situations in which an
appellee must appeal or cross-appeal. The functional problem of
including in the record those matters relevant to the issues that
appellee seeks to urge on appeal' can be handled by permitting
the appellee, as does proposed rule 24, to designate any parts he
deems necessary for inclusion in the record.' In any event, the
record in many cases will be sufficient without any designation
of additional parts by the appellee.' The significant effect of
eliminating the requirement that an appellee must file his own
notice of appeal, therefore, is to permit the appellate court to
consider the case as a whole once the appellant takes his appeal.
The remaining problem faced in Foman-that of premature
filing of a notice of appeal-is treated in subdivisions (b) and (d)
of rule 4, both of which were extensively amended after initial
publication of the rules. The general rule established by rule 4(d)
is that the right to an appeal is not lost by filing notice of appeal
prior to formal entry of the judgment.2 " In the language of the
rule, "a notice of appeal filed before the entry of the judgment
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof."
Rule 4(b) carves out an important exception to this general rule
for civil actions. If a post-trial motion specified in subdivision (b)
is timely filed after filing of notice of appeal, a new notice of
appeal must be filed after the court has disposed of the motion.
An appeal cannot be sustained on the notice filed prior to the
filing of one of the specified post-trial motions.'
The final noteworthy feature of rule 13(a) is that the scope
of review of questions of law is the same for all appeals, including
those in which the supreme court exercises its discretionary power
170. See generally Comment, Appeal and Error: Review of Errors at the
Instance of a Party Who Has Not Appealed, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 70, 77 (1932).
171. See text accompanying notes 472-75 infra.
172. Comment, supra note 170, at 77.
173. For a discussion explaining the circumstances in which a notice of
appeal may be filed prematurely, see note 121 supra. Prior to revision, the only
rule dealing with premature filing of notice of appeal simply provided that "the
premature filing of notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal if
no prejudice results."
174. This resolution of the problem is based on the proposed amendments
of April 1977 to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. PROPOSED FEDERAL
AMENDMENTS,

204.14 (1975).

supra note 121. See generally 9 MooRE's FEDEAL PRACTICE
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to review the final decision of an intermediate appellate court1 "
and in which an appellate court exercises its discretionary power
to permit interlocutory review.' This result is accomplished by
the language in rule 13(a) that does not require the other parties
to file separate applications for permission to appeal requesting
the appellate court to exercise its discretionary power to permit
an appeal. The principal utility of a separate application for permission to appeal is simply that it furnishes the appellate court
with additional reasons to hear the case. Permitting the appellate
court to consider the case as a whole is as desirable in the context
of an interlocutory appeal or an appeal from a final decision of
an intermediate appellate court as it is in the context of an appeal
from a final trial court judgment.'77 One conceivable disadvantage of this approach with regard to interlocutory review is that
interlocutory appeals might increase. 78' Typically, interlocutory
review is sought of a particular ruling by the trial court. Review
seems clearly appropriate with regard to all issues material to the
ruling.'7 ' If all other rulings are open to review, however, litigants
have an incentive to fashion an appealable ruling in order to gain
review of otherwise nonappealable rulings, and therefore the
number of interlocutory appeals may increase."' Another conceivable disadvantage might arise in the context of supreme court
175. See PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 11. The Supreme Court follows a
different practice when exercising its discretionary power to grant certiorari
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254-1258 (1970). Supreme Court Rule 23(1)(c) requires that
a petition for certiorari set forth the questions presented for review and provides
that "Ithe statement of a question presented will be deemed to include every
subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. Only the questions set forth in the
petition or fairly comprised therein will be considered by the court." But see,
e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 318(a):
In all appeals, by whatever method, from the Appellate Court to the
Supreme Court, any appellee, respondent, or co-party may seek and
obtain any relief warranted by the record on appeal without having
filed a separate petition for leave to appeal or notice of cross appeal or
separate appeal.
176. PROPOSED TEN. R. APP. P. 9-10.
177. But see Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516, 543
(Tenn. 1977) (Harbison, J., dissenting); Tennessee Dep't of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation v. Hughes, 531 S.W.2d 299, 300-01 (Tenn. 1975).
178. See generally Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts
Under 28 U.S.C. I 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REv. 607, 628-29 (1975).
179.

Id. at 629.

180. Id.
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review of final decisions of the intermediate appellate courts.
Proposed rule 11, which sets forth the guidelines for exercise of
the supreme court's discretionary review, recognizes that the supreme court's function is not to correct errors of the intermediate
appellate court but to decide important questions of law or of
public interest, as well as to secure uniformity of decision.' 8' In
view of these purposes, it is arguable that the supreme court
should not be encumbered with questions of interest only to the
parties. Both of these conceivable disadvantages, however, pale
in the light of the appellate court's power to refuse to pass upon
issues presented for review. But the existence of this discretionary
power does not, mean the appellate court should refuse to consider
issues not presented in an application for permission to appeal
when it is desirable to do so. For example, if on interlocutory
review the appellate court readily perceives an error that may
require reversal upon an appeal from the final judgment, then
consideration of that issue would have the desirable effect of preventing needless litigation. Similarly, questions that might not be
sufficient standing alone to prompt supreme court review of a
final decision of the intermediate appellate court might nonetheless be significant or related to a question deserving of review.182
In this situation as well, the desirability of preventing needless
litigation might impel the supreme court to review issues that
would require later reversal even though those issues might not
otherwise merit review.
2.

Consideration of Issues Not Presented for Review

Far more controversial than extending review to issues in the
absence of a cross-appeal, separate appeal, or separate application for permission to appeal is extending review to issues not
presented for review. ' 3 Any discussion of this question must begin
181.

PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. l(a). See also Stern, supra note 154, at

777-80.
182. See also Stern, supra note 154, at 778-79.
183. See generally APPELLATE COURT STNDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.11;
Tate, Sua Sponte Considerationon Appeal, 9 TIAL JUDGES J. 68 (1970); Vestal,
supra note 60. Professor Vestal helpfully distinguishes among the facts, legal
issues, and bases of decision. With rare exception, the appellate court is limited
in its review to the facts set forth in the record. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 13(c);
see text accompanying notes 215-25 infra. On the other hand, Professor Vestal
noted:
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with an appreciation of the fact that appellate courts do consider
matters not presented for review by the parties. 4 Karl Llewellyn
has observed that "an appellate court in quest of justice can do
(and often has done) more reformulating of ill-drawn issues than
is generally realized by lawyers . . . .Nevertheless, such action,
on the large scale . . . is both relatively rare and a function of
peculiarly sharp pressure from felt need."'8 5 Many times such
reformulation is not apparent because the appellate court makes
no mention of it.' 6 There is little reason to doubt, however, that
at least on occasion appellate courts, including those in Tennessee, will go beyond the issues presented for review.
The reluctance of appellate courts to consider unargued issues is based on a number of reasons, many of them wellfounded."s7 One very practical reason is the "compulsion of inertia
from the pressure of work and from the effort needed to redo a
In an analysis of the authorities, precedents, and bases of decisions, the judges of the appellate courts generally feel that they have
the right to go beyond the materials presented by counsel. Although
counsel will present cases and other materials in briefs and oral arguments, the court may go beyond these authorities and in independent
examination reach a conclusion concerning the legal issue posed. . ..
The courts have always felt free to reach a decision concerning a given
legal issue on any grounds available. The judge writing the opinion will
consider the briefs, his own fund of information concerning the area of
law involved, the precedents discoverable in the library, what his research assistant can uncover, and other materials called to his attention. Without a doubt, there is a feeling of absolute freedom concerning
sources from which the just answer to legal problems is to be ascertained.
A third fact, which arises in point of time before the consideration
of legal authorities, is that of determining what legal questions or issues
are posed by the case submitted by the court. Here, there is not the
rigid, almost complete acceptance of the articulation of the attorney as
in the case of the factual environment. Neither is there the complete
freedom as in the case of examination of decisional materials.
Vestal, supra note 60, at 479-81. Proposed rule 13(b) is concerned only with
issues not presented fo'ireview; it is not a limitation on the legal authorities that
may be considered or the bases upon which the appellate court may decide the
issues presented for review.
184. Tate, supra note 183; Vestal, supra note 60.
185. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 81, at 29. Justice Traynor has endorsed
Liewellyn's observation. See Traynor, supra note 31, at 159.
186. Vestal, supra note 60, at 497-98.
187. But see Tate, supra note 183.
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job from the ground up.""' Even the most hard-working appellate
judge with a crowded docket simply must make "'some concessions . . . to the shortness of human life.' "I" Another reason is
tied to the adversary theory of litigation in which the court is
viewed as a passive instrumentality simply responding to the
issues when, as, and if presented by the parties.' Yet a third
reason is related to the idea that the purpose of appellate review
is the correction of errors."' An issue an appellate court wishes to
consider on its own motion typically will not have been presented
for consideration at the trial level.19 2
If the appellate court is viewed solely as a court for the correction of errors, it is powerless when faced with an error not called
to the attention of the lower court. Since the lower court has not
been given an opportunity to consider the matter and rectify it,
the lower court has not erred, and it follows the appellate court
cannot act." 3
This attitude is buttressed by a notion of deference to the trial
court;' such deference, however, "is meaningful only when the
sua sponte consideration would result in a reversal. Deference
does not foreclose sua sponte consideration to affirm a decision
previously reached.""' 5 The notion of deference also has a functional aspect in that the appellate court loses whatever benefit
might be gained by the lower court's opinion on the new issue.'"
188. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 81, at 29; see Campbell, Extent to Which
Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved
(pt. 3), 8 Wis. L. REV. 147, 163 (1933); Vestal, supra note 60, at 494-95.
189. Morgan, supra note 72, at 3. The source of the quotation is not indicated and has not been discovered.
190. Vestal, supra note 60, at 487-90; see text accompanying notes 67-76
supra.
191. APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.11, at 20-21; see text
accompanying notes 52-66 supra.
192. Vestal, supra note 60, at 490.
193. Id. at 491; see Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will
Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved,4pt. 1), 7 Wis. L. REV.
91, 93 (1932); Note, supra note 60, at 654. See also Pound, Appeal and
Error-New Evidence in the Appellate Court, 56 HAzv. L. REV. 1313, 1317-18
(1943); Note, New Evidence on Appeal, 18 TENN. L. REv. 285, 286 (1944)
[hereinafter cited as New Evidence].
194. Vestal, supra note 60, at 491-92.
195. Id. See also Pound, supra note 193, at 1318.
196. Note, supra note 60, at 655.
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This consideration, however, "possesses less strength if, in practice, written lower court opinions are not available," ' 7 as is often
the case in Tennessee.)" An appellate court will be reluctant to
consider issues on its own motion for the further reason that, if
the issue has not been raised below, notions of waiver generally
counsel against affording relief to a party who, in the language of
proposed rule 36, "failed to take whatever action was reasonably
available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error."
Finally, and perhaps most convincingly, "especially in jurisdictions not addicted to rehearings, the bench is likely to share the
feeling of the bar that there is something unfair in putting a
decision on a ground which losing counsel has had no opportunity
to meet."'' 5 Somewhat understandably, this feeling is less intense
in criminal appeals in which defendant is represented by courtappointed counsel."'
Sometimes added to this list of reasons is the argument that
consideration of new issues on appeal amounts to the exercise of
original jurisdiction and is beyond the power of courts like the
197. Id.
198. TENN. R. Crv. P. 52.01 requires only findings of fact and conclusions
of law, not an opinion. Findings and conclusions, however, may be incorporated
in an opinion. Moreover, findings and conclusions are necessary only if requested by a party prior to entry of judgment; and even if conclusions are set
forth, they may be largely uninformative.
199. K. LLEwmLYN, supra note 81, at 29.
200. Vestal, supra note 60, at 506. Professor Rosenberg has observed (with
an unmistakable affinity for the humorous):
One recent development

. . .

impresses me as likely to encourage still

more judicial activism at the expense of the adversary way in a great
many cases; that is the strong movement to provide free legal services
for the poor, both in criminal and in civil cases. When a client has not
selected his lawyer in the open market, when he is not paying him out
of his own pocket, when he did not entrust his fate to the lawyer with
full voluntariness, I think the court will show less reluctance about
second-guessing the lawyer and will act more spontaneously. The point
is made nicely in the story about the young lawyer who was nervously
trying his case, and the judge was getting more and more aggressive
about taking it over. Finally, the judge took over the questioning and
the cross-examination of witnesses, and the point came when the young
lawyer said to him, "Your Honor, this case is very important to my
client and me, and if you are going to try it, you better make sure that
you don't lose it."

Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 17.
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Tennessee Supreme Court,2"' Court of Appeals,0 2 and Court of
Criminal Appeals,193 whose jurisdiction is appellate only.'" Professor Sunderland convincingly contended that this argument
begs the question:
What, it may be asked, is being reviewed-the judgment, or the
items of law or fact which produced it? Obviously it is the judgment with which the appellant is dissatisfied, and the correctness of that judgment is equally under review whether new
points or old points are being considered. The argument confuses appellate power with the manner of its exercise, and would
place upon modern courts a constitutional restriction against
using any data for testing the justice of a judgment which was
not available to courts of error in the Middle Ages. m
It often seems an afterthought, and a conclusory one at that,
when an appellate court refuses to consider a new issue on the
ground that its jurisdiction is appellate only. It would be regrettable if new issues were denied appellate consideration solely because of unthinking application of this formula.
Some of the more significant objections to appellate consideration of issues not presented for review can be avoided if counsel
is given an opportunity to submit new briefs3"0 It would also be
helpful if courts were to respond favorably to petitions for rehearing on the ground that, as set forth in rule 39(a), "the court's
decision relies upon matters of . . . law upon which the parties
have not been heard and that are open to reasonable dispute."
Nonetheless, control over the issues should, generally speaking,
reside in the parties, not the court. 7 Accordingly, rule 13(b) proTENN. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
202. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-408 (1955).
203. Id. § 16-448 (Supp. 1977).
204. See, e.g., Ruckart v. Schubert, 223 Tenn. 215, 218, 443 S.W.2d 466,
468 (1969) (dictum):
This court is thus, constitutionally, a tribunal of appeals and errors,
with jurisdiction which can only be exercised upon questions and issues
tried and adjudged by inferior courts, the burden resting upon the
appellant or plaintiff in error to show the adjudication and the error
therein of which he complains.
205. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 657; see Judicial Review,
supra note 52, at 430.
206. See Traynor, supra note 31, at 159.
207. See APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.11; F. JAMES &
G. HAZARD, supra note 67, § 1.2, at 6-7.
201.
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vides that "[rieview generally will extend only to those issues
presented for review." The rule does, however, identify one situation in which the appellate court must and three others in which
the appellate court may consider issues not presented for review,
although the rule does not purport to provide an exclusive listing
of such situations.
The appellate court is required to consider the issue of its
own as well as the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. This
requirement is a generally recognized exception to the rule precluding review of matters not raised by the parties and is based
on the idea that the parties cannot by consent confer subjectmatter jurisdiction.m In the trial court this notion finds expression in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.08, which provides
that "whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the
court shall dismiss the action." Only this question of jurisdiction
over the subject matter must be considered by the appellate
court; in all other situations the court retains the discretion as to
whether it will consider issues not presented for review.
One reason an appellate court may consider an issue on its
own motion is "to prevent needless litigation."" ' For example, if
the court perceives another basis upon which the trial court's
judgment can be affirmed, then affirmance on unargued issues
will prevent a rather meaningless and wasteful reversal. Another
reason for considering an issue not presented for review is "to
21 " There is today an
prevent injury to the interests of the public.""
increasing amount of litigation in which the impact of the judgment is not confined to the parties. The "dominating characteristic" of this litigation, as it has arisen in the federal courts, "is that
[the litigation does] not arise out of disputes between private
parties about private rights. Instead, the object of litigation is the
vindication of constitutional or statutory policies. 2 ' This
208. Vestal, supra note 60, at 499-502; see Note, Appellate Practice-Questions Raisedfor the First Time on Appeal, 12 TENN. L. REv. 57 (1933).
209. PROPOSED TEN. R. APP. P. 13(b)(1); cf Note, supra note 60, at 656
("[A] more satisfactory rule might be one that an appellate court should consider new issues only when the new issue enables it to render a final judgment."). See also Vestal, supra note 60, at 506-07.

210. PRoPosED TENN. R. ApP. P. 13(b)(2). See also Note, supra note 208.
211. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1281, 1284 (1976). See also McGowan, supra note 105, at 1588.
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"public law litigation" is by no means limited to the federal
courts, as demonstrated by the litigation recently before the Tennessee Supreme Court on the question of the permissible rate of
interest for the loan of money.1 Exclusive control of the litigation
by the parties may be appropriate if only private rights are involved, but the interests of the public should not suffer because
of inadequate representation.1 Finally, an appellate court may
consider issues not raised by the parties in order "to prevent
prejudice to the judicial process." ' Although this standard is
admittedly vague, it seems most likely to be of use in criminal
actions in which, for example, the defendant was inadequately
represented by court-appointed counsel or was denied a fair trial.
3.

Facts that May Be Considered on Appeal

The propriety of appellate consideration of issues not raised
below needs to be distinguished from the propriety of considering
additional facts.1 In actions tried before a jury, appellate consideration of additional facts relevant to the merits would work a
deprivation of the right to trial by jury.2"' In criminal actions
consideration of such facts would raise serious problems under
the confrontation clause. 1 7 Even in nonjury civil actions the appellate court is ill-equipped both to receive lengthy testimony and
to consider factors affecting the probative value of testimony that
212. See Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn.
1977).

213. Vestal, supra note 60, at 511. As my colleague Professor Martha S.L.
Black kindly brought to my attention, the interests of the public were thoroughly protected in the Cumberland Capital case, and nothing in the text
should be construed as suggesting otherwise.
214. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 13(b)(3); ef APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS,
supra note 121, § 3.11 (appellate court should consider an issue not raised only
when necessary to prevent "manifest injustice"). See also text accompanying
notes 549-50 infra. The recent case of Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174

(Pa. 1978), provides a recent example of an appellate court's willingness to
consider an issue on its own motion. In McKenna, the court, on its own motion,
considered the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania death penalty statute.
215. See generally Millar, supra note 60; Pound, supra note 193; Appellate
Procedure, supra note 52, at 651-56; Judicial Review, supra note 52, at 420-22;
Sunderland, supra note 51, at 143-46; Note, supra note 60.
216. See Millar, supra note 60, at 441; Sunderland, supra note 51, at 144.
217, U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has held that the confrontation clause is applicable to the states. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400

(1965).
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cannot be conveyed in the record.' These reasons, combined
with the power of the trial court to reopen a judgment in order to
hear new evidence," ' suggest that appellate consideration with
only rare exception is properly limited, as provided in rule 13(c),
to "those facts established by the evidence in the trial court and
set forth in the record and any additional facts that may be judicially noticed .

... This limitation on the facts that may be
"0

considered on review also operates as a limitation on appellate
consideration of new issues. If considering a new theory on review
raises new questions of fact, then the appellate court may refuse
to consider the issue because it would be necessary to remand for
a new trial, which would increase rather than prevent needless
litigation.
On rare occasion, however, it is appropriate for the appellate
court to consider additional facts without remanding for a new
trial and requiring the disproportionately burdensome preparation of a supplemental record. For example, in some cases it is
critically important to bring the record up to date so that the
appellate court is aware of the current position of the parties.
218. See text accompanying notes 277 & 282-83 infra. In this area too it
has been argued that consideration of new facts is beyond the power of a court
whose jurisdiction is appellate only. See, e.g., Pierce v. Tharp, 224 Tenn. 328,
349, 461 S.W.2d 950, 954 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971); Morrow v.
State, 172 Tenn. 699, 113 S.W.2d 1196 (1938); Fine v. Lawless, 140 Tenn. 453,
205 S.W. 124 (1918); Outlaw v. Cherry, 88 Tenn. 367, 12 S.W. 725 (1890);
Comment by Judge D. DeHaven (Nov. 13, 1942), reported in 17 TENN. L. REV.
750-51 (1943). But see Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1885);
R. POUND, supra note 43, at 387-88; New Evidence, supra note 193, at 287-88.
Professor Millar labeled as "deplorable" a decision of the Supreme Court of

Illinois, Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 376 Ill. 183, 195, 33 N.E.2d
485, 491 (1941), holding that receipt of new evidence on appeal would amount
to the unconstitutional exercise of original jurisdiction. R.MILLAR, CnL PROcEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTOzCAL PsRsPEcTVE 25 (1952). In any event,
Professor Sunderland's analysis is equally applicable here. See text accompanying note 205 supra. In truth, new facts have been considered on appeal. See, e.g.,
Frazier v. Byrd, 535 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tenn. 1976).
219. See TENN. R.Civ. P. 60.02.
220. On the power of an appellate court to take judicial notice, see
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 12(3) (act withdrawn 1974); C. McCoiuccK, THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 333, at 773-74 (2d ed. 1972); Currie, Appellate Court's Use
of Facts Outside the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent
Investigation, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 39. For a general discussion of judicial notice,
see C. McCoRMICK, supra §§ 328-335; 9 J. Wioimouz, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§
2565-2583 (3d ed. 1940).
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Accordingly, proposed rule 14 provides that the appellate court
may, in its discretion, consider "those facts [that occurred after
judgment capable of ready demonstration, affecting the positions of the parties or the subject matter of the action such as
mootness, bankruptcy, divorce, death, other judgments or proceedings, relief from the judgment requested or granted in the
trial court, and other similar matters." To emphasize the limited
type of facts that may be considered initially on appeal, rule 14(a)
also provides that "[niothing in this rule shall be construed as
a substitute for or limitation on relief from the judgment available under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or the PostConviction Procedure Act." 22' As stated in the Commission comment, rule 14 is "not intended to permit a retrial in the appellate
court."222
Neither the power to consider issues not presented for review
nor the power to consider certain limited types of facts initially
on appeal should be confused with two other distinguishable
problems. One problem concerns the relief to be granted. Under
proposed rule 36, the appellate court is directed to "grant the
relief on the law and facts to which the party is entitled." Nothing
in this rule, however, requires the court to give relief that a party
has no desire of obtainingY32 Second, when a new statute is enacted or a new decision handed down during the pendency of an
appeal, the problems are essentially those of retroactivity and the
use of new authority to support propositions previously advanced. 21 The propriety, if not indeed the obligation, of counselm2
to bring such matters to the attention of the appellate court is
clear and is confirmed in proposed rule 27(d), which permits the
citation of supplemental authorities "twihen pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after his brief
has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision."
221. TENN. R. Civ. P. 60.02 is the most significant relevant provision. The
Post-Conviction Procedure Act is codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-3801 to
3824 (1975).
222. The rule, after all, permits consideration of only postjudgment facts.
223. This seems to follow from the adversary theory of litigation and the
control over the issues that resides in the parties. See text accompanying notes
69-76 & 183-207 supra.
224. See Note, supra note 60, at 653-54.
225. See ABA CODE OF PROmESIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-23, Disciplinary Rule 7-105(B)(1) (1975).
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4.

Review of Factual Determinations

One of the principal reasons for not permitting appellate
consideration of new facts relevant to the merits is that factfinding is the task of the trial court or jury. 2 6 This division of responsibility in turn raises the question of the degree of deference the
appellate court should accord to trial court findings of fact and
jury verdicts.
Historically, the scope of review of factual determinations 2"
depended on whether an action was at law or in equity. Equity
practice permitted de novo review while review at law was limited
to legal errors.2 8 The jury's exclusive right to find the facts provides one explanation for restricting review at law to legal issues.
After all, the theory of proceedings in error was that of an accusation against the judge, and since the jury determined the facts,
any error regarding the facts was no fault of the judge. Thus, no
error could be assigned upon any factual questions.' Moreover,
evidence in actions at law was typically received through the
testimony of witnesses in open court. The trier of fact therefore
sensed significant information that could not be adequately conveyed in the record. 3 The less informed appellate court would
seem no better able to make factual determinations than the trial
judge or jury. None of these considerations applied to equitable
actions. Juries were not used in equity:
[The] decision of both law and fact rested with the Lord Chancellor or with his subordinate, the Master of the Rolls. Under
proper circumstances there might be a rehearing of the cause
226.
227.

See text accompanying notes 216-18 supra.
See generally APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.11;

Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Jury Cases, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 68 (1936);

Chestnut, Analysis of Proposed New Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 533,
540-41 (1936); Clark & Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CI. L. REV. 190

(1937); Goodhart, Appeals on Questions of Fact, 71 L.Q. REV. 402 (1955);
Wright, supra note 92, at 758-71; Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings
of Fact Based on Documentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506
(1963).
228. Clark & Stone, supra note 227, at 190; Degnan & Louisell, Rehearing
in American Appellate Courts, 34 CANADIAN B. REV. 898, 902-03 (1956);
Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 653-54; Judicial Review, supra note 52,
at 420; Sunderland, supra note 51, at 139-46; Note, supra note 227, at 508-09.
229. See text accompanying notes 52-61 supra.
230. See text accompanying notes 277 & 282-83 infra.
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after pronouncement of decree, and a cause decided by the Master of the Rolls could be the subject of a rehearing before the
Lord Chancellor. This last was sometimes loosely spoken of as
an appeal, but in strictness it was still a rehearing. For the
Master of the Rolls in deciding a cause was acting only as deputy of the Lord Chancellor: every decree of the court was
deemed to be that of the Chancellor. 23'
Review in equitable actions was not considered a new proceeding
directed against error committed by the judge but was a continuation of the original proceeding designed to result in entry of the
correct decree.2 3 Moreover, unlike in proceedings at law, evidence
in equitable actions was traditionally taken by deposition rather
33
than by examination of witnesses in open court.
As might be expected, these two systems influenced each
other's development. Courts of equity began to receive evidence
by examining witnesses in open court. 34 As a result, appellate
courts on review of equitable actions began to restrict the principle of de novo review.2" On the other hand, glaringly incorrect
findings of fact in actions at law were deemed correctable as a
matter of law."6 The evolution of the law governing review of
factual determinations in the federal courts illustrates these his7
torical developments .2
The constitutional provision that the "Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall
make" '23 was construed by opponents of the Constitution as en231. Millar, supra note 60, at 428.29. See generally Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REv. 289 (1966); Wolfram, The
ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973).
232. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 653-55; Sunderland, supra
note 51, at 143.
233. C. CLARK, THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 5, at 16 (1947); R.MILLAR,
supra note 218, at 25; Bowen, Progressin the Administrationof Justice During
the Victorian Period, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 516,

524-27 (1907).
234. R. MILLAR, supra note 218, at 270-72.
235. See text accompanying notes 250-52 infra.
236. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 654; Judicial Review, supra
note 52, at 421.
237. The two best treatments of the subject, upon which the textual discussion is largely based, are Clark & Stone, supra note 227; Note, supra note
227.
238. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 2.
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dangering, if not abrogating, the right to trial by jury.1' The
ultimate result of this opposition was adoption of the seventh
amendment, which not only preserved the right to a jury trial but
also provided that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the
rules of the common law."
The seventh amendment, however, did not prescribe the
scope of review of factual findings in equitable or admiralty proceedings, since the jury was not used in those proceedings. 40 The
standard of review in those proceedings was established instead
by the first Congress in the first Judiciary Act of 1789, which
provided for appellate review by means of the common-law writ
of error. 4' Review by writ of error was limited to questions of
law; 242 thus, review of factual findings in equitable and admiralty
actions was unavailable? 3 The Act also provided that the mode
of proof by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open
court should be the same in admiralty and equitable actions as
in legal actions.4 Limiting review to questions of law, therefore,
was logical since the chancellor, like the common-law judge, observed the witnesses and was thus aware of significant information unavailable to the appellate court, which had only the cold
record before it."' This unified system of review of factual determinations in both legal and equitable actions was short-lived,
primarily because of the opposition of chancery and admiralty
lawyers.246 In 1802 Congress provided that, on request of a party
in an equitable action, the court in its discretion could receive
evidence by deposition, as was done prior to the first Judiciary
Act.247 In the following year, appeals were restored for equitable
and admiralty actions, and the writ of error was abolished in
those actions."' Thus, a bifurcated standard of review was reinstated.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Clark & Stone, supra note 227, at 192; Note, supra note 227, at 508.
Note, supra note 227, at 508.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84.
See text accompanying note 61 supra.
Note, supra note 227, at 508-09 & n.12.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88.
Note, supra note 227, at 509.
Clark & Stone, supra note 227, at 194-95.
Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 25, 2 Stat. 156, 166.
Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat. 244.
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Three notable changes occurred in the law between 1803 and
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. In 1865
Congress permitted the parties to waive a jury and empowered
the trial court to decide factual as well as legal issues in actions
at law when the parties waived their right to trial by jury. 24' In

1912 evidence in equitable actions was again received, as in legal
actions, by examination of witnesses in open court.50 The trial
court therefore once again had the advantage of observing the
witnesses. As a result, the appellate courts, while continuing to
assert their power to find facts de novo upon the record, adopted
"self-denying ordinances" ' ' that led to results similar to those
obtained upon review of actions at law.52 Finally, yet most significantly, code pleading, with its emphasis on a union of law and
equity, brought about a decline of the procedural distinctions
between the two systems 53
The Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, which
drafted the federal rules, considered three alternative standards
of review of factual findings in nonjury cases.?"1 The first was
retention of the distinction between legal and equitable actions;
in legal actions, review would be limited to sufficiency of the
supporting evidence, while in equitable actions review would extend to the weight as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. The
second alternative was adoption of a unified standard of review,
the standard being that used to review jury verdicts. The final
alternative considered was de novo review of findings of fact in
all nonjury actions whether denominated legal or equitable. Initially the Committee opted for de novo review. ' After extensive
commentary in the legal periodicals,2" the rule as adopted provided, as it does today, that findings of the trial court "shall not
249. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 500, 501.
250. Equity R. 46, 226 U.S. 661 (1912).
251. Clark & Stone, supra note 227, at 207.
252. Id. at 207-09; Note, supra note 227, at 510-11.
253. Clark & Stone, supra note 227, at 199-201.
254. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68, Advisory Comm. Note 120-21 (Prelim. Draft 1936).
255. Id. R. 68 provided, "The findings of the court in [cases tried without
a jury] shall have the same effect as that heretofore given to findings in suits
in equity."
256. See Blume, supra note 227, at 132; Chestnut, supra note 227; Clark
& Stone, supra note 227; Clark, Review of Facts Under ProposedFederal Rules,
20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 129 (1936).
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be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of witnesses."2 7 The clearly erroneous standard was a compromise; it neither permits de novo review nor accords trial court
findings the same insulation from review as is granted jury verdicts. 1m There is force in Learned Hand's observation:
It is idle to try to define the meaning of the phrase "clearly
erroneous"; all that can be profitably said is that an appellate
court, though it will hesitate less to reverse the finding of a judge
than that of an administrative tribunal or of a jury, will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly and only when well persuaded."'.

Approximately one-third
of the states have adopted the clearly
0
erroneous standard. 2
Like the law in the federal courts, the law in Tennessee today
establishes one standard of review in nonjury civil actions and a
separate, more limited standard for jury verdicts. Review in nonjury actions is "de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the judgment or
decree of the trial court, unless the preponderance of the evidence
is otherwise.""' This standard is apparently subject to the exception that, in actions tried without oral testimony in a chancery
court, the court of appeals is not "limited to the consideration of
such facts as were found or requested in the lower court, but it
shall independently consider and find all material facts in the
record." ' In certain actions, findings of a master concurred in by
257.
258.

FED. R. Ctv. P. 52(a).
supra note 121, § 3.11, at 23; see 5A
52.03 (1975); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL

APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS,

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2585 (1971).

259. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir.
1946).
260. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 52(a); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 52(a); Aiuz. R. Civ. P.
52(a); COLO. R. Civ. P. 52(a); GA. R. Civ. P. 52(a); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 52(a); IND.
T.R. 52(A); Ky. R. Civ. P. 52.01; ME. R. Civ. P. 52(a); MASS. R. Civ. P. 52(a);
MICH. GEN. CT.R. 52.01; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.310 (Vernon 1952); NEV. R. Civ.
P. 52(a); N.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a); S.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a); VT. R. Civ. P. 52(a); W.
VA. R. Crv. P. 52(a).
261. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-303 (Supp. 1977). This same standard applies
when an appeal is taken from a trial court directly to the supreme court. Id. §
27-304 (1955).
262. Id.§ 27-113. See also id. § 27-301; Harbison, supra note 33, at 293-
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the chancellor cannot be "disturbed" by the court of appeals." 3
Similarly, both by statute"4 and case law,"' findings by the trial
court concurred in by the intermediate appellate courts are conclusive if there is any evidence to support them. Jury verdicts are
not to be set aside "where there is material evidence to support
the verdict of the jury."' ' Finally, yet a different standard applies
in criminal actions, which are tried almost exclusively before a
jury: verdicts of guilt are set aside only if the evidence preponderates against the verdict. '
This crazy quilt raises a number of questions. Should there
be separate standards of appellate review for actions tried before
a trial judge and those tried before a jury? Should the standard
vary depending upon whether the evidence consists of oral
testimony? Should it matter if the action were tried in a chancery
court or that there were concurring findings between the master
and chancellor or trial judge and intermediate appellate court?
Should there be separate standards for civil and criminal actions?
There is a good deal of legal literature focusing on the desirability and appropriate scope of appellate review of trial court
findings." Broad, if not de novo, review of trial court findings has
been urged on the ground that an appellate court is more likely
than the trial court to make correct findings since an appellate
court has more time to study the case, and its findings, just as
those of a jury, reflect the knowledge, experience, and wisdom of
greater numbers." Moreover, if a trial court is given final power
over life, liberty, and property, too much discretion is being
vested in one person and may result in public distrust and suspicion. "' In addition, uniformity, certainty, and correctness of results are as jeopardized by erroneous findings of fact as by application of an incorrect principle of law.' Since an appellate court
263.

§ 27-113 (1955).
Id.
265. E.g., Scharff v. State, 551 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tenn. 1977); Hickory
Springs Mfg. Co. v. Evans, 541 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tenn. 1976).
TENN. CODE ANN.

264.

266.
267.
McBee v.
268.
269.
527.
270.
271.

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 14(7).
See, e.g., State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476-77 (Tenn. 1973);
State, 213 Tenn. 15, 19-20, 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (1963).
See note 227 supra.
Blume, supra note 227, at 72. See also Carrington, supra note 92, at
Blume, supra note 227, at 71.
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has plenary power to review questions of law, it ought also to
review findings of fact de novo. Affording complete review of both
legal and factual issues has the advantages of eliminating the
necessity of drawing the difficult and oftentimes impossible lawfact distinction and of reducing the number of jury trials.2" Finally, it is argued that there is no empirical proof that standard
demeanor evaluation is reliable; in fact such evaluation may well
be misleading."
On the other hand, some other commentators point to the
disadvantages of encouraging appeals by providing broad review
of trial court findings.' Appeals increase the demand on scarce
judicial resources and delay final disposition of litigation. In addition, appeals make litigation more expensive and thus give an
advantage to the litigant with the deeper pocket?." Broad review
of trial court findings also impairs trial court morale and lessens
respect for the trial court. ' Furthermore, while there is probably
no certain way of knowing whether appellate or trial courts are
more often correct, the trial court, like the jury, senses more than
can be adequately conveyed in the record." '
Most of the arguments either in favor of or against broad
review of trial court findings do not directly address the question
(1949); Wilner, Civil Appeals: Are They Useful in the Administration of
Justice?, 56 GEO. L.J. 417, 449 (1968).
272. Blume, supra note 227, at 72. Professor Blume argues that if trial
court findings are not open to review, it is likely a litigant would rather take his
chances on twelve jurors whose verdict may be set aside by the trial court. If,
on the other hand, there is de novo review of trial court findings, "it is likely
that the doubtful litigant will resolve his doubts in favor of waiver (of a jury]
knowing that an avenue of escape from an unjust decision will be open to him."
Id.
273. Id. at 72; see D. MCCARTY, PSYCHOLOGY FOR THE LAWYER 250-51 (1929);
Note, Credibility of CertainLay Witnesses: The Psychopathic Liar on the Witness Stand, I CURRENT MED. 21 (1954).
274. For authorities arguing that broad review of questions of fact increases the number of appeals, see Chestnut, supra note 227, at 540-41; Wright,
supra note 92, at 780. See also Frankfurter & Landis, The Supreme Court at
October Term, 1929, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1, 26-35 (1930).
275. Wright, supra note 92, at 780.
276.

Id. at 781. But see text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.

277. APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.11, at 23; Chestnut,
supra note 227, at 540; Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 663-65; Wright, supra note
92, at 781-82; see text accompanying notes 282-83 infra. See generally J. FAST,
BODY LANGUAGE (1970).
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of why the law generally discriminates in intensity of review between trial court findings and jury verdicts. 7 One beguiling explanation for this discrimination, as well as for the greater respect
shown administrative findings, was offered by Judge Jerome
Frank:
A wag might say that a verdict is entitled to high respect because the jurors are inexperienced in finding facts, an administrative finding is given high respect because the administrative
officers are specialists (guided by experts) in finding a particular
class of facts, but, paradoxically, a trial judge's finding has far
less respect because he is blessed neither with jurors' inexperience nor administrative officers' expertness."'
The biting questions underlying Judge Frank's witty observation
are whether or not a jury is more likely than a trial court to make
correct determinations of fact and whether or not review of jury
verdicts and administrative determinations reflects an excess of
caution.
Perhaps, on the whole, jury verdicts are more likely to be
correct than trial court findings. 2 But this argument and virtually all the other arguments on the desirability of no review
versus some broader measure of review are wide of the mark. The
task of an appellate court is not to decide whether the factfinder
is generally reliable or unreliable or whether it is generally good
or bad to permit review of determinations of fact. Instead, an
appellate court is faced with the far more painstaking task of
deciding in the particular case under review whether the factual
determination in issue should be sustained or set aside. Neither
the factfinder's general reliability or unreliability nor the general
desirability or undesirability of review helps determine whether
an erroneous determination has been made in a particular instance.
A remaining explanation for broader review of trial court
findings than of jury verdicts is that the material evidence rule
governing jury verdicts is too narrow. If indeed the rule is too
supra note 121, § 3.11, at 22-

278.

But see APPELLATE COURT

279.

Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 540 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340

STANDARDS,

23.

U.S. 810 (1950).
280. But see Chestnut, supra note 227, at 540; Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REv. 443, 459 (1899).
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narrow, the fault may lie not with what the test ought to mean
but with what it has meant. The material evidence rule is sensible
insofar as it means that an appellate court, given a conflict in
testimony, will uphold the trier of fact if there is material evidence from which the determinations in issue could reasonably
have been made.' Traditionally, the law has recognized that the
trier of fact is at least in a position to take note of a number of
factors affecting the probative value of testimony that cannot be
adequately conveyed in the record. 2 Justice Traynor has observed:
[An appellate court] cannot know whether a witness answered
some questions forthrightly but evaded others. It may find an
answer convincing and truthful in written form that may have
sounded unreliable at the time it was given. A well-phrased
sentence in the record may have seemed rehearsed at the trial.
A clumsy sentence in the record may not convey the ring of truth
that attended it when the witness groped his way to its articulation. What clues are there in the cold print to indicate where the
truth lies? What clues are there to indicate where the half-truth
lies?"
On the other hand, the material evidence rule ought not lead an
appellate court to sustain a determination not based on any evidence or not reasonably made from the evidence.' Yet, factual
determinations that cannot reasonably be made may be upheld
if an appellate court considers only the evidence supporting the
determination. Justice Traynor's analysis is insightful and convincing:
Occasionally an appellate court affirms the trier of facts on isolated evidence torn from the context of the whole record. Such
a court leaps from an acceptable premise, that a trier of fact
could reasonably believe the isolated evidence, to the dubious
conclusion that the trier of fact reasonably rejected everything
that controverted the isolated evidence. Had the appellate court
examined the whole record, it might have found that a reasonable trier of fact could not have made the finding in issue. One
of the very purposes of review is to uncover just such irrational
281.
282.
283.
284.

R. TRAYNoR, supra note 50, at 27.
See text accompanying note 277 supra.
R. TRAYNOR, supra note 50, at 20-21.
See generally Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 646.
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findings and thus preclude the risk of affirming
a finding that
2 5
should be disaffirmed as a matter of law. 8
Interestingly, the material evidence rule has also been criticized not on the ground that it affords too narrow a review but
on the ground it affords too broad a review of jury verdicts. To
many, the principal virtue of the jury is that it softens the harshness of the law, which often lags behind community standards of
fairness and decency."' Reviewing jury verdicts on a material
evidence or reasonableness standard is thus too broad since it
may deprive the jury of its valuable function of vetoing harsh,
oppressive, or discriminatorily administered laws. But history
provides examples not only of jury compassion but also jury passion," 7 As Justice Traynor has contended:
It is misleading to argue that a narrow review affords an
expedient precaution against the court's moving into the province of the trier of fact. Concededly, it is not for an appellate
court to retry cases on appeal or to substitute its judgment of
the probabilities for that of the trier of fact, whatever it may find
in the record. To say, however, that it should not exceed its
province is not to justify an excess of caution that would stay
its review even when it becomes additionally apparent from the
record that the conclusion of the trier of fact was contrary, not
merely to what the appellate court would have done, but to what
a trier of fact could reasonably have done. The very folly of such
a conclusion works an injustice whose redress is a matter of
law.Z2SS
Little harm would result if the law tolerated an occasional
jury veto of harsh laws but at the same time guarded against jury
R. TRAYNOR, supra note 50, at 27.
See L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 122-23 (1930); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 15.5, at 891-92 (1956); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note
67, § 7.15, at 301-02; 5A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 49.05, at 2235-36 (1975);
R. TRAYNOR, supra note 50, at 31; Holmes, supra note 280, at 459-60.
285.
286.

287.

See, e.g.. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). As Holmes observed

in dissent:
Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the phrase "due

process of law," there can be no doubt that it embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be heard. Mob law
does not become due process of law by securing the assent of a terrorized jury.
Id. at 347.
288.

R.

TRAYNOR,

supra note 50, at 27.
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intolerance."' If justice is to be administered evenhandedly, however, appellate courts must assume their responsibility to keep
the law straight. Acceptance of this responsibility, combined with
review to determine whether the factual determinations are reasonably supported by the evidence, would seem best suited to
realization of the demands of justice.
Based upon these considerations, the Advisory Commission
considered a proposed rule that set forth a single standard of
review to govern jury and nonjury, legal and equitable, civil and
criminal actions. The proposed rule provided:
Findings of fact, whether by the trial court or jury, based on the
opportunity of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses who appeared personally before it, shall be set aside only

if, considering the whole record, no trier of fact could reasonably
make the finding in issue by the required degree of persuasion.
The proposed rule was based on the theory that since both the
jury and the trial court are able to take account of factors affecting the probative value of testimony that cannot adequately be
conveyed in the record, n ' it is logical to establish a unitary standard of review and sensible to sustain factual determinations, if
there is a conflict in testimony, as long as there is evidence to
support them.3 1 Since the burden of persuasion differs between
289.

See id. at 33.

290.

See text accompanying notes 277 & 282-83 supra,

291.

See

APPELLATE COURT

STANDARDS,

supra note 121, § 3.11. The Com-

mission on Standards of Judicial Administration found no good reason for a
different approach to a trial judge's findings and recommended that both verdicts and findings be governed by the same standard of whether the factual
determinations are reasonably supported by the evidence.
In light of the pertinent historical and practical considerations
involved, the appropriate rule should be that a trial judge's findings of
fact and application of law to fact should be governed by the same
standard that is applied to corresponding jury determinations. The
trial judge, like the jury, has opportunity to see and hear the witnesses
and to evaluate the evidence as a whole. The trial judge, unlike the
appellate court, is regularly engaged in resolving issues of fact and is
primarily responsible for doing so. To the extent that his authority in
this regard is treated as less than that of the jury, appeal inevitably
becomes a mechanism for retrying the facts, to the detriment of both
the trial and appellate court. The interpretation, and if necessary the
formulation, of rules such as Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should consequently be reconsidered.

Id. at 23-24.
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civil and criminal actions and even among certain issues in civil
actions, the rule would also have required the appellate court to
take these differences into account."' Thus, if the appellate court
required the trier to find facts by a greater degree of conviction
than the more-probable-than-not standard that ordinarily applies in civil actions, then the appellate court would have had to
accept responsibility for its enforcement. Otherwise, the rule requiring a more rigorous degree of persuasion would lose its vitality.9 Finally, the rule did not contemplate a separate standard
for concurring findings of the master and chancellor and of the
trial court and intermediate appellate court. Ironically, the broad
review of facts available if there are no concurring findings in
actions tried in chancery court appears based in part on the absence of an opportunity to observe witness demeanor, since the
statute establishing this broad scope of review is apparently inapplicable in any action tried upon oral testimony.294 The limited
review of concurring findings seems better viewed as a statement
that one review of the findings is enough. In the case of the supreme court, where there have been concurring findings of the
trial court and intermediate appellate court, limiting review can
also be viewed as an admonition to the supreme court not to
exercise its discretionary review power to hear cases of interest
only to the parties. 5
Despite these considerations, however, the Advisory Commission recommended that the supreme court not change current
law. This decision was based in part on the thought that, while
jurors come and go, judges remain who may be unwilling to enforce certain legal principles. 29 ' The reasonableness standard was
292. R. TRAYNOR, supro note 50, at 29.
293. See Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal. 2d 808, 817, 141 P.2d 732, 737
(1943) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
294. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-113 (Supp. 1976) provides that broad review
of facts by the court of appeals "shall not apply to any case tried in the chancery
court upon oral testimony."
295. See text accompanying notes 385-408 infra.
296. See Carrington, supra note 92, at 520:
When a jury sits, the need for appellate review of findings of fact is less
compelling, for several reasons. First, the jury is enthroned too briefly
to create a risk that the enforcement of any principle will be impaired
by an unwillingness to apply it; if juries in general will not apply a
principle, its desuetude is probably in the public interest. In any event,
the lawlessness is not associated with the personal despotism of the
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therefore considered insufficient to serve as a meaningful check
on the trial court's power. ' Conversely, there was some sentiment that the reasonableness standard was too broad for jury
verdicts. It was also considered inexpedient to change the law
since it is so ingrained in Tennessee procedure. Accordingly, rule
13(d), which deals with findings of fact in civil actions, simply
8
restates current law.
Proposed rule 13(e), on the other hand, establishes a different standard of review from that previously adhered to in criminal actions. The initial draft of the proposed rules simply restated
the prevailing law concerning appellate review of findings of guilt
district judge. The jury has already served as some check on his power,
hence the need for review is less. Moreover, inasmuch as the trial judge
must instruct the jury and set aside its verdict if he deems it contrary
to the weight of the evidence, the judgment resting on a jury verdict
comes to the court of appeals with a double imprimatur.
Professor Blume also argued that trial court findings are not given less respect
than jury verdicts.
It is true that a verdict will not be reviewed on the facts by an appellate
court, but it is also true that it can be, and is every day, reviewed by
the trial judge on motion for a new trial. A review by an appellate court
is of higher dignity than a review by the trial court.
Blume, supra note 227, at 71.
297. The example most often cited by the Advisory Commission was review in workmen's compensation cases.
298. PROPOSED TENN. R. Aep. P. 13(d) provides:
Unless otherwise required by statute, review of findings of fact by the
trial court in civil actions shall be de novo upon the record of the trial
court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the finding,
unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Findings of fact
by a jury in civil actions shall be set aside only if there is no material
evidence to support the verdict.
The introductory clause concerning situations governed by statute is designed
to preserve current law regarding concurring findings, see text accompanying
notes 263-65 supra, findings in workmen's compensation cases, see TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1018 (1977), and findings in administrative adjudications. See Public
Serv. Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. 1977); United InterMountain Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 555 S.W.2d 389 (Tenn. 1977);
Metropolitan Gov't v. Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601 (Tenn. 1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 4-524 (Supp. 1977). The workmen's compensation statute limits review
in accordance with the practice "governing other appeals in the nature of a writ
of error in civil causes." TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1018 (1977). The scope of review
in such proceedings is limited to errors of law. See, e.g., James v. Ducktown
Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 109 Tenn. 375, 71 S.W. 821 (1902).
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in criminal actions?'9 Quite recently, however, the United States
Supreme Court held that an accused may not be subjected to a
second trial when his conviction is reversed by an appellate court
solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, 0°
a holding made applicable to the states."" Although the Court did
not expressly address the standard governing appellate reversal
on the ground of insufficient evidence, it seems likely that the
Court will hold that findings of guilt must be set aside if the
evidence fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Proposed rule 13(e), therefore, provides that "[f]indings of guilt in
criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set
aside if, considering the whole record, the evidence fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
D.

The Timing of Appellate Review

Just as vitally important as the question of the scope of review is the question of when appellate review may be sought.
Most jurisdictions, including Tennessee, generally permit an
appeal as of right-that is, "an appeal that does not require permission of the trial or appellate court as a prerequisite to taking
an appeal""'-only upon entry of a final judgment. 0 ' The proposed rules follow this general rule and permit an appeal as of
299. Originally, proposed rule 13(e) provided that "[f]indings of guilt in
criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside only if the
evidence preponderates against the finding."
Arguably, the current standard of review of findings of guilt in criminal
actions is unconstitutional under the due process clause as well as the double
jeopardy clause. See text accompanying notes 300-01 infra. In In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court held that due process requires all elements
of a criminal offense to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, as noted in
the text, see text accompanying note 293 supra, unless the appellate court takes
the burden of persuasion into account when reviewing factual determinations,
the rule requiring a rigorous degree of persuasion loses its vitality. Thus, the
Tennesee law, requiring that the evidence preponderate against the finding of
guilt, may subvert the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard constitutionally
mandated by In re Winship, and itself be violative of due process.
300. Burks v. United States, 46 U.S.L.W. 4632 (U.S. June 14, 1978).
301. Greene v. Massey, 46 U.S.L.W. 4636 (U.S. June 14, 1978).
302. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 3(d).
303. See, e.g., Cockrill v. People's Say. Bank, 155 Tenn. 342, 347, 293 S.W.
996, 997-98 (1927) (writ of error); Carrol v. Caldwell, 8 Tenn. (1 Mart. & Yer.)
78 (1827) (appeal in the nature of a writ of error); Moore v. Churchwell, 27 Tenn.
App. 443. 446, 181 S.W.2d 959, 961 (1942) (appeal).
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right only from a final judgment. "4 The rules do not contain a
general definition of finality" 5 because it is typically clear
whether an order is final or interlocutory23' However, proposed
rule 3(a), dealing with the availability of an appeal as of right in
civil actions, does define finality in the context of civil actions
involving multiple claims or multiple parties:
Except as otherwise provided in rule 9, if multiple parties or
multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, any order
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before entry of a
final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities
of all parties.17
The general rule limiting appeals to entry of a final judgment"' has been justified, first of all, on the ground that it reduces the number of appellate proceedings and their attendant
expense and burden on both the parties and the appellate courts.
At most there is only one appeal, and if the issue that would
otherwise be the basis of an interlocutory appeal is rendered
moot-because the party who would have appealed prevails or
settles or because the trial court itself corrects its error-there
may be no appeal 00 In addition, a finality rule prevents delay at
304. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 3(a)-(b).
305. For definitions of a final judgment, see Mengle Box Co. v. Lauderdale
County, 144 Tenn. 266, 276, 230 S.W. 963, 965 (1921); Thomas v. Hedges, 27
Tenn. App. 585, 590, 183 S.W.2d 14, 16 (1944).
306. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 158, § 101, at 505.
307. Proposed rule 9 describes situations in which interlocutory review is
available. See text accompanying note 346 infra.
308. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 67, §§ 13.4, .9-.12; 9
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
110.06-.13, .16-30 (1975); C. WRIGHT, supra note
158, §§ 101-102; 15 C. WRIGHT, A MILLER, & F. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 3905-3919 (1976); Carrington, supra note 92, at 508-17; Crick, The
Final Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932); Frank,
Requiem for the FinalJudgment Rule, 45 TEx. L. REV. 292 (1966); Redish, The
PragmaticApproach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
89 (1975); Sunderland, supra note 51, at 127; Wright, supra note 92, at 771-82;
Note, The Final Judgment Rule in the Federal Courts, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 239
(1947) thereinafter cited as Final Judgment Rule]; Note, Appealability in the
Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Appealabilityl.
309. See 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.07, at 108-09 (1975); 15 C.
WRIGHT,

A.

MILLER,

& F.

COOPER, FEDERAL PRATICE AND PROCEDURE §

3907, at
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the trial level and results in a quicker ultimate resolution of the
action. :" "Thus, the final judgment rule seeks to serve the twin
goals of minimizing appellate dockets and maximizing fairness to
litigants by the speedy and inexpensive termination of litigation." Moreover, the fact that the trial court is given "primary
responsibilities for fact finding, standard application, and procedure mean that most rulings that precede factfinding do not
lead to reversal, and that often a court of appeals can satisfactorily identify the controlling legal questions only after factfinding
has been completed.""' On the other hand, delaying appellate
430-32 (1976); Carrington, supra note 92, at 509; Frank, supra note 308, at 293;
Appealability. supra note 308, at 352; Final Judgment Rule, supra note 308, at
239.
310. See 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
110.07, at 107 (1975); 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & F. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3907, at
431-32 (1976); Carrington, supra note 92, at 509; Frank, supra note 308, at 29293; Appealability, supra note 308, at 351; FinalJudgment Rule, supra note 308,
at 239.
311. Note, Civil Procedure-Appealability-Expansionof Interlocutory
Appeals in Tennessee, 42 TENN. L. REV. 584, 585 (1975).
312. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & F. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3907, at 430 (1976); see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 67, §
13.4, at 670; Appealability, supra note 308, at 352. It is also argued that delaying
appeal to entry of a final judgment may prompt the trial court to consider its
interlocutory rulings with greater care, "for errors not requiring reversal will
never be corrected and those that warrant reversal will compel a complete
retrial." Appealability, supra note 308, at 352; see 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, &
F. COOPER, FEDERAL PACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3907, at 431 (1976). It seems
more likely, however, that insulation from review may prompt lesser care. Finally, Professor Wright has repeatedly argued that "Itirial judge authority may
be so enhanced by the delayed appellate process, further, that more effective
trial governance is possible, and greater community acceptance will attach to
all judicial determinations, whether at the trial or appellate level." 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & F. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3907, at
431-32 (1976); see Wright, supra note 92, at 779-80. Professor Carrington, on the
other hand, has argued that interlocutory review
assures the trial judge that his relation with his constituent litigants is
built on something more firm than his own personal force; the moral
integrity of the federal judicial enterprise stands behind his rulings.
Only a venal or unduly timid judge should fear or regret review, insofar
as the esteem of his office is concerned.
Carrington, supra note 92, at 513. The principal difficulty with both these arguments, however, is that neither offers a discriminating principle by which those
interlocutory rulings justifying an immediate appeal can be identified. The best
effort to articulate such principles is in Appealability, supra note 308, which
provided invaluable assistance in formulating proposed rules 9 and 10.
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review until entry of a final judgment may mean that subsequent
proceedings will be a waste because an early error that could have
been corrected by an interlocutory appeal will cause a later reversal.' 3 Furthermore, under a finality rule, review may be permitted only when it is too late to be effective.3"' In addition, certain
types of orders, such as discovery orders, may never be reviewed
on appeal from a final judgment because it is unlikely that they
would require reversal. 35 Thus, both the prevention of inconsistent trial court rulings and the development of a uniform body of
law may be stifled."' Finally, unyielding application of a finality
rule would prevent immediate correction of those relatively rare
instances of capricious trial court behavior." 7
Speaking generally, the rule limiting appeals of right to final
judgments has worked well, while jurisdictions with broad authority for appeals as of right from virtually all interlocutory rulings have found such authority "a prime source of delay and
expense in litigation [that] imposes an undue burden on the
[appellate court]." 18 The principal difficulties presented by retention of the final judgment rule, therefore, lie in identifying
those interlocutory orders that should be immediately appealable
and establishing procedures to prevent abuse of interlocutory
appeals.
Two principal methods of describing those interlocutory orders that should be immediately appealable emerge from a survey
of the statutes and rules of court of other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions an appeal is permitted, generally as of right though
313.

See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & F. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTmCE AND

3907, at 434 (1976); Carrington, supra note 92, at 510; Frank, supra
note 308, at 293; Sunderland, supra note 51, at 127; Appealability, supra note
308, at 352.
314. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 158, § 101, at 504; 15 C. WRIGHT, A.
PROCEDURE §

COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3907, at 433 (1976);
Frank, supra note 308, at 293; Sunderland, supra note 51, at 127; Appealability,
supra note 308, at 352; Final Judgment Rule, supra note 308, at 239.
315. See Carrington, supra note 92, at 511; Appealability, supra note 308,
at 352.

MILLER, & F.

316. See Appealability, supra note 308, at 352.
317. Id.See also Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the
All Writs Act, 86 HARv. L. REV. 595 (1973); Comment, The Use of Extraordinary
Writs for InterlocutoryAppeals, 44 TENN. L. REv. 137, 152-57 (1976).
318. Korn, Civil Jurisdictionof the New York Court of Appeals and Appellate Divisions, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 307, 330 (1967).
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at times by permission, from defined classes of interlocutory orders. Most often singled out for interlocutory review in civil actions are (1) orders granting or denying an injunction;" ' (2) orders
appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver; " (3) orders granting
or denying a new trial; 2 ' (4) orders involving changes in or challenges to the place of trial; a2 (5) orders granting or denying provisional remedies 23 or involving the possession, delivery, or sale of
property,"' or the payment of money;2 5 and (6) orders requiring
an accounting. 2' This listing is by no means exhaustive. Indeed,
depending upon the classification scheme, as many as fifty or so
additional classes of interlocutory orders emerge. A second, less
common method of describing those interlocutory orders that are
immediately appealable is by setting forth flexible guidelines but
conditioning appeal on the consent of the trial and appellate
court. For example, when an immediate appeal will materially
advance ultimate termination of litigation, interlocutory review
is commonly permitted from interlocutory orders involving a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
319. See, e.g., ALASKA Sup. CT. R. 23(a); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2102 (1962);
GA. CODE ANN. § 6-701(a)(3) (Supp, 1974); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 307(a); MINN. R. Civ.
APP. P. 103.03(b); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-24-7 (1969); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 817.33(3)(b)
(West 1977).
320. See, e.g., CoLo. APP. R. 1(a)(4); KAN. Civ. PRo. STAT. ANN. § 602102(a)(3) (Vernon 1967); MIcH. GEN. CT. R. 806.2(2); MONT. R. ApP. Civ. P.
1(b); Nrv. R. APP. P. 3A(b)(2); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-26-1(5) (1967).
321. See, e.g., ILL. SuP. CT. R. 306(a)(1); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-47-1(b)
(Burns 1973); MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 103.03(e); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 512,020 (Vernon
1952); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 952 (West 1961); OR. REV. STAT. § 19.010(2)(d)
(1975); WASH. R. APP. P. 2.2(a)(9).
322. See, e.g., FLA. APP. R. 4.2(a); MONT. R. APP. Civ. P. 1(b); NEV. R. APP.
P. 3A(b)(2).
323. See, e,g,, KAN. CIv. PRO. STAT. ANN. § 60-2102(a)(1) (Vernon 1967);
MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 103.03(c); MONT. R. Civ. APP. P. 1(b); OKLA, STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 952 (West 1961).
324. See, e.g., ILL. SuP. CT. R. 307(a)(4)-(5), (7); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1151-7 (1972); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 512.020 (Vernon 1952); MoNT. R. ApP. Civ. P.
1(b); NEV. R. APP. P. 3A(b)(3); OR. REV. STAT. § 19.010(2)(b) (1975); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-24-7 (1969); VA. CODE § 8.01-670(B)(2) (1977); W. VA. CODE § 58-51(g) (1966).
325, See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-51-7 (1972); VA. CODE § 8-462(2)(b)
(1950); W. VA. CODE § 58-5-1(g) (1966).
326. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 6-701(a)(3) (Supp. 1974). Some of the
situations set forth in the text reflect the fact that historically the final judgment
rule was not adopted in equity. See Crick, supra note 308, at 545-46.
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difference of opinion.3 27 Interlocutory review is also permitted
whenever final review would amount to an injustice because of
the impairment of a legal right or because of unnecessary delay,
expense, hardship, or other related factors; 2 ' or whenever necessary and appropriate for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; 2'
or whenever specified motions present important questions;1'31 or
whenever an appeal from certain motions would settle all the
controlling principles. 1 1 This listing also is not exhaustive, but it
does convey an accurate impression of the kinds of flexible guidelines other jurisdictions have formulated.
Most jurisdictions adopt neither method to the total exclusion of the other but utilize both methods of identifying those
interlocutory orders immediately appealable. Thus, an appeal
typically as of right is permitted from certain enumerated classes
of interlocutory orders, and flexible guidelines describe when a
discretionary appeal is permitted in other than the enumerated
instances. This approach is also embodied in the federal rules and
statutes.' 2 The current Tennessee statute governing interlocutory
appeals is also a combination of both methods, although all inter327. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970); ALASKA Sup. CT. R. 23(d); ILL. SuP.
CT. R. 308(a). For discussions of the federal statute, see Note, Section 1292(b):
Eight Years of Undefined Discretion, 54 GEo. L.J. 940 (1966); Note, supra note
178; Note, Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders: A
Guided Tour Through Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 YALE L.J. 333
(1959) [hereinafter cited as DiscretionaryAppealsl.
328. ALASKA SUP. CT. R. 23(e). The Alaska rules also provide that otherwise nonappealable orders or decisions may be reviewed only
(1) where the order or decision sought to be reviewed is of such substance and importance as to justify deviation from the normal appellate procedure by way of appeal and to require the immediate attention
of [the supreme court]; (2) where the sound policy behind the general
rule of requiring appeals to be taken only from final judgments is outweighed by the claim of the individual case that justice demands a
present and immediate review of a particular non-appealable order or
decision; or (3) where the superior court has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned
such a departure by an inferior court or administrative tribunal, as to
call for [the supreme court's] power of supervision and review.
Id. R. 24.
329. E.g., IowA R. Civ. P. 347(a); MONT. R. App. Civ. P. 17(a).
330. MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 103.03(i).
331. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-51-7 (1972).
332. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651(a), 1292 (1970); FED. R.Civ. P. 54(b).
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locutory appeals are discretionary 3 3
The prevalence of a combination of both methods suggests
that each has advantages. Permitting interlocutory appeals in
defined classes of cases, particularly appeals as of right, appears
to make the law definite and lessens the need for any preliminary
judicial involvement in determining the propriety of an interlocutory appeal. 314 Some uncertainty and resultant judicial involvement no doubt continues, however, in determining whether a case
falls within or without the defined class. 3 This uncertainty could
be disastrous and spawn an increased number of appeals if a
party forfeits his right to appellate review of an interlocutory
order by not appealing at the specified time. 33 Moreover, permitting an appeal in defined classes of cases may permit interlocutory appeals when they are not needed and, even more significantly, prohibit them when vitally necessary. ' 73 On the other
hand, formulating flexible guidelines and conditioning an interlocutory appeal on the permission of the trial or appellate court
permits interlocutory review when and if appropriate and eliminates uncertainty as to the right to appeal..
A" These gains, however, are purchased at the cost of greater judicial involvement in
determining the appropriateness of an interlocutory appeal. 339
On balance, the arguments in favor of formulating flexible
guidelines seemed stronger to the Advisory Commission, and it
thus became necessary to determine whether an interlocutory
appeal ought to require the consent of the trial and appellate
court. The reasons typically advanced for requiring the consent
of the trial court are that its familiarity with the controversy and
parties better enables it to predict whether an interlocutory appeal will result in a reduction in the total duration or cost of the
litigation if the challenged order is reversed, as well as to determine the presence of dilatory motives. 9 If performed with a sym-

334.

§ 27-305 (Supp. 1977).
Appealability, supra note 308, at 352.

335.

Id.

336.

See 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

333.

TENN. CODE ANN.

WHIGHT, A. MILLER,

& F.

110.07, at 109-10 (1975); 15 C.

CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3907, at

434 (1976); Appealability, supra note 308, at 352-53.
337. Appealability, supra note 308, at 352.
338. Id. at 353.
339. Id.
340. See Note, supra note 178, at 614; Appealability, supra note 308, at
379; DiscretionaryAppeals, supra note 327, at 344-45.
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pathetic understanding of the general undesirability of interlocutory appeals, the trial court can also protect the appellate court
from being inundated with requests for permission to appeal)"
On the other hand, the trial court is more likely to be influenced
by the pressure of the litigants and the temptation to rid itself of
difficult or controversial questions.342 Appellate court consent
would thus eliminate the wastefulness of preparing the record,
writing the briefs, and conducting oral argument only to have the
appeal ultimately dismissed on the ground that the trial court's
consent was not properly given. Experience under the current
Tennessee discretionary appeals statute has proven this possibility to be more than simply an academic concern. Finally, the
appellate court knows better the burden interlocutory review has
on its own docket and can probably better assess the likelihood
of reversible error than the trial judge who made the contested
ruling. 311
Little if anything will be gained, however, if the appellate
judicial energy expended in determining the appropriateness of
interlocutory review approaches the effort needed to dispose of
the case as upon a full appeal. 44' Similarly, any effective limitation on the right to an interlocutory appeal will require the appellate court to refuse to consider review of cases in which the trial
court has not given permission to appeal. Indeed, as long as the
trial court considered all relevant factors and no improper ones,
its decision to give or withhold permission should generally be
accepted. 35 Appellate review without the trial court's consent
would seem appropriate only to control capricious trial court behavior or as may be necessary to protect the appellate court's
ability to grant complete relief in the regular course of a later
appeal. Refusal to review in the face of certification would seem
appropriate only if it readily appears that certification was improper.
All interlocutory appeals under the proposed appellate rules
are governed by rules 9 and 10 and are denominated as appeals
341. Appealability, supra note 308, at 379.
342.

Id.

343. Id.; DiscretionaryAppeals, supra note 327, at 345.
344. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat
to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HAuv. L. lEv. 542, 571
(1969); Note, supra note 178, at 614.
345. Note, supra note 178, at 617.
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by permission. Interlocutory review under rule 9 requires the permission of both the trial and appellate courts and is the rule
under which most interlocutory appeals must be sought. Subdivision (a) of rule 9 does not purport to be a complete statement of
the circumstances that may justify discretionary interlocutory
review, but it does set forth "the character of the reasons that will
be considered." Those reasons are as follows:
(1) the need to prevent irreparable injury, giving consideration
to the severity of the potential injury, the probability of its
occurrence, and the probability that review upon entry of final
judgment will be ineffective; (2) the need to prevent needless,
expensive, and protracted litigation, giving consideration to
whether the challenged order would be a basis for reversal upon
entry of a final judgment, the probability of reversal, and
whether an interlocutory appeal will result in a net reduction in
the duration and expense of the litigation if the challenged order
is reversed; and (3) the need to develop a uniform body of law,
giving consideration to the existence of inconsistent orders of
other courts and whether the question presented by the challenged order will not otherwise be reviewable upon entry of final
judgment. '
In addition, in order to render protective applications for permission to appeal unnecessary, the last sentence of rule 9(a) provides
that "If]ailure to seek or obtain interlocutory review shall not
limit the scope of review upon an appeal as of right from entry of
the final judgment."
Interlocutory review under rule 9 is sought first by requesting
the trial court to grant its permission to appeal. If the trial court
is of the opinion that an appeal should be allowed, it must state
in writing the reasons for its opinion, including "(1) the legal
criteria making the order appealable. . . ; (2) the factors leading
the trial court to the opinion those criteria are satisfied; and (3)
any other factors leading the trial court to exercise its discretion
' 7 The requirement of written
in favor of permitting an appeal."3"
reasons should not only facilitate consideration by the appellate
court of the propriety of the exercise of its discretionary power to
permit the appeal but should also guard against a precipitous or
an unwarranted grant of permission by the trial court. Once the
346.
347.

PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 9.
Id. R. 9(b).
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trial court enters an order granting permission to appeal, an application for permission to appeal must be filed "within 10 days
after the date of entry of the order in the trial court or the making
of the prescribed statement by the trial court, whichever is
later."' 4 The application must contain "(1) a statement of the
facts necessary to an understanding of why an appeal by permission lies and (2) a statement of the reasons supporting an immediate appeal" and must be accompanied by copies of "(1) the order
appealed from, (2) the trial court's statement of reasons, and (3)
the other parts of the record necessary for determination of the
application for permission to appeal." ' If the appellate court
grants its permission, the appeal proceeds in the same manner as
an appeal as of right. As a safeguard against delaying tactics, the
rule provides that an application for permission to appeal or the
grant thereof does "not stay proceedings in the trial court unless
the trial or appellate court orders otherwise."3' 0
Interlocutory review under rule 10 requires only the permission of the appellate court but is available only "(1) if the lower
court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings as to require immediate review, or (2) if necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal as otherwise provided in these rules."3 5' In order to emphasize the infrequent and unusual situations in which rule 10 is available as well
as the need to obtain only the permission of the appellate court,
the rule is captioned "Extraordinary Appeal by Permission on
Original Application in the Appellate Court." The procedure for
applying for an extraordinary appeal under rule 10 is substantially the same as that set forth in rule 9. An application for an
extraordinary appeal must be filed and must contain "(1) a statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of why an extraordinary appeal lies, (2) a statement of the reasons supporting
an extraordinary appeal, and (3) the relief sought." 52 The application must also "be accompanied by copies of any order or opinion or parts of the record necessary for determination of the application."" 3 Unless the appellate court is of the opinion that an
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id. R.
Id,R.
Id.R.
Id.R.
Id. R.
Id.

9(c).
9(d).
9(0.
10(a).
10(c).
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extraordinary appeal should be granted, no answer to the application need be filed.3" If, on the basis of the application, the appellate court is of the opinion that the extraordinary appeal may lie,
"the appellate court shall order that an answer to the application
be filed by the other parties within the time fixed by the order. "3
The proceedings thereafter, with regard to briefs and oral argument, lie in the discretion of the appellate court." Finally, rule
10 authorizes the appellate court to "issue whatever order is necessary to implement review under this rule."" 7 The purpose of
this provision, in addition to empowering the appellate court to
enter whatever order is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
rule, is to eliminate any dispute regarding the technically correct
writ-certiorari, supersedeas, mandamus, prohibition, and the
like-that should issue. Abandonment of the old terminology of
the writs is thus designed to force consideration of the appropriate
order to achieve the purposes of rule 10 without being encumbered by irrelevant historical considerations.
While rules 9 and 10 alter existing law on the availability of
interlocutory review in civil actions, their impact on appeals by
the state in criminal actions is particularly noteworthy. Both
rules expressly provide that permission to appeal may be sought
by the state in criminal actions. 381 Currently, interlocutory review
by the state is obtained by petitioning for certiorari under the
section of the Tennessee Code that provides:
The writ of certiorari may be granted whenever authorized by
law, and also in all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or is acting illegally, when, in the judgment of
the court, there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. 5 '
This section is of strained application if, for example, the state
is seeking interlocutory review of an order to suppress evidence.
While the trial court's order may be erroneous, it is difficult to
understand in what manner the court "has exceeded the jurisdic354.

Id.R. 10(d).

355. Id.
356. Id.
357.

Id.R. 10(a).

358. Id. R. 9(g), 10(e).
359. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-801 (1955); see, e.g., State v. Wert, 550 S.W.2d
1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).
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tion conferred, or is acting illegally." In truth the appellate courts
have simply recognized that, unless certiorari lies, the state has
no "plain, speedy, or adequate remedy." The irreparable injury
standard of proposed rule 9(a)(1) should easily be satisfied, however, since without the suppressed evidence, a judgment of acquittal is often inevitable, and, even under proposed rule 3(c),
which deals with appeals by the state in criminal actions, the
state cannot appeal as of right from such a judgmentA0 °
E.

PartiesEntitled to Appeal in Criminal Actions

While the question of who is entitled to appeal from a final
judgment presents few problems in civil actions,8 1 appeals from
final judgments in criminal actions present some unique problems. A defendant is clearly entitled to appeal, as a matter of
right, a judgment of conviction entered on a plea of not guilty.
On the other hand, the defendant typically forfeits his right to
appeal on a plea of guilty,"' and the same is probably true on a
plea of nolo contendere. The Tennessee Supreme Court Advisory
Commission on Criminal Rules concluded, however, that even on
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere it is desirable in certain situations to permit the defendant to appeal as a matter of right.
Accordingly, proposed appellate rule 3(b) permits an appeal as of
right by the defendant
on a plea of guilty or noo contendere, if the defendant entered
into a plea agreement but explicitly reserved with the consent
of the state and the trial court the right to appeal a certified
question of law dispositive of the action, or if the defendant
seeks review of his sentence and there was no plea agreement
concerning his sentence, or if the issues presented for review
were not waived as a matter of law by the plea of guilty or nolo
contendere and if such issues are apparent from the record of the
proceedings already had. 63
360. See text accompanying note 378 supra.
361. But see, e.g., Cole v. Arnold, 545 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1977).
362. See, e.g., Capri Adult Cinema v. State, 537 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tenn.
1976); Ray v. State, 224 Tenn. 164, 167-68, 451 S.W.2d 854, 855 (1970); McInturff v. State, 207 Tenn. 102, 106, 338 S.W.2d 561, 563 (1960).
363. As originally promulgated, proposed rule 3(b) did not include the last
situation specified in the current version of the rule. The proposed appellate
rules were drafted before legislative approval of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The current version of the proposed appellate rules has been altered
in light of the criminal rules, and the criminal rules also will require amendment
if the appellate rules are approved by the General Assembly.
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Rule 3(b) also authorizes the defendant to appeal as of right
"from an order modifying the conditions of or revoking probation,
and from a final judgment in a criminal contempt, habeas corpus,
extradition, or post-conviction proceeding."
The authorities are in conflict over whether at common law
the state had a right to seek review in criminal actions." In any
event, as long as the defendant could not appeal,3 had no counsel, could not call witnesses, or testify on his own behalf,3" denying the state the right to appeal did seem to even things up just
a bit. Also, the double jeopardy clause places significant constitutional restrictions on state appeals.6 7 The defendant has a significant interest in his liberty pending appeal by the state"' as well
as a legitimate concern about paying the costs of his defense on
appeal. ' These matters, however, can be handled without completely denying the state the right to appeal.7 There is also a
364. Compare United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892); State v.
McGrorty, 2 Minn. 224 (1858), and Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal
Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486 (1927), with State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 A. 1110
(1894), and Kronenberg, Right of a State to Appeal in Criminal Cases, 49 J.
CiuM. L.C. & P.S. 473, 473-75 (1959). See generally L. OREia, supra note 52,
at 55-76; Hoy, Appellate Review for the State in Criminal Cases, 22 U. CIN. L.
REV. 463 (1953); Note, Criminal Procedure-Right of State to Appeal, 45 Ky.
L.J. 628 (1957); Comment, State Appeals in Criminal Cases, 32 TENN. L. REV.
449 (1965).
365. L. ORFlELD, supra note 52, at 56-57; Miller, supra note 364, at 490.
366. See 2 J. WIOMORE, supra note 220, § 575, at 684-86; Miller, supra note
364, at 491.
367, See, e.g., Sanabria v. United States, 46 U.S.L.W. 4646 (U.S. June 14,
1978); Burks v. United States, 46 U.S.L.W. 4632 (U.S. June 14, 1978); United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); United States v. Sisson,
399 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1970); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962);
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662, 671 (1896). See generally Kronenberg, supra note 364, at 475-76, 481-82;
Miller, supra note 364, at 491-96; Comment, Government Appeals of "Dismissals" in Criminal Cases, 87 HAv. L. REV. 1822, 1822-28 (1974); Note,
supra note 364, at 631-36; Comment, supra note 364, at 458-62; Comment,
Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Criminal Dismissals, 52 TEX, L.
REv. 303 (1974); see also Friedenthal, Government Appeals in Federal Criminal
Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 71 (1959); Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials
and Successive Prosecutions,74 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1960). But see United States
v. Scott, 46 U.S.L.W. 4653 (U.S. June 14, 1978).

368.

ABA

ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, STANDARDS RELAT-

ING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS § 1.4, at 39 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL
APPEALS STANDARDSI.

369.
370.

Id. § 1.4, at 40; L.

ORFIELD, supra note 52, at 62.
See text accompanying notes 381-84 infra.
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vital public interest that the guilty should not go free because of
an erroneous result at the lowest level of the judicial hierarchy.3 7'
Moreover, if the state is not permitted to appeal, there is no
opportunity to develop a uniform body of substantive and procedural law unless and until a defendant chooses to raise the issue
on appeal.372
It seems rather remarkable, in a country which debates so violently

. - .

the propriety of permitting the Supreme Court of the

United States to pass on the constitutionality of legislative acts,
that at the same time we tolerate a method which makes possible a final adjudication of unconstitutionality by the trial
court.

37

Finally, for a variety of reasons, including limited resources and
the difficulty of sustaining the interest of prosecuting witnesses,
experience seems to demonstrate that appeals by the state are not
abused, but rather are rarely taken in jurisdictions permitting
them 371
By statute in Tennessee, the state is permitted to pray an
appeal in the nature of a writ of error or to seek a writ of error as
in civil actions,3" ' subject to the exception that the "state has no
371. Kronenberg, supra note 364, at 480; Miller, supra note 364, at 503;
Comment, supra note 364, at 467.

372. Kronenberg, supra note 364, at 480-81; Miller, supra note 364, at 50506; Comment, supra note 364, at 468; see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
140 (1967). But see L. ORFIELD, supra note 52, at 73:
As to the contention that appeal by the state will aid in the scientific
development of the law, is not a sufficient answer that too high a price
is paid for such development when it is obtained by harassing persons
charged with crime? Has there been any dearth of development in the
past? Cannot the law be adequately shaped by the legislature or judicial council and in cases where the appeal is by the defendant? Is it not
a bit far-fetched to assert that the rights of the state will be underdeveloped and those of the defendant be overdeveloped merely because the
appeal is brought by the defendant? Moreover, as has been pointed out,
in jurisdictions where the state may appeal, very few appeals are
brought. How can the law be developed unless they are?
373. Miller, supra note 364, at 505; see Kronenberg, supra note 364, at 481.
374. L. ORIELD, supra note 52, at 72 & nn.61-62; Miller, supra note 364,
at 500.
375. TENN. CODE ANN. H§ 40-3401 to 3402 (1975).
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right of appeal or other remedy for the correction of errors, upon
37 This
a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case of any grade.""
exception was modified somewhat by rule 29(c) of the Tennessee
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides, "The State shall
have the right of appeal where the Court sets aside a verdict of
guilty and enters a judgment of acquittal." Proposed rule 3(c)
adopts this provision of the criminal rules and is otherwise consistent with the current interpretation of the statute.3 The rule is
more specific than the statute, however, and provides:
In criminal actions an appeal as of right by the state lies only
from an order or judgment entered by a trial court from which
an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals: (1) the substantive effect of which results in dismissing
an indictment, information, or complaint; (2) setting aside a
verdict of guilty and entering a judgment of acquittal; (3) granting or refusing to revoke probation; (4) arresting judgment; or
(5) remanding a child to the juvenile court."8
In addition, rule 13(a), providing that any question of law may
be brought up for review and relief by any party, would permit
the state to obtain review on any question of law decided adversely to the state if the defendant appeals. None of these provisions would interfere with the right to trial by jury, 7' since only
376. Id. § 40-3403.
377. See Stiller v. State, 516 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tenn. 1974); Gossett v.
State, 224 Tenn. 374, 387-88, 455 S.W.2d 585, 590-91 (1970); State v. Malouf,
199 Tenn. 496, 504-06, 287 S.W.2d 79, 82-83 (1956).
378. For recommended statutes giving the state the right to appeal in
criminal actions, see CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS, supra note 368, § 1.4; ALI
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW § 13 (1935); ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 428 (1931); Note, supra note 364, at 637. The federal statute permitting appeals by the government is 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
379. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 52, at 71:
To give the state the right to appeal from a verdict of not guilty is
to take a step in the direction of despotism. Trial by jury is one method
of obtaining popular and local participation in the administration of
the criminal law. If laws out of harmony with public opinion have been
passed, it gives an opportunity for such public opinion to assert itself.
It is true that a defendant may appeal from a verdict of guilty. But
since he himself is appealing he cannot object that the jury is being
ignored; and it is probable that jury trial was developed more to protect
the rights of individuals than to safeguard society at large.
But see Kronenberg, supra note 364, at 480; Miller, supra note 364, at 497-99;
Comment, supra note 364, at 465-66.
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questions of law are open to review on appeal by the state." To
protect the defendant's liberty interest, rule 8(b) provides that
"defendant shall not be held in jail or to bail during the pendency
of an appeal by the state, or an application for permission to
appeal by the state, unless there are compelling reasons for his
continued detention or being held to bail.""' Defendants without
sufficient financial resources are currently provided counsel,8 2
transcripts," 3 and the like at state expense. As an additional protection against harassment of the defendant, rule 40(b) permits
awarding costs against the state in the same circumstances they
may be awarded against a private litigant."'
F.

Discretionary Review by the State Supreme Court of Final
Decisions of the IntermediateAppellate Courts

In addition to permissive appeals from interlocutory orders,
the proposed rules establish one other type of appeal by permission for the situation in which the supreme court is asked to
exercise its discretionary power of review of final decisions of the
intermediate appellate courts. This discretionary power of review
needs to be considered against the background of the allocation
of subject-matter jurisdiction between the supreme court and intermediate appellate courts.
Under current law, certain specified classes of cases are appealable directly from the trial court to the supreme court,8 and
all other cases are appealable only in the discretion of the supreme court from final determinations of the intermediate appellate courts.? Thus, the supreme court is a court of both first and
second appeal. The highest court of virtually every other state
with intermediate appellate courts also acts as a court of both
first and second appeal. The classification of cases sent directly
to the respective appellate courts for review varies greatly among
380.
14, 1978);
381.
382.
383.
384.

See generally Burks v. United States, 46 U.S.L.W. 4632 (U.S. June
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
See generally CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS, supra note 368, § 1.4.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2017 (1975).
Id. § 40-2040.
See generally Friedenthal, supra note 367, at 96-97; Kronenberg,

supra note 364, at 479; Miller, supra note 364, at 501.

385.
386.

See note 114 supra.
TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 16-452, 27-819 (Supp. 1977).
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the states."' There is also a variety of approaches concerning the
treatment of cases that reach the highest court through the intermediate court of appeals. In some states, certain cases can be
appealed from the intermediate appellate court to the highest
court as a matter of right.- Another common approach is to
permit the highest court to review cases pending but not yet
decided by the intermediate appellate court upon request of the
parties, certification by the intermediate appellate court, or the
highest court's own motion."" Again, review of cases pending before the intermediate appellate court is often restricted to certain
classes of cases.
Proposed rule 11 covers discretionary review by the supreme
court of only final decisions of the intermediate appellate courts.
The rule does not need to address those cases in which an appeal
lies directly from the trial court to the supreme court since all
direct appeals are either appeals as of right or by permission and
are covered by previously discussed rules. Similarly, rule 11 does
not govern review of cases pending in the intermediate appellate
courts since plenary discretionary review by the supreme court
is limited to final decisions of the intermediate appellate courts."0
Thus, the fundamental purpose of rule 11 is to identify those
cases that are of such extraordinary importance that they justify
the burdens of time, expense, and effort associated with double
39
appeals. '
The laws of other jurisdictions identify a number of situations as appropriate for a double appeal. These include cases in
which the decision sought to be reviewed conflicts with other
decisions," 2 involves an important question of law'"' or a signifi387. Sunderland, supra note 114.
388. E.g., FI.A. App. R. 2.1(5)(b); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 317; N.C. GEN. STAT. §
7A-30 (1969); WAsH. R. App. P. 13.2(a).
389. E.g., COLO. App. R. 50(b); MAss. App. R. 11(a); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
16-7-14(C) (1953); N.C. R. App. P. 15.
390. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-452, 27-819 (Supp. 1977).
391. Professor Sunderland severely criticized double appeals. See Sunderland, supra note 114. But the practical problems are such that double appeals
will probably remain a feature of appellate review for some time to come. For a
discussion of a recommended terminal intermediate appellate court, see Lilly
& Scalia, Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia, 57 VA. L. Rav. 3 (1971).
392. See, e.g., ALA. R. APP. P. 39(c)(4); COLO. ApP. R. 49(a)(3); FLA. App.
R. 2.1(5)(b); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 315(a); Min. GEN. CT. R. 853.1(3); N.M. STAT.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

1978]

cant constitutional question, 3 ' involves a matter of public interest,"' or requires exercise of the highest court's supervisory authority.'
Instead of describing classes of decisions of the intermediate
appellate court, proposed rule 11 identifies four reasons of extraordinary importance that justify double appeals. These reasons are "(1) the need to secure uniformity of decision, (2) the
need to secure settlement of important questions of law, (3) the
need to secure settlement of questions of public interest, and (4)
the need for exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority." 9 7 The principal shortcoming of describing categories of cases
is that often such cases are not in fact sufficiently important to
justify a double appeal. For example, double appeals ought not
be permitted simply because a case involves a constitutional or
novel question since not all constitutional or novel questions are
important questions of law. Rule 11 provides that an appeal in
all cases lies only in the discretion of the supreme court and
further provides that the four reasons specified in the rule are
neither controlling nor a full measure of the reasons that the court
will consider.?
The procedure for seeking permission to appeal from final
decisions of the intermediate appellate courts does not differ significantly from the procedure for seeking permission for interlocutory review. An application for permission to appeal must be filed
within thirty days after the date of the entry of the judgment of
the intermediate appellate court or within fifteen days after denial of a petition for rehearing or entry of the judgment on rehearing .- ' The application must contain the following:
ANN. §§ 16o7-14(B)(1)-(2) (1953);
WASH. R. App. P. 13.4(b)(1)-(2).

393.
GEN. STAT.

394.

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§

7A-31(b)(3), (c)(3) (1969);

See, e.g., ILL. SuP. CT. R. 315(a); MiCH. GEN. CT. R. 853.1(1); N.C.
§ 7A-31(b)(3), (c)(3) (1969).
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-7-14(B)(3) (1953); WAsH. R. APP. P.

13.4(b)(3).
395.

APP. R. 2.1(5)(b); MASS. APP. R. 27.1(a); N.M. STAT.
STAT. § 7A-31(b)(3), (c)(3) (1969);
WASH. R. App. P. 13.4(b)(4).
396. See, e.g., CoLO. APP. R. 49(a)(4); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 315(a).
ANN.

See, e.g.,

FLA.

§ 16-7-14(B)(4) (1953); N.C. GE.

397.

PROPOSED TENN.

398.
399.

id.
ld.R. 11(b).

R. App. P. 11(a).
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(1)the date on which the judgment was entered and whether a
petition for rehearing was filed, and if so, the date of the denial
of the petition or the date of entry of the judgment on rehearing;
(2) the questions presented for review; (3) the facts relevant to
the questions presented, but facts correctly stated in the opinion
of the intermediate appellate court need not be restated in the
application; and (4) the reasons, including appropriate authorities, supporting review by the Supreme Court.'
A copy of the opinion of the appellate court must be appended
to the application."' If permission to appeal is granted, the rule
specifies the time within which briefs must be served and filed. 02
It should be emphasized that the purpose of the application is to
demonstrate to the supreme court that the case is an appropriate
one for the exercise of the court's discretion in favor of permitting
an appeal, not to argue the merits of the decision of the intermediate appellate court.
Rule 11 differs from existing law in several respects. Most
significantly, the rule articulates guidelines for the exercise of the
supreme court's discretionary power of review. In addition, rule
11(e) requires two justices to vote in favor of granting permission
to appeal. 03 Under current law, only one justice need favor granting certiorari in order for the case to be heard. 41 Permitting review on the vote of a single justice seems to create needless expense and delay since in all probability the judgment will be
affirmed. The effect of granting review is simply to enable one
member of the court to write a dissenting opinion."'5 Third, the
time for filing an application for permission to appeal is thirty
days from the date of entry of the judgment of the intermediate
appellate court. No extensions are permitted."' This differs from
the forty-five days that may be extended an additional forty-five
days currently permitted for seeking certiorari."07 Finally, rule 11
changes existing terminology. Instead of speaking of certiorari,
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id.
Id.
Id.R. 11(f).
Id.R. I1(e).

404.

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-452, 27-819 (Supp. 1977).

405.

Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate

Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REv, 211, 214-15 (1957).
406. PROPOSED TENN. R. App. P. 2,
407. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-452, 27-820 (1955 & Supp, 1977).
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the rule talks of an application for permission to appeal. While
renaming familiar procedures is not inherently desirable, certiorari is an ambiguous word used to describe distinguishable procedures capable of a more functional description.'"" Moreover, it
proved far simpler in the overall scheme of the appellate rules to
divide all plenary review proceedings into appeals as of right and
appeals by permission.
G.

Effect of an Appeal on Enforceability

If an appeal, either as of right or by permission, is taken, two
important problems arise. The first concerns what effect the appeal should have on the enforceability of the judgment or order
appealed from and whether security ought to be required. The
other involves the record on appeal.
Quite inexplicably there appears to be an absence of critical
commentary and empirical study concerning the perplexing problem of enforceability pending appeal in civil actions, although
there is commentary explaining how the rules of various jurisdictions are intended to work.' 0 ' As a result, enforceability pending
appeal is an area in which it appears desirable to permit the
exercise of a measure of judicial discretion until experience and
study make more definitive guidelines perceptible. Moreover, if
the Commission's deliberations are an accurate gauge, the current law in Tennessee, particularly that concerning the need to
secure judgments, seems at times to be unnecessarily complicated if not unascertainable. Although the need for a concise and
understandable statement of the law was therefore clear, the proper content of such a statement was far less clear.
The Commission ultimately recommended that Tennessee
Rule of Civil Procedure 62 on stay of proceedings to enforce a
judgment be extensively amended and that the current statutes
on security and stays be repealed." 0 Proposed amended rule 62
provides that no execution may issue upon a judgment until the
expiration of thirty days after its entry, subject to certain enumerated exceptions:
408. For example, certiorari sometimes refers to a method of securing
interlocutory review. See text accompanying note 359 supra.
409. See, e.g., 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
62.01-.10 (1975); 11 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2901-2909 (1973).
410. The most important sections of the Tennessee Code that would be
repealed are TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-312 to 318 (1955).
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In injunction and receivership actions, and in actions that remove a public officer as otherwise provided by law, or that
award, change or otherwise affect the custody of a minor child,
an interlocutory or final judgment shall not be stayed after entry
unless otherwise ordered by the court and upon such terms as
to bond or otherwise as it deems proper to secure the other
party. The party in whose favor judgment is entered may also
obtain execution or take proceedings to enforce the judgment
prior to expiration of the 30-day period if the party against
whom judgment is entered is about fraudulently to dispose of,
conceal, or remove his property, thereby endangering satisfaction of the judgment."'
An automatic thirty-day stay in injunction and receivership actions might effectively defeat the granted relief, and the interests
of the public and minor child were deemed to be of such importance as to justify excepting judgments removing public officers
and custody decrees from the automatic thirty-day stay.412 Even
after an appeal is taken in these actions, and in actions for alimony or child support, "the [trial] court in its discretion may
suspend relief or grant whatever additional or modified relief is
deemed appropriate during the pendency of the appeal and upon
such terms as to bond or otherwise as it deems proper to secure
the other party.""' Except for injunction, receivership, removal,
and custody actions, the execution of a judgment is additionally
stayed
for 30 days after entry of any of the following orders made upon
timely motion: (1) granting or denying a motion under rule 50.02
for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict;
(2) granting or denying a motion under rule 52.02 to amend or
make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration
of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3)
granting or denying a motion under rule 59.03 to alter or amend
a judgment; and (4) denying a motion under rule 59.01 for a new
trial."'
411.

412.
eg.,

CAL.

413,

R.Civ. P. 62.01.
Other jurisdictions take a similar approach to custody decrees. See,
CIV. PROC. CODE § 917.7 (West Supp. 1977).
PROPOSED TENN.

PRoPosED TENN. R. Civ. P. 62.03. For a discussion of the current law

concerning the trial court's power to alter a decree for child support during the
pendency of an appeal, see Smith v.Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1975).
414. PROPOSED TENN. R.Civ. P. 62.02.

19-1
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Under proposed appellate rule 4(b), these same motions also terminate the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal, which
need not be filed until and within thirty days after entry of the
enumerated orders. 5 Thus, these motions have an identical effect on the time after which execution may issue and within
which notice of appeal must be filed.
In order to obtain a stay beyond the automatic thirty days
and the additional stay provided upon the making of the previously specified motions, an appellant must ordinarily give a
bond or other security," 6 the conditions of which are as follows:
A bond for stay shall have sufficient surety and: (1) if an
appeal is from a judgment directing the payment of money, the
bond shall be conditioned to secure the payment of the judgment in full, interest, damages for delay, and costs on appeal;
(2) if an appeal is from a judgment ordering the assignment,
sale, delivery or possession of personal or real property, the bond
shall be conditioned to secure obedience of the judgment and
payment for the use, occupancy, detention, and damage or
waste of the property from the time of appeal until delivery of
possession of the property, and costs on appeal. If the appellant
places personal property in the custody of an officer designated
by the court, such fact shall be considered by the court in fixing
7
the amount of the bond.4
Additional provisions of rule 62 exempt poor persons from the
requirement of securing the judgment and empower the trial
court, upon a proper showing, to require less than the full amount
of security based upon a party's financial condition.' 8 If the appellant is the state, any county or municipal corporation within
the state, or an officer or agency thereof acting in their behalf, the
judgment is stayed automatically and no bond or other security
is required. 41' In cases in which a bond is required, the stay is
effective when the bond is approved by the trial court.2 0 Finally,
proposed appellate rule 7 establishes a procedure for summary
review of the trial court's action, although it also recognizes the
415.

See note 123 supra.

416. PRoPosED TENN. R. Civ. P. 62,04.
417. Id. R. 62,05.
418. Id.
419.

Id. R. 62.06.

420. Id. R. 62.04.
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appellate court's authority to order a stay, approve a bond, or

grant other relief without first seeking relief from the trial court
if "application to the trial court for the relief sought is not practicable .... "421 A related provision establishes a summary pro-

cedure for review of bail orders by the defendant both prior to and
42 2
after conviction.

As indicated earlier, the effect an appeal should have on the
enforceability of the judgment or order appealed from and
whether security ought to be required is a perplexing one that has
escaped meaningful commentary and empirical study. The overwhelming majority of states, however, condition a stay of execution in actions for money or property upon a bond or other security securing the judgment,41 although the states differ as to

whether a stay upon filing a bond is a matter of right or lies in
the discretion of the court. 24 A handful of states provide that the
taking of the appeal itself stays execution without any bond requirement,"' and at least one state permits execution in certain
circumstances if the judgment creditor provides security for restitution.426 No state has adopted the position that a stay may not
421. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P.7(a).
422. Id.R. 8. The proposed rules do not set forth the circumstances in
which release may be obtained in criminal actions. The relevant statutory provisions are TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1201 to 1243, 40-3405 to 3408 (1975 & Supp.
1977). The recent enactment of the Release from Custody and Bail Reform Act
of 1977 may affect these statutory references in an as yet undertermined fashion.
See 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 506, §§ 1-48.
423. E.g,, ALASKA R. Civ. P. 62(d); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 917.1 (West
Supp. 1977); CoLo. R. Civ. P. 62(d); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 305(a); IND. T.R. 62(D);
KAN. CIV. PRO. STAT. ANN. § 60-262(d) (Vernon 1963); Ky. R. Civ. P. 73.04; MD.
R.P. 1017; MINN. R. Civ. ApP. P. 108.01; NEV. R. Civ. P. 62(d); N.M. R. CIv. P.
62(d); N.Y. CiV, PRAC. LAW § 5519 (McKinney 1963); N.D. R. Civ. P. 62(d); OHIo
R.Civ. P. 62(B); WASH. R. APP. P. 8.1.
424. E.g., MD. R.P. 1017(e) (lower court may refuse stay).
425. E.g., ME. R. Civ. P. 62(e); MAsS. R. Civ. P. 62(d).
426. MINN.R. Civ. APP. P. 108.04 provides:
Notwithstanding an appeal from a money judgment and security given
for a stay of proceedings thereon, the trial court, on motion and notice
to the adverse party, may grant leave to the respondent to enforce the
judgment upon his giving bond to the appellant as herein provided, if
it be made to appear to the satisfaction of the trial court that the appeal
was taken for the purpose of delay. Such bond shall be executed by the
respondent, or someone in his behalf, and shall be conditioned that if
the judgment be reversed or modified the respondent will make such
restitution as the Supreme Court shall direct.
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be granted under any circumstances in money and property actions. This universal acceptance of the propriety of stays, at least
in some circumstances, may be rooted in history."' The very opportunity to appeal accorded in all states stands as a testament
to the fact that judgments of trial courts are not invariably correct. Accordingly, there is an element of unfairness in depriving
a person of his money or property before his liability has been
conclusively adjudicated. In addition, permitting execution prior
to completion of the appellate process presents some practical
problems if the trial court's judgment is reversed. The party
against whom execution issues may not be able to be made whole
if the executing party is without sufficient assets when the judgment is later reversed on appeal, although security could be required before execution would issue. Even if security is required,
however, the judgment debtor may be deprived of needed use or
enjoyment of property for which he cannot be adequately compensated in monetary terms, or he may be forced prematurely
into bankruptcy. On the other hand, the judgment creditor may
not have as great a need for the money or property involved. Also,
undoing execution because of a later reversal requires expenditure of more effort and money and raises more complicated factual and legal issues than would be the case if execution issued
only upon completion of the appellate process.
Delaying execution until the appeal process is finally exhausted is not immune from criticism, however. While appeals
are universally permitted for the correction of errors, they are not
deemed so fundamentally important as to be required by the
Federal Constitution.'2 Although errors requiring reversal are not
uncommon, most errors are harmless or require only partial rever427.

An appeal in equity vacated the decree. 1 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

112, Comment b (1971); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 41,
Comment d (1942). But see Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARD.
L. REv. 994, 1072 (1965). While a pending writ of error did not vacate the
judgment, it apparently did act as a supersedeas to execution. Note, The Finality of Judgments in the Conflict of Laws, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 878, 880 (1941).
428. Ohio v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930); McKane
v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). Indeed, one distinguished commentator has
observed that someday "the fact will have to be faced that . . . there cannot
be an appeal of right in all cases." Hazard, After the Trial Court-the Realities
of Appellate Review, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 83 (H.
Jones ed. 1965).
CONFLICT OF LAWS §
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sal. "IThe fact that most cases on appeal are affirmed means that
the party prevailing at the trial level can quite accurately urge
that it is probably he, not the appellant, who is being deprived
of the use and enjoyment of property or money if execution is
delayed pending appeal. Moreover, the availability of a stay may
invite frivolous appeals taken only for the purpose of delay during
which time appellant, unless restrained, may dissipate his assets
or damage appellee's property. The requirement of security alleviates this problem, but it is not a complete solution for the
judgment creditor who needs his property in kind or needs his
money immediately rather than at some indefinite time in the
future. Finally, the remaining arguments in favor of stays-the
potential of premature bankruptcy and the complicated issues
that may arise in undoing a completed execution-can be effectively refuted. The bankruptcy argument is inapplicable if the
judgment debtor is financially solvent and no empirical data
demonstrating the pervasiveness of bankruptcy in these circumstances is available. Besides, it generally works to the judgment
creditor's disadvantage to force his debtor into bankruptcy. With
regard to the factual and legal issues that would arise in undoing
a completed execution, the well-developed law of restitution is
available to provide needed guidance. The possibility of being
required to undo execution exists even today in the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions in which the appeal itself does not stay
execution, since appellant may not provide security. In short, this
problem has not proven to be insuperable.
The desirability of requiring security to stay execution is also
debatable. Two purposes are served by a security requirement.
First, a bond or other security gives the opposing party some
assurance that the judgment will be expeditiously satisfied and
that he will be made whole for any damages caused by the delay
on appeal. Second, a bond securing the judgment, and not costs
alone, may be aimed at deterring frivolous appeals taken only to
429, A study of nearly 1000 published opinions in civil actions taken to
either the Tennessee Supreme Court or Court of Appeals revealed that 58% of
the cases before the supreme court were affirmed and 54% of the cases before
the court of appeals were affirmed. Eleven percent of the supreme court's cases
and 14% of the court of appeals' cases were affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Outright reversals occurred in 31% of the supreme court's cases and 32% of the
court of appeals' cases, These statistics were compiled by my former research
assistant, Elizabeth A. Snyder.
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delay execution. Whether a security requirement achieves these
objectives is not known. The bond premium may be less than the
reduction in the judgment that the judgment debtor may gain if
the judgment creditor needs to settle in order to avoid the delay
in payment incident to an appeal. If the bond is not set in an
adequate amount or fails to cover noneconomic loss, the security
may not be sufficient to make the ultimate winner whole. The
fact that bonds cost money not only increases the expense of
already expensive litigation but also disadvantages those unable
4
to afford a bond or find a willing surety.3
These problems can
be substantially alleviated, however, by the trial court's discretionary power to require less than full security from those financially able to secure a part of the judgment, or none at all from
poor persons.43 ' The trial court's authority in proposed new rule
65A to accept security "in any . . . form the court deems sufficient to secure the other party" should also alleviate these problems.
All the arguments for and against stays and security requirements suggest the need for some judicial discretion. Accordingly,
proposed rule 62.07 provides that "in exceptional cases" the trial
court may stay proceedings "on any other terms or conditions as
the court deems proper." In a similar vein, proposed rule 62.08
permits the appellate court "to stay proceedings or to suspend
relief or grant whatever additional or modified relief is deemed
appropriate during the pendency of any appeal or to make any
order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the effectiveness
of any judgment that may subsequently be entered." To be sure,
this discretionary power combined with the other provisions of
the relevant rules cannot be viewed as a final, perfect accommodation of the conflicting interests. But until further study provides better answers, the proposed rules at least should cure some
of the defects in existing law2 '
430. See also Dobbs, Should Security Be Required as a Pre-Condition to
ProvisionalInjunctive Relief?, 52 N.C.L. Ray. 1091, 1093-96 (1974).
431. See text accompanying note 418 supra.
432. Security for costs in the amount of $500 must be filed in all civil
actions, unless an appellant is otherwise exempted by the proposed appellate
rules or the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or has filed a bond for stay that
includes security for the payment of costs on appeal. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP.
P. 6. Proposed appellate rule 18 permits poor persons to proceed without the
giving of security, and proposed amended civil trial rule 62.06 permits the state
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The Record on Appeal

The second significant problem that arises once an appeal is
taken involves the record on appeal, "the story upon which the
reviewing court is to say whether or not one of the parties has been
ill-used under the law." 4 3 Here, as much as in any other area, it
is necessary to consult history in order to understand the current
law in Tennessee.
Before 1285 the appellate record in England consisted only
of the judgment roll, which included the writ, the pleadings, the
verdict, and the judgment.4"3' This rather limited amount of information, however, is all that was probably necessary for appellate
review in an era in which the jury was the knower of facts and
not the finder of facts. 3 Later, other matters were included in the
record; 3' but, despite the dramatic evolution of the role of the
jury, "It]he evidence, proceedings and rulings on the trial of the
action including the proceedings on motion for a new trial or
rehearing were not part of the record proper . . . ."Il In order to
incorporate this latter kind of information into the record, the
Statute of Westminster of 1285111 introduced the bill of exceptions. For the first time, the appellate court was in a position to
consider errors that occurred at the trial itself. 3' The record on
appeal thereafter consisted of two parts, the original judgment
roll and the latter-day bill of exceptions. Moreover, these two
parts of the record were mutually exclusive.
and other specified governmental entities also to proceed without giving security. It should be noted that the California Supreme Court held that, under the
circumstances there presented, the absolute right to demand security for costs
without a prior judiciai inquiry into the reasonableness of the amount or the
merits of plaintiff's action constituted a taking of property without due process
of law. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 488, 535 P.2d 712, 121 Cal. Rptr.
585 (1975), noted in 89 HARV. L. REv. 1006 (1976).
433. Stone, The Record on Appeal in Civil Cases, 23 VA. L. REV. 766, 768
(1937).
434. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 658; see R. POUND, supra note
43, at 44.
435. For a classic discussion of the historical evolution of the jury, see J.
THAYER, supra note 53.
436. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 658.
437. Stone, supra note 433, at 772.
438. 13 Edw. 1, c. 31.
439. R. POUND. supra note 43, at 44-45; Stone, supra note 433, at 773-74;
Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 652; Judicial Review, supra note 52, at
419.
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Matters of exception could never become a part of the judgment
roll, and matters of record could never become part of a bill of
exception. . . . The question was not so much whether a matter
was proper for the appellate court to consider, but rather
whether the proper vehicle was employed to bring it before the
court. If proper material came up through the wrong part of the
appellate record-for example in the judgment roll when it
should have come up in the bill of exceptions, or vice versa-it
was treated as a nullity and the court would not consider it.""
Thus it is that, because of what happened nearly seven hundred
years ago, Tennessee law to this day draws a distinction between
the technical record and bill of exceptions, and the courts are
called upon to decide what matters properly belong in each."' To
take a little license with Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of [Edward I]. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."2
Professor Sunderland observed in 1943 that "[b]ills of exception
became obsolete in England so long ago that many of the oldest
men now in the offices of the Royal Courts of Justice never heard
of them, and the record proper as such no longer exists in English
practice."" 3
One of the purposes of the proposed rules treating the record
on appeal is to abolish the senseless distinction between the bill
of exceptions and the technical record. "They merely provide
obstacles which confuse and delay the litigant and divert his
attention and that of the court from the really meritorious questions which are of primary concern." 4 The method of preparing
the record should, in addition, be inexpensive and simple and
should convey what transpired below fully, fairly, and accurately
without overburdening the appellate court with unnecessary matter.
One method that has been utilized to achieve these ends is
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
tion

Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 658-59.
See note 45 supra.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 659.
Id. Professor Sunderland's observation applied as well to the distincbetween the bill of exceptions and the wayside bill of exceptions.
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the narrative, as opposed to a question-and-answer record.' It
was argued in support of narrative records that they would save
the expense of reproducing a more voluminous verbatim record,
concomitantly save the time of the judges who otherwise would
be required to "wade through thousands of pages of printed testimony,""' and thereby prevent one-judge decisions that would
result from the inability of each judge to read the entire record. 7
On three separate occasions narrative records were utilized in the
federal courts, and each time their use was abandoned. " ' While
445. For a discussion of the significance of verbatim recording of proceedings, see Louisell & Pirsig, The Significance of Verbatim Recording of Proceedings in American Adjudication, 38 MINN. L. REV. 29 (1953). These authors note
the effect of verbatim recording of proceedings on the behavior at trial of the
court and counsel and on the ability for meaningful review in certain circumstances on motions for a new trial and on appeal. The availability of a verbatim
recording seems additionally important in order to ascertain whether error is
harmless or prejudicial. See text accompanying notes 501-53 infra.
446. Griswold & Mitchell, The Narrative Record in Federal Equity
Appeals, 42 HARV. L. REv. 483, 503 (1929).
447. Id. at 502-03; Stone, supra note 433, at 789.
448. Narrative records were initially authorized by the first Judiciary Act,
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84, but abandoned in 1803. Act
of March 3, 1803, ch. 983, § 2, 2 Stat. 244. Narrative records were again authorized in 1861, Equity R. 67, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 6 (1861), but in 1891 the narrative
form was made optional. Equity R. 67, 144 U.S. 689, 690 (1891). Narrative
records were last authorized in 1912. Equity R. 75(b), 226 U.S. 671 (1913). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that were adopted in 1938 once again made the
narrative form optional, Fed. R. Civ. P. 75(c), 308 U.S. 753-54 (1939), and the
1966 amendments to rule 75, Fed. R. Civ. P. 75, 383 U.S. 1064-67 (1965), as do
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure today, FED. R. App. P. 10, require a
transcript of proceedings if available. As one commentator observed, narrative
records are
explainable only as an anachronism surviving from the days when the
only record of the trial consisted in the notes of the trial judge and a
narrative statement of the proceedings was the easiest to prepare. Since
the courts have been provided with stenographers and their proceedings are taken down in shorthand, it is a useless waste of time and effort
to require that a narrative statement of the proceedings be prepared;
such statement, moreover, does not present nearly so accurate a picture
as the transcript of the stenographer's notes.
Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5 (1950). Since the
courts in Tennessee have not been provided with stenographers for civil actions,
narrative records are not anachronisms. However, if a verbatim report of proceedings is available, the proposed rules require that a transcript be prepared.
PROPOSED TENN. R. App. P. 24(b); see text accompanying notes 476-78 infra.
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there may have been some saving in reproduction costs, it was
argued that "all of this saving, and much more, is lost in the
process of reducing the record to a narrative." 4 Also, reducing
the record to a narrative itself takes time, so while the appellate
court may save time, the entire appellate process may be lengthened." Finally, and most significantly, "lilt is impossible for
the court to get a true picture of the proceedings at the trial
except by reading the questions of counsel and the answers of
witnesses in the words which were used at the trial." 45'
Today, appeals in the federal system for the most part are
taken on a record consisting of a verbatim transcript, the papers
and exhibits filed in the district court, a certified copy of the
docket entries,'12 and a document known as the appendix. ' The
appendix consists of the relevant docket entries, pleadings,
charge, findings or opinion, the judgment, order or decision in
question, "and any other parts of the record to which the parties
wish to direct the particular attention of the court."4 '' Essentially
the appendix is an addendum to the briefs and provides each
appellate judge with a condensed version of the record.' If the
appendix contains all the information necessary for decision, the
appeal can be determined without recourse to the record. 56 If the
449. Griswold & Mitchell, supra note 446, at 503-04; see Stone, supra note
433, at 790. It should be kept in mind that when these authors wrote, records
were printed and therefore far more expensive to prepare than today. See Joiner,
Lawyer Attitudes Toward Law and ProceduralReform, 50 JUDICATURE 23, 25

(1966).
450.
451.

Griswold & Mitchell, supra note 446, at 504.
Id.; see Parker, supra note 448; Stone, supra note 433, at 790.

452,

FED. R. App. P. 10(a).

453.
454.

Id. R. 30.
Id.R. 30(a).

230.01-.02 (1975); 16
455. See generally 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, F. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3976 (1977); C. WRIGHT, supra note 158, § 104, at 524-25; Cohn,

The Proposed Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 54 Gso. L.J. 431, 459-63
(1966); Longsdorf, Record on Appeal in Civil Cases in Federal Courts-An Analysis of Methods, 26 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 179 (1943); Slade, The Appendix to the
Briefs: Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 28 FED. B.J. 116
(1968); Willcox, Karlen, & Roemer, Justice Lost-By What Appellate Papers

Cost, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 934, 945-48 (1958).
456.

Longsdorf, supra note 455, at 182.
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appendix is insufficient, resort can always be had to the record
itself." 7
The appendix system, however, was controversial when proposed"," and has been subjected to substantial criticism. Although
perhaps to a lesser extent, preparation of the appendix, like preparation of the narrative record, is costly and time-consuming as
well as complicated. 59 The costs are particularly high in cases in
which it is argued that the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings or a verdict, since the inevitable tendency is to reproduce
all the evidence in the appendix.6 0 Similarly, "[ilf the evidence
is diffusely technical or documentary, excerpting is difficult and
the tendency is to overload.""' Moreover, some of the advantages
of the appendix can be achieved simply by quoting relevant portions of the record in the brief in connection with the argument
itself. 2 Within the federal system, the Ninth Circuit does not
require preparation of an appendix,' and other circuits dispense
with the appendix for certain kinds of cases46 ' pursuant to federal
appellate rule 30(f), which empowers the circuits to "dispense
with the requirement of an appendix and permit appeals to be
heard on the original record, with such copies of the record, or
relevant parts thereof, as the court may require." California
adopted the appendix system in 1907 but later abandoned it as
amounting to "unnecessary, expensive, and ofttimes garbled
duplication of material already available in the record.""' Justice
Traynor has been quoted as saying that hearing appeals in California on the original transcript alone has worked well, has not
been unduly burdensome although only one record is available for
457.

FED.

R. App. P. 30(a).

458. Professor Wright notes that "Ithe question of the contents and
preparation of the appendix was more controversial than any other question in
the preparation of the Appellate Rules and at one point three different drafts
were distributed for consideration by the profession." C. WRIGHr, supra note
158, § 104, at 524.

459.
note 455,
460.
461.
462.

Cohn, supra note 455, at 461-62; Wilcox, Karlen, & Roemer, supra
at 461.
Longsdorf, supra note 455, at 182.
Id. See also Cohn, supra note 455, at 461.
Longsdorf, supra note 455, at 182.

463.

9TH CIR. R. 4.

464.

IST C1R. R. 11(f); 2D CmR. R. 10(a); 3D CmR. R. 10(a); 5TH CiR. R. 13(b);
11(a)(1); 10TH Ct. R. 10(a), (c).

6TH Cm. R. 10(a); 8TH CIa. R.

465.

Longsdorf, supra note 455, at 183.
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the entire court, has caused no difficulty in transferring the
record among the judges, and has not contributed to the evil of
one-judge opinions.1 6
As a result of these conflicting considerations, the proposed
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure do not require preparation of an appendix but afford the parties the option of preparing
an appendix if they so desire." The cost of preparing the appendix, however, is not a recoverable cost on appeal.4 8
The method of preparing the record under the proposed rules
is similar to the method specified in the federal rules. If the parties do nothing at all, the record on appeal automatically consists
of (1) copies of all papers filed in the trial court, except subpoenas, summons, discovery papers, and jury lists, none of which
typically are needed on appeal; (2) the original of any exhibits
filed in the trial court; (3) a transcript or statement of the evidence or proceedings; and (4) any other matters designated by a
party (including those matters just noted that are not normally
included in the record) that are needed to convey a fair, accurate,
and complete account of what transpired in the trial court."9
Papers relating to discovery and offered in evidence for any purpose are treated as exhibits. ' By drawing no formal distinction
between the different parts, all constituting but one record, the
rules eliminate the present distinction between the technical
record and the bill of exceptions and the concern over what matters properly belong in each.'' By transmitting a complete account of what transpired below, the appellate court is in a posi466. Willcox, Karlen, & Roemer, supra note 455, at 948.
467. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 28. Proposed rule 28 may well prove to
be the least significant of the proposed rules.
The method of preparing the appendix is typically referred to as the separate appendix method. Although the appellant is directed by proposed rule 28(a)
to reproduce all parts of the record that must be studied in order to determine
the issues presented and not merely those parts that support his argument, the
rule merely encourages, but does not require, the parties to agree upon a single
appendix. The appellee may include in a separate appendix to his brief any
additional parts of the record he deems essential for the judges to read. The
parties may rely on parts of the record not included in the appendix, which is
served and filed with a party's brief. References in the briefs to parts of the
record reproduced in an appendix must be made to the pages of the appendix
at which they appear. Id. R. 28(c).
468. See id. R. 40(c).
469. id. R.24(a).
470. Id.
471. Bills of exception are explicitly abolished. Id. R. 24(h).
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tion to ascertain whether error is harmless or prejudicial and
whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the findings or verdict.
If less than a full record is considered sufficient, however, the
appellant may, within fifteen days after filing his notice of appeal, file and serve a description of the parts of the record he
intends to include on appeal.7 2 The appellant's description must
be accompanied by a short and plain declaration of the issues he
intends to present on appeal,' If the appellee desires to have any
other parts included in the record, he must file and serve a designation of additional parts within fifteen days after service of the
appellant's declaration of the issues and designation."' All parts
of the record described or designated by the parties are included
by the clerk of the trial court as the record on appeal.'75
Because of the need to have an exact record of what took
place in the trial court and to avoid the inaccuracies that inevitably attend preparation of a narrative record, 70 the rules require a
verbatim transcript "[ilf a stenographic report or other contemporaneously recorded, substantially verbatim recital of the evidence or proceedings is available."' The rules do not require that
a stenographic report be made of all the evidence or proceedings,
however, since the Advisory Commission concluded that any such
requirement would be impracticable given the shortage of qualified court reporters in some areas and the undue expense in certain kinds of cases. 7 ' If a stenographic or other substantially verbatim record is not available, the rules establish a procedure for
generating a narrative record.' In all cases, the parties can prepare an agreed statement as the record on appeal in lieu of the
full record that otherwise results if the parties do nothing at all.'
472. Id. R. 24(a).
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id,
476. See text accompanying note 451 supra.
477. Pxoposw TENN. R. APP. P. 24(b).
478. Of course, in criminal actions verbatim transcripts will almost always
be available since the courts have been provided court reporters for such actions.
See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2030 to 2043 (1975).
479. Piioposer, TENN. R. APe. P. 24(c). The procedure is essentially the
same as that described in the text for'preparing less than the entire transcript.
See text accompanying notes 481-84 infra.
480. PRoPosEn TENN. R. APP. P. 24(d).
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The method of preparing the verbatim transcript is substantially the same as the method of preparing the entire record, of
which the transcript is only a part. If less than the entire transcript is to be included in the record, the appellant must, within
fifteen days after filing his notice of appeal, file and serve a description of the parts of the transcript he intends to include in the
record. 8 ' The appellant's description must be accompanied "by
a short and plain declaration of the issues he intends to present
on appeal." 2 The appellant's declaration and description of the
parts of the transcript to be included in the record may be filed
and served with the declaration and description of the parts of the
record to be included on appeal." ' The appellee is then given the
opportunity to designate additional parts, which must be prepared at the appellant's expense unless he applies for an order
requiring appellee to do so."' The transcript must be filed within
ninety days after filing the notice of appeal.1' 5 The appellant must
give the appellee notice of the filing of the transcript and the
appellee is given fifteen days to object to the transcript as filed.",
If no objection is made, the transcript as filed is included in the
record on appeal." 7
Unless the parties are unable to agree on what transpired, it
is not necessary for the trial court to authenticate the record on
appeal,"' although the transcript must be certified as accurate by
the appellant, his counsel, or the reporter."' Omissions, improper
inclusions, and misstatements may be remedied at any time,
pursuant to stipulation of the parties or on motion of a party or
on motion of the trial or appellate court.'" This procedure should
be somewhat more convenient than the current scheme, inherited
from the common law,"' for diminution of the record.0 Elimina-

481.
482.
483.
484.

Id. R. 24(b).
Id.
Id. R. 24(a).
Id. R. 24(b).

485.

Id.

486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.

Id.
Id.
Id. R. 24(0.
Id. R. 24(b). A narrative record must also be so certified. Id. R. 24(c).
Id. R. 24(e).
Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 660.
See TENN. SuP. CT.R. 9; TENN. CT.App. R. 20.
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tion of the current requirement of authentication of the bill of
exceptions by the trial court is designed to lighten the burden of
both the parties and the trial court and is based on the assumption that the parties in an adversary setting will see to it that the
record is accurate. Many members of the Tennessee bench do not
share this assumption, but at least in cases in which a stenographic transcript is available it seems unlikely that any untoward problems will arise.
As an additional step in simplifying the record, assignments
of error are abolished."e ' Assignments of error are simply a remnant of the theory at common law that proceedings in error were
an accusation against the trial judge."' In the words of Professor
Sunderland,
As a part of a modern system of appellate review assignments
of error serve no jurisdictional purpose, and are useful only for
giving notice of the points to be raised before the appellate
court. When used simply for this purpose, there is a definite
advantage in dropping the term "assignments of error," since it
carries with it common-law implications which merely confuse
and obstruct . . . .

For "assignments of error," the rules substitute the term "issues
presented for review."'9 6 The issues are set forth in the briefs,
which must contain, among other things, a jurisdictional statement in cases appealed directly from the trial court to the supreme court, a statement of the case, a statement of the facts with
appropriate references to the record, an argument, and a short
conclusion stating the precise relief sought.9 7 To facilitate preparation of the briefs, the record on appeal is retained in the trial
9 ' In order to hold down
court until receipt of the appellee's brief."
costs, neither the record nor the briefs need to be printed," 9 and
the rate of recoverable costs cannot be higher "than [that] gen493.

PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 3(h). See generally Wilson, Assignments

of Error in Appellate Practice, 9 U. KAN. L. Rv. 165 (1960).
494.

See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.

495. Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 660; see American Bar Association, Report of the Committee on Simplification and Improvement of Appellate Practice, 63 A.B.A. RaP. 602, 604 (1938).
496. PROPOSED TENN. R. APp. P. 27(a)(4).
497. Id. R.27(a).
498. Id. R.25(b), (d).
499. Id. R.30(a).
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erally charged for photocopying in the area where the [trial
court] clerk's office is located."' 10
L

The Effect of Error

Once the briefs are in and oral argument has been heard,wi
the appellate court must consider the issues presented in light of
the substantive law. The proposed rules offer no guidance here.
But if, after careful deliberation, the court concludes error has
been committed, the rules speak to the "riddle"502 of whether the
500. Id. R. 40(f).
501. Some federal courts of appeals have curtailed the availability of oral
argument. See Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 257, 265-69. In England, on the
other hand, "appellate argumentation is entirely oral." P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 16 (1976); see D.KARLEN, APPELLATE
COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 152-54 (1963); CRIMINAL APPEALS,
supra note 132, at 71-80; Wiener, English and American Appeals Compared, 50
A.B.A.J. 635 (1964). The American Bar Association has expressed its opposition
to the curtailment or elimination of oral argument in nonfrivolous appeals.
Action of the House of Delegates, August 1974, reprinted in 2 ADVISORY COUNCIL
FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, QUANTITY AND QUALITY IN APPELLATE JusncE 32 (1975).
The Association's Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration recommends that oral argument be denied only "if the court concludes from a review
of the briefs and record of the case that its deliberation would not be significantly aided by oral argument." APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS, supra note 121,
§ 3.35. Similarly, the Commission on Revision of the Federal Appellate System
recommended that the appellant
be entitled as a matter of right to present oral argument, unless: (a)
the appeal is frivolous; (b) the dispositive issue or set of issues has been
recently authoritatively decided; or (c) the facts are simple, the determination of the appeal rests on the application of settled rules of law,
and no useful purpose could be served by oral argument.
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE

AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: REcOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

48

(1975).

The

pro-

posed rules provide that oral argument will be heard in every appeal on request

of a party or the appellate court. PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 35(a), (h). The
Advisory Commission explicitly rejected a proposal that would have permitted
the appellate court to dispense with oral argument even though requested by a
party. See generally P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra at 1624.
502. This is Justice Roger Traynor's characterization of the problem. See
note 50 supra. Llewellyn thought in 1960 that Justice Traynor's concern with
finding a pattern to distinguish harmless from prejudicial error "is probably a
full generation ahead of him and me." K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 81, at 197

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

error is harmless or prejudicial.0 3
The problem of identifying error as prejudicial or harmless
has a history in need of telling. Wigmore states that until the
landmark case of Crease v. Barrett,"" the orthodox English view
was that an error in admitting or excluding evidence "was not a
sufficient ground for setting aside the verdict and ordering a new
trial, unless upon all the evidence it appeared to the judges that
the truth had thereby not been reached."' ' 5 This formulation of
the orthodox English rule seems to equate harmless error with the
correctness of the judgment or, alternatively, the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the result.5"0Doe v. Tyler,07 one of the
principal cases upon which Wigmore relied, certainly supports his
formulation. In Doe the court determined that a verdict of the
jury would be sustained if the finding could be justified independently of the evidence that was the subject of the objection.
On the other hand, Rex v. Ball,"'5 the other principal case upon
which Wigmore relied, can be construed to establish a significantly different test of harmless error. This test does not equate
harmlessness with correctness. Rather, if, but for the error, the
n.194. Traynor in characteristic fashion has advanced a resolution to the problem sooner than even one of the most insightful jurisprudes imagined possible.
503. Justice Traynor's book, see note 50 supra, is by far the best treatment
of the subject. For other discussions, see C. McCoaMhcK, supra note 220, § 183;
7 MOORE's FEDERAL PaCTCE
61.01-.12 (1975); 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
EVIDENCE
103[06] (1977); 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 220, § 21; 11 C. WRIGHT
& A. MIuER, FEDERAL PRACTrCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2881-2888 (1973); Baker,
Reversible Error in Homicide Cases, 23 J.CraM. L.C. & P.S. 28 (1932); Calvert,
The Development of the Doctrine of Harmless Error in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV.
1 (1952); Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A

Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1976); Gibbs, Prejudicial
Error:Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3 VILL. L.
REV. 48 (1957); Hebert, The Problem of Reversible Error in Louisiana, 6 TUL.
L. REv. 169 (1932); Mause, Harmless ConstitutionalError: The Implications of
Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1966); Saltzburg, The Harm of
Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973); Note, The Harmless Error Rule
Reviewed, 47 COLUM. L. R-V. 450 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Rule Reviewed];

Comment, Harmless ConstitutionalError, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967); Note, A
Comment on Application of the Harmless ConstitutionalErrorRule to "Confession" Cases, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 144.
504. 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (1835).
505. 1 J.WIoMOns, supra note 220, § 21, at 365.
506. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 50, at 17-22.
507. 130 Eng. Rep. 1397 (1830).
508. 168 Eng. Rep. 721 (1807).
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party asserting the error might have prevailed and a verdict in his
favor upheld on appeal, the error is prejudicial regardless of the
appellate court's opinion of the correctness of the result. 9 This
more stringent test of harmless error is surprising since, as mentioned in Ball, a criminal case, the English doctrine of double
jeopardy apparently prevented a new trial upon reversal. " '
Crease v. Barrett, like its predecessors, is subject to conflicting interpretations. In this case plaintiff had demanded a toll for
tin extracted from a mine. The dispositive issue was whether the
surface land was part of plaintiff's leasehold or the private property of another. Defendant offered in evidence a lease executed
by the Prince of Wales, also plaintiff's lessor, in which the Prince
admitted the land was that of another. The lease was not received
in evidence, but the Court of Exchequer held this to be error. The
court then proceeded to consider whether a new trial was necessary and held that regardless of the strength of the evidence in
plaintiff's favor or the court's opinion of the correctness of the
verdict, the error was prejudicial:
It may be that the supposed admission may be readily explained, and may not weigh in the least against the very strong
evidence of the right of the Prince to the mines in question...
but we cannot on this account refuse to submit the question to
the consideration of another jury ...
We cannot say, however strong our opinion may be on the
propriety of the present verdict, that, if the lease had been received, it would have had no effect with the jury; nor that it is
clear beyond all doubt, if the verdict had been for the defendant,
that it would have been set aside as improper; and therefore we
think there must be a new trial.' "
Wigmore vilified Crease v. Barrett for enunciating "a rule
which in spirit and later interpretation signified that an error of
ruling created 'per se' for the excepting and defeated party a right
to a new trial. ' 512 Justice Traynor, on the other hand, concluded
that the rule approximating automatic reversal originated not
See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 50, at 6.
For a discussion of the English doctrine of double jeopardy prior to
Friedland, New Trial after an Appeal from Conviction (pt. 2), 84 L.Q.
(1968).
149 Eng. Rep. at 1358-59.
512. 1 J. WIOMORE, supra note 220, § 21, at 367.

509.
510.
1907, see
REv. 185
511.
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with Crease v. Barrett but with its subsequent misapplication.
Indeed, Traynor praised the decision for its "resolve not to invade
the province of the jury" ' by identifying an error as harmless or
prejudicial according to whether the court believed that a correct
or incorrect result was reached:
The rationale of Crease v. Barrett is that when the appellant has introduced sufficient evidence to take his case to the
jury and might conceivably have received, but for the error, a
verdict in his favor that would have been upheld on appeal the
risk that error affected the verdict is too great to permit affirm51
ance. 4
Whatever the source of the original sin, the majority of American jurisdictions during the second half of the nineteenth century adopted a rule of presumed prejudice or automatic reversal
for the commission of error. 5 Moreover, "[o]riginally applied to
erroneous rulings by the trial court on questions of evidence, the
application of the [rule of presumed prejudice] was extended, in
many jurisdictions, to every error committed in the course of a
trial, whether in a criminal or civil case."' 4 The concern of the
courts during this period was their fear of invading the province
of the jury. The appellate court could tell from the record whether
an error had been committed during the trial, but the effect of
error on the minds of the jurors was not etched in the record. Only
by weighing the evidence could error be deemed harmless, but the
exclusive right to weigh the evidence belonged to the jury. Affirmance in the face of error would thus deprive the litigants of their
right to trial by jury.1 7
Wigmore argued that concern for invading the jury's province ignored the doctrine and history of the jury's function, since
the jury
has always been under the control and correction of the trial
judge and appellate courts. . . . Moreover, upon a question of
new trial because of erroneous ruling on evidence, the appellate
Court is not asked to overturn the verdict; on the contrary, it is
asked to let the verdict stand . . . . The "usurpation," if any,
513.

R. TaiANoa, supra note 50, at 6.

514. Id.
515. 1 J. WsGmom, supra note 220, § 21, at 367-68.
516. Hebert, supra note 503, at 171.
517. See Appellate Procedure, supra note 52, at 652-53.
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consists in setting aside the verdict, not in confirming it. The
advocates of the Exchequer rule concede that, for the purpose
of overturning the verdict, they may scrutinize and interfere
with it, so as to say that it goes against the weight of the whole
mass of the evidence; yet, for the purpose of supporting the
verdict, they professs to be unable to weigh a particular piece
of evidence, so as to say that it ought not to have affected the
same weight of evidence. This is one of the most indefensible
cases of illogic that has ever been sanctioned in our books."R
Traynor also convincingly argues, although on markedly different
grounds, that appellate review to determine whether an error is
harmless or prejudicial does not usurp the jury's role:
Actually, appellate review of the evidence to determine whether
an error is harmless does not invade the province of the jury.
The function of such review is not to determine how an appellate
court would decide the facts, but to determine whether an error
influenced the verdict. If the court is convinced upon review of
the evidence that the error did not influence the jury, and hence
sustains the verdict, a fortiori there is no invasion of the province of the jury. There is likewise no invasion should it appear
instead that the error did influence the jury, and hence contaminated the verdict, for the appellant then did not get the jury
trial to which he was entitled. In that event, the appellate court
clearly acts within its own province when it affords the appellant a right to a new trial.51"'
Moreover, the rule of automatic reversal had serious disadvantages. The rule extracted the price normally associated with appeals-delay, expense, increased demand on limited judicial resources-without inquiring whether the price was worth paying
because the error deprived a party of the essentials of a fair
trial.5 20 When appellate courts reversed for any error, "lawyers
played the game accordingly, . . . sowing error in the record,"'
and those with unmeritorious causes were most likely to succumb
to the temptation of sowing error.
The undesirability of automatic reversals led to the enactment of harmless-error statutes, rules, and even constitutional

518. 1 J. WIGMOIs, supra note 220, § 21, at 369-70.
519. R. TAmoFt, supra note 50, at 13-14.
520. See id.at 14.
521. Id.
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provisions." These provisions took a number of different forms,
but their common objective, without depriving litigants of a fair
trial, was "to conserve not merely public funds, but the judicial
process itself for legitimate disputes by guarding against needless
reversals and new trials that would clog already burdened trialcourt calendars."1' 3 The effectiveness of these enactments varied
significantly, with many courts continuing as before to reverse for
virtually any error.Y2'
In nearly one-half the states,5 5 the formulation of which errors are harmless is substantially that of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 61:111
No error

..

is ground for granting a new trial or for setting

aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
522. See 1 J. WicOma,
note 503, at 171 & nn.11-13.
523.

supra note 220, § 21, at 376 n.17; Hebert, supra

R. TRAYNOR, supra note 50, at 14.

524. Professor Sunderland concluded that harmless error statutes changed
judicial decisionmaking not at all. He thought that the problem of determining
whether error is harmless or prejudicial was essentially
a problem inprofessional psychology. No rules can be framed which
will solve it, for rules can only be drawn in general terms, and it is in
the interpretation of the rules that the difficulty comes ....
The only permanent and effective cure for technicality in this respect is a better conception of the purpose of all procedure.
Sunderland, supra note 51, at 146-47. See also 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 220, §
21, at 373-74: "By an emasculating interpretation, or by a virtual obliteration,
the statutes have effected little progress,-so far as their mere legislative command is concerned. Professional instinct from within, and professional pressure
from without-the demands of the Bar to be allowed to win by technicalities-have been too strong."
525. E.g., ALASKA R. Crv. P. 61; Amz. R.Civ. P. 61; COLO. R. Crv. P. 61;
DEL. CH.R. 61; DEL. CT. C.P. Civ. R.61; GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-161 (Supp. 1977);

IND. R.P. 61; Ky. R.Crv. P. 61; ME.R. Civ. P. 61; MASS. R. Cxv. P. 61; MicH.
GEN. CT.R. 529(1); MINN. R. Civ. P. 61; MONT. R. Civ. P. 61; NEB. REv. STAT.

§ 25-853 (1975); NEv. R.Civ. P. 61; N.M. R. Civ. P. 61; N.D. R. Civ. P. 61; R.I.
R. Civ. P. 61; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-61 (1969); UTAt R. Civ. P. 61;

VT. R. Civ. P. 61; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 61; Wyo. R.Ctv. P. 61.
526. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970); FED. R. Crim. P. 52.
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Despite its widespread adoption, this test offers no guidelines for
identifying which errors are prejudicial and which harmless. The
rule seems at best an admonition not to disturb a judgment for
insubstantial error; it does not help decide which errors affecting
the substantial right of the parties to a fair trial are of such
importance that affirmance is inconsistent with substantial justice.5 " In this regard, the current Tennessee statutes are clearly
preferable, for affirmance or reversal is tied to the effect of error
on the "merits of the judgment"2 8 or "results of the trial."5 ''
Under this test a litigant is not entitled to a trial free from all
error, but he is entitled to a trial free from error that contaminates the judgment.'
In applying this test, which identifies harmless or prejudicial
error according to its effect on the judgment, it is improper for
an appellate court to affirm, as the court did in Doe v. Tyler,
because there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment.' 3'
An error may have affected the outcome even though the result
is reasonably based on the proper evidence. More difficult to
overcome is the easy equation of harmless error with the correct
result, that is, the appellate court's belief that the same result
would be reached on retrial. Professor Reese has argued:
[Tihe notion that the appellate court should not be influenced
by what it believes to be the "correctness" of the judgment may
not always be sound. To be sure, an appellate court should, in
regard to the merits of a case, be extremely hesitant to substitute its own judgment for that of the trial judge and particularly
for that of the jury. And yet, would it always be wrong for an
appellate court, particularly in a civil case, to affirm a judgment
that almost certainly reached the right result although it could
not honestly be said that it was "highly probable" that the error
did not influence the trier of fact? The interest of the public in
the conservation of court time and the interest of the parties
in a reasonably speedy resolution of their dispute are obviously
values to be considered, although they are perhaps not of paramount importance. 33
527.
528.
529.

R. TRmNoR, supra note 50, at 15-16.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-116 (1955).
Id. § 27-117.
530. R. Traynor, supra note 50, at 20.

531.
532.
533.

See text accompanying notes 505-07 supra.

See R.

TRAYNOR,

supra note 50, at 17-18.

Reese, Book Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 529 (1971).
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Traynor's response is central to a correct interpretation of a
harmless-error statute like Tennessee's and proposed rule 36(b),
which measures harmlesss error in terms of the effect of error on
the judgment:
The conservation of judicial resources, though itself a worthy objective, is a strange terminal point for an argument purportedly concerned with precluding miscarriages of justice. The
argument goes off course because of its assumption at the outset
that a correct result is necessarily a just one.
What could be more misleading than such an equation? It
is one thing to tolerate as harmless the errors that involve only
the "mere etiquette of trials" or the "formalities or minutiae of
procedure." It is quite another also to tolerate as harmless the
errors that do such violence to the substantial rights of litigants
as to debase the judicial process itself, whose very purpose is to
assure justice. Once such violence is tolerated, no one could
enter a courtroom confident of a fair trial. Would that matter?
Would justice suffer? Yes. Concededly, not one of us can draw
a picture of justice or state its dimensions in words. Nonetheless, we know from this country's long experience in giving substance to the concept of a fair trial that for us, at least, it is an
essential element of justice. 4
Thus, under the current statutes and proposed rule 36(b), a
party's right to a fair trial is not dependent on the strength or
weakness of his adversary's evidence. 5 Over time, reversal for
error affecting the judgment may increase fairness at the trial
level by causing error to be more closely monitored.Y35 Moreover,
as Professor Reese tacitly concedes, to affirm in the face of error
affecting the judgment because the appellate court believes the
correct result was reached below and would be reached again on
retrial necessarily requires the appellate court to determine what
result it would have reached on the record without the error. In
so doing, the appellate court substitutes itself for the trier of
fact. 7 But the appellate court is not in as good a position as the
trier of fact, since the court cannot adequately judge the impact
of witnesses testifying personally before the trier of fact."' In
534. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 50, at 19.
535. See Rule Reviewed, supra note 503, at 459.
536. R. TUAyNoR, supra note 50, at 50.
537. Id. at 21.
538. See notes 277 & 282-83 supra and accompanying text.
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addition to the inability of the appellate court to observe the
demeanor of witnesses, Justice Traynor has noted:
[A] quasi trial in the appellate court is bound to deprive a
defendant in a criminal case of an opportunity to confront any
witnesses against hit. Even though there was confrontation in
the trial court, an appellate court can never conjure up the
impact of that live confrontation.
Worst of all, a quasi trial on appeal deprives defendants in
criminal cases and many litigants in civil cases of the right to
trial by jury. It is one thing for an appellate court to determine
that a verdict was or was not affected by error. It is quite another
for an appellate court to become in effect a second jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty.Y'
Realistically, of course, even a test that identifies harmless
or prejudicial error by its effect on the judgment requires an appellate court to weigh the evidence. 40 The process is a painstakingly difficult one that involves an evaluation only of probabilities, for typically there are no certain answers as to the effect error
had on the trier of factY ' Because the process involves probabilities based upon weighing of the evidence, Judge Jerome Frank
argued that unless an appellate court reversed automatically for
error affecting a reasonable trier of fact or was convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the result was correct, the error must be
held prejudicial. Otherwise, the appellate court will simply decide whether it agrees with the result below and thereby substitute itself for the trier of fact. ' This is essentially the test embraced by the Supreme Court for federal constitutional errors. 43
Although incapable of verification, it seems, however, that an
appellate judge can separate his conviction concerning the correctness of the result from the degree of probability that error
influenced the judgment." Moreover, under Frank's test, few
539. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 50, at 21.
540. Id. at 36.
541. Id. at 22, 30.
542. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 648 (2d Cir.
1946) (Frank, J., dissenting). For a listing of cases in which Jerome Frank and
Learned Hand carried on a dialogue on harmless error, see R. TRAYNOR, supra
note 50, at n.85.
543. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
544. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 50, at 36.
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errors could conscientiously be held harmless. 45 His test thus
results, although perhaps to a lesser extent, in the same disadvantages as those associated with the rule of automatic reversal.
Traynor advocated a test of high probability for harmlessness: "Given an error that affected a substantial right, the judgment below is suspect. Unless the appellate court believes it
highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment, it
should reverse." 54' The Advisory Commission considered Traynor's test but substituted a rule that provides: "A final judgment
from which relief is available and otherwise appropriate shall not
be set aside unless, considering the whole record, error involving
a substantial right more probably than not affected the judgment
or would result in prejudice to the judicial process." ' The rule
differs from Traynor's in that it substitutes the language "more
probably than not affected the judgment" for his "highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment." Rule 36(b), therefore, seems to require reversals less frequently than would Traynor." In addition, the rule adds that an error can be prejudicial,
regardless of its effect on the judgment, if it prejudices the judicial process. Examples of errors in this latter category would include "failure to provide the accused with the effective assistance
of counsel, obvious bias on the part of the judge or jury, and
improper discrimination in jury selection.""54 These errors ought
545. See id.at 43-44.
546. Id. at 35.
PROPOSED TZNN. R. ApP. P. 36(b).
548. Fewer reversals seem likely principally because under proposed rule
36(b) all errors must be weighed in light of all the evidence. Traynor's test, on
the other hand, would permit reversal almost invariably "without weighing the
evidence, in the event of an error that inherently carries a high risk of affecting
the judgment." R. TAYNOR,supra note 50, at 58. Examples of such inherently
prejudicial error are trials "dominated by a mob or infected by prejudicial
publicity. High risks also attend the knowing use of perjured testimony by the
prosecution or the suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant. Again,
high risks attend confessions, particularly in light of their usually shattering
force." Id. Some of these situations might require reversal under proposed rule
36(b), regardless of their impact on the judgment, on the ground that they carry
a high risk of prejudice to the judicial process. See text accompanying notes 54950 infra.
549. Reese, supra note 533, at 527. For other examples, see R. TRAYNOR,
supra note 50, at 64-73.
547.
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to lead to automatic reversal without consideration of whether
they affected the judgment in a particular case because the public
would lose confidence in a system that tolerated themW The
rule also differs from the current Tennessee statutes in two respects. First, the statutes do not set forth the degree of conviction
an appellate judge must possess that an error influenced the judgment before it will be held prejudicial;5' the proposed rule adopts
a more-probable-than-not standard.5 2 Second, the statutes do
not expressly require, as they should, reversals for errors inimical
to the judicial process. But despite these differences, the proposed rule adopts the approach embodied in the current statutes
insofar as most errors are linked to their effect on the judgment.
3
This seems the most sensible approach to an intricate problem.5
550.

Reese, supra note 533, at 527-28.

551.

See

TENN. CODE ANN.

44 27-116 to 117 (1955).

552. Articulating the standard in these terms seems far more helpful than
a formulation couched in terms of "reasonable" probability. "The nebulous test
of reasonableness is unlikely to foster uniformity either in the application of
standards, should there be any, or in the pragmatic exercise of discretion. Discretion is at least under better control within tests that focus on the degree of
probability . . . ." R. TRAYNOR, supra note 50, at 34-35.
553. The standard set forth in rule 36(b) applies to both criminal and civil
appeals. Professor Saltzburg has argued that a more stringent test of harmlessness should apply to criminal appeals. The test he favors is one of reasonable
possibility; as long as it is reasonably possible that the error affected the judgment, the appellate court should reverse. Saltzburg, supra note 503. Aside from
the shortcomings that inhere in a standard couched in terms of "reasonable"
possibility, see note 552 supra, Professor Saltzburg's position is premised on the
questionable assumption that "since the standard of proof in ordinary civil cases
differs greatly from that required in ordinary criminal cases, the significance of
a procedural error in either context also differs and should be reflected in the
applicable standard of harmlessness." Saltzburg, supra note 503, at 989 (emphasis added).
The significance of admitting evidence that should have been excluded or
excluding evidence that should have been admitted undoubtedly varies between
criminal and civil cases. For example, in criminal cases improperly excluded
evidence should be held prejudicial if its admission would raise a reasonable
doubt about guilt, while in typical civil cases, improperly excluded evidence is
prejudicial only if its admission would tip the balance of probabilities. Conversely, error is prejudicial in criminal cases if the evidence, without the improperly admitted evidence, fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
while in an ordinary civil case error is prejudicial only if the evidence, without
the improperly admitted evidence, fails to satisfy the less rigorous moreprobable-than-not standard. While the application of a harmless error standard
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Opinion Writing and Publication

No better test has yet been developed to ensure the careful
deliberation necessary to determine the existence of error and its
effect on the judgment than the requirement that the appellate
court reduce its reasons to writing, "which is thinking at its hardest.""'
A judge, inevitably preoccupied with the far-reaching effect of
an immediate solution as a precedent, often discovers that his
tentative views will not jell in the writing. He wrestles with the
devil more than once to set forth a sound opinion that will be
sufficient unto more than the day.-S

In addition, "litigants and the public are reassured when they can
see that the determination emerged at the end of a reasoning
process that is explicitly stated, rather than as an imperious
ukase without a nod to law or a need to justify."5"
On the other hand, it is not always necessary that a lengthy,
written statement of reasons accompany every final disposition
of an appeal. Similarly, the inconvenience of preparing written
reasons to accompany the appellate court's minor day-by-day
thus will vary depending upon the required degree of persuasion, it does not
necessarily follow that the standard itself should be different for criminal and
civil cases.
The crucial question addressed by a properly constructed harmless error
standard is the degree to which an appellate court must be persuaded that an
error did (or, alternatively, did not) affect the judgment before it will reverse
(or, alternatively, affirm). Professor Saltzburg would have an appellate court
reverse in a criminal case whenever a reasonable possibility exists that the error
affected the judgment. Justice Traynor would require reversal unless the appellate court concluded that it was highly probable the error did not affect the
judgment. Proposed rule 36(b) adopts yet a third standard: an appellate court
should reverse only if it is more probable than not that the error affected the
judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process. The acceptability
of any of these standards ultimately depends upon the extent to which they
avoid the evils associated with automatic reversal, on the one hand, and the
evils associated with too ready affirmance in the face of error on the other.
Because of its nebulousness, see note 552 supra, the "reasonable possibility" test
appears largely indistinguishable from a rule of automatic reversal and thus
may result in the very evils most harmless error statutes are designed to alleviate.
554. Traynor, supra note 405, at 218.
555. Id.
556.

P. CARIUNGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. RosgNBERG, supra note 501, at 31.
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determinations 7 would almost certainly outweigh the probable
benefits. Opinion writing is the single "most time-consuming and
expensive phase of the traditional American [appellate] process.9558

Some judges are prone to write more than is necessary and to
polish and refine the literary style at considerable cost in time
and with insignificant gain for the judicial function. Refined
editing is particularly likely when the opinion is destined to be
preserved in print between hard covers under the author's
name. 2 '
Moreover, the burden placed upon other members of an appellate
court in considering needlessly lengthy opinions reduces the time,
enthusiasm, and ability to consider more deserving appeals. The
other extreme of simply affirming or, worse still, reversing without any statement of reasons needs be avoided as well."0
In order to accommodate these conflicting considerations,
proposed appellate rule 37(b) defines two kinds of opinions: a full
opinion and a memorandum opinion. A full opinion sets forth the
facts, the issues presented for review, and an analysis of pertinent
authorities and principles. On the other hand, a memorandum
opinion is written principally for the benefit of the parties and
sets forth simply the issues presented, the result or other disposition, and a short statement of the reasons."' The memorandum
opinion differs from the full opinion in two respects. First, because the memorandum opinion is written principally for the
benefit of the parties, there is no need to set forth a statement of
the facts or procedural history of the case, at least not in any great
detail, since the parties are already acquainted with these matters. 5 2 Second, the memorandum opinion sets forth the reasons
behind the decision of the appellate court; it does not contain an
557. An example is the decision whether to grant a motion or other request
for an order or relief. Proposed rule 37(a) requires that the denial of any motion
or application or petition be accompanied by a statement of reasons, either
orally or in writing. The form of the statement lies in the discretion of the
appellate court.
558. P. CA.UUNOTON, D. MEAoR, & M. RosNSiamo, supra note 501, at 32.
559. Id.

560. See Haworth, supra note 501, at 271-74.
561.

34-35.
562.

See P. CaRmioTON, D.MEAR, & M. RosEs.am, supra note 501, at
Id.at 35.
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analysis of pertinent authorities and principles. As has been
stated by other writers, "[al memorandum decision gives only
the reasons; it does not lay bare the reasoning.''53
Based on recommendations made by the American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration," '
the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice,0 and other commentators," ' rule 37(b) provides that a written statement of reasons
must accompany every final disposition of an appeal and "should
be in a form appropriate to the complexity and importance of the
issues presented." The rule also provides that a memorandum
opinion is appropriate if
(1) the issues presented involve application of a well-settled rule
of law to a recurring fact situation; (2) the issue presented is
whether the evidence is sufficient to support the findings and
the evidence clearly is sufficient; (3) disposition of the appeal
is clearly controlled by a prior holding of the deciding or higher
court and no reason appears for questioning or qualifying that
holding; and (4) the appeal is accompanied by an opinion of the
court or agency being reviewed, and that opinion identifies and
discusses all the issues presented, and the appellate court approves of the conclusion and reasons in the opinion.
Full opinions, on the other hand, are appropriate if
(1) the opinion enunciates a new rule of law, modifies or criticizes an existing rule, or applies an established rule to a novel
fact situation; (2) the opinion resolves a conflict or apparent
conflict of authority; (3) the court is not unanimous; or (4) the
opinion involves a question of public interest.
In order to ensure collegial deliberations, all opinions must indicate the participating judges. In order to lessen the self-perceived
need of individual judges to draft full opinions and to refine and
polish their prose, on the other hand, memorandum opinions
need not signify their author. Finally, rule 37(a) provides that
563. Id. For examples of memorandum opinions, see State v. Hawkins, 263
La. 36, 267 So. 2d 185 (1972); People v. Thomas, 58 Mich. App. 218, 227 N.W.2d
257 (1975).
564. APPtLLAr COURT STANDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.36.
565. 5 Aov[soRY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTicE, SUPPLEMENT, PROCERDINOS, AND CONCLUSIONS 128 (1975) [hereinafter cited as APPELLATE JUSTICE].
566. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 501, at 33-
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denials of motions or applications or petitions-matters other

than the final disposition of an appeal-may be accompanied by
either an oral or written statement of reasons."7
Related but distinguishable from the problem of opinion
writing is the problem of publication of opinions." 8 Many appeals
appear to be of interest only to the parties and "do not raise issues
of types that.

. .

will contribute importantly to knowledge of the

law or its development." ' If every appellate opinion were published and, particularly, if every final disposition of an appeal
were accompanied by a full opinion, the quantitative and qualitative burden and cost of legal research would be intolerable and
the cohesiveness of the law threatened." ' Since the insignificant
opinions are commingled with the blockbusters, all volumes must
be purchased, creating serious problems of storage not to mention
the expense of acquisition and maintenance. 7 ' Besides, the burgeoning number of case reports sires digests, services, and periodicals discussing the cases 72" Furthermore, publication increases
the time spent individually writing and collectively considering
567.

See note 534 supra.

568. See generally APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.37;
APPELLATE JUSTICE, supra note 565, at 128-29; P. CARRINOTON, D. MEADOR, & M.
ROSENBERG, supra note 501, at 35-41; Advisory Council for Appellate Justice,

Standards for Publicationof Judicial Opinions (1973), reprinted in 2
COUNCIL FOR APELLATE JUSTCE, QUANTIT

ADVISORY
AND QunsrY iNAPPELATE JUSTICE 79-

88 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PublicationStandards];Chanin, A Survey of the
Writing and Publicationof Opinions in Federal and State Courts, 67 LAw LB.
J. 362 (1974); Gardner, Ninth Circuit'sUnpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal
Justice?, 61 A.B.A.J, 1224 (1975); Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control
of the Publication of Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REV. 791 (1975);
Joiner, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions, 56 JUDICATURE 195 (1972);
Kanner, The UnpublishedAppellate Opinions: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J.
386 (1974); Leventhal, Appellate Procedures:Design, Patchwork, and Managed
Flexibility, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 432, 438-39 (1976).
569. Publication Standards, supra note 568, at 79; see APPELLATE COURT
STANDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.37, at 63; P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M.
ROSENBERG, supra note 501, at 35; Joiner, supra note 568, at 195.
570. APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.37, at 63-64; P.
CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 501, at 35; Publication
Standards, supra note 568, at 79; Joiner, supra note 568, at 195-96.
571. APPELLATE CoUwr STANDARDS, supra note 121, § 3.37, at 63-64; P.
CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 501, at 35; Publication
Standards, supra note 568, at 79; Joiner, supra note 568, at 196.
572. Publication Standards,supra note 568, at 79; Jacobstein, supra note
568, at 795; Joiner, supra note 568, at 196.
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poses a
opinions." On the other hand, selective nonpublication
74

threat to the evenhanded administration of justice:

[Olpinions [that] are not published . . . are not generally
available. Access is limited to lawyers who can conveniently get
to the court's files and to the governmental and institutional law
offices that are in a position to maintain their own collections
of clandestine opinions. This affords an advantage over the
"have-nots." If these opinions are citable, we have a violation
of a fundamental presupposition of our legal order, that the law
be knowable and readily and equally accessible to all."
Alternatively, unpublished opinions might be made generally
available by unofficial reporting services, such as those that currently exist in Tennessee. But "that in turn frustrates the objectives of the non-publication policy, namely, reducing the quantity of printed material that lawyers must read and use."' ' Moreover, "(wihen judges are able to hide their work product from
public view, they become unaccountable in the tribunal of informed public opinion and unassailable by their critics." '77 This
last observation is not aimed at intentional misconduct but at the
far more likely unintentional errors an appellate court may commit. Indeed, one study of a jurisdiction with a selective nonpublication rule found that, articulated guidelines to the contrary notwithstanding, "[i]mbedded in the bulk of unpublished opinions
is a not-inconsiderable body of law dealing with novel points and
giving rise to conflicts among decisions." '78 The problem of invisible conflicts is exacerbated if a no-citation rule accompanies a
nonpublication rule, because counsel cannot call the conflicts to
the attention of the court."' Thus, the "uniform and coherent
enunciation and application of the law" S' is undermined. Be573. P. CARRINGTON, D. MLDOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 501, at 35;
PublicationStandards, supra note 568, at 81; Joiner, supra note 568, at 196.
574. P. CARRINGTON, D. MXAOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 501, at 36;
Gardner, supra note 568, at 1124; Kanner, supra note 568, at 386; Seligson &
Warnloff, The Use of Unreported Cases in California, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 37
(1972). But see Leventhal, supra note 568, at 439.
575. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENB.RG, supra note 501, at 36.

576. Id.
577. Gardner, supra note 568, at 1227; see Kanner, supra note 568, at 386.
578. Kanner, supra note 568, at 443.
579. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEAOB, & M. RosENBERG, supra note 501, at 38;
Gardner, supra note 568, at 1225.
580. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 501, at 38.
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sides, a no-citation rule cannot compel lawyers and judges to
forget what they remember. It cannot prevent counsel from relying on the reasoning of an unpublished case-thereby perhaps
refreshing the appellate court's recollection-or "insinuat[ing]
its existence and its persuasive force." 5 ' Similarly, it should not
be surprising to learn that trial judges have let their "duty to the
litigants to avoid reversible error . . . override their duty to observe the amenities of non-citation."5 82 Added to these considerations is the concern that
nonpublication inevitably reduces the visibility of the correcting
function of the appeal. Over time, it must depreciate that basic
function, leaving trial courts and administrative agencies more
on their own, and increasing general anxiety about the integrity
of the legal process at all levels. Visibility is too important...
to be abandoned in favor of the limited benefits of nonpublication . 3
While all these matters were considered, the Advisory Commission did not recommend to the supreme court that all opinions
be published. Instead, rule 37(b) provides only for the publication
of full opinions; "memorandum opinions shall not be published."
If the standards establishing the situations in which a memorandum opinion is apprbpriate are strictly followed,"' then most
memorandum opinions will not have any stare decisis value."' In
addition, the precedential value of memorandum opinions is
slight in any event by reason of their rather cryptic form and
absence of a statement of facts. 5" Rule 37 does not prohibit citation of unpublished opinions, and these opinions will continue to
be matters of public record. Thus, conflicting unpublished opinions can be brought to the appellate courts' attention, although
these courts should make clear that a "lawyer is not remiss in his
professional duty if he fails to do research in the memorandum
decisions, or to cite such decisions. Such research will not be
economic, and all litigants should be spared the expense of it."" 7
581. Id. at 37.
582.
583.

Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.

584.

See text accompanying notes 564-67 supra.
See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADoa, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 501, at

585.
39.

586.
587.

id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
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Finally, if any judge perceives an abuse of the nonpublication
rule, he need merely translate his perception into a separate concurring or dissenting opinion since a full opinion and publication
is required whenever the court is not unanimous."'
Whatever the impact the publication standards established
by rule 37 would have elsewhere, their impact in Tennessee will
likely be to make more opinions available in published form. The
Tennessee Code currently requires all opinions of the supreme
court to be officially published, but only the opinions of the court
of appeals for which certiorari is denied by the supreme court
must be published."' However, the Code excepts from its mandatory publication requirement
appeals from any state boards or commissions, including public
service commission, appeals involving revenue matters and/or
taxes, and appeals where the only grounds for a new trial were
that there was no evidence to support the verdict and/or that the
verdict of the jury was contrary to the weight and preponderance
of the evidence. ' "
The reason for some of these exceptions, particularly those involving revenue and tax matters, is not clear, but most of the
exceptions correspond roughly to situations specified for nonpublication in rule 37. While the number of published supreme court
opinions will not be dramatically affected by rule 37, the number
of published opinions of the intermediate appellate courts should
increase. Some may lament the added burden and expense this
may appear to cause, but the visible and evenhanded administration of justice should be promoted thereby.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Any discussion focusing on rules of fundamental significance
or unusual interest runs the risk of creating some mistaken impressions. One is that the proposed rules are entirely new and
create change for the sake of change itself. To be sure, the proposed rules do alter current law in many of its fundamental reSee text accompanying notes 564-67 supra.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-612 (Supp. 1977). But see TENN. SUP. CT. R.
31. The Code provision noted herein inexplicably makes no provision for publication of decisions of the court of criminal appeals.
588.
589.

590.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-612 (Supp. 1977).
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spects. But given the absence of any comprehensive reform in the
law for more than a century, the changes seem strikingly modest.
In point of fact, much of the law embodied in the rules is familiar
fare, as can be verified by studying the rules, which are appended
to this discussion. Another mistaken impression that might be
created is that the rules were not drafted with a concern for details. Yet, even a cursory examination will quickly reveal rules on
a variety of matters of detail including voluntary dismissal;" 1
joint and consolidated appeals; " 2 transfer of cases appealed to the
wrong court; " appeals by poor persons;" the substitution, addition, and dropping of parties;" filing and service of papers " ' and
briefs;0 7 form of briefs and other papers;" computation and extension of time;"' motions;'" completion, transmission,"' and filing of the record;"" sequence of oral argument or submission of
cases; 6 3 conduct of oral argument;"" entry of judgment and the
persons to whom copies of the reasons and judgment are to be
sent; "' rehearing in the appellate court; 0 ' costs;"17 interest on
judgments;' 8 issuance, stay, and recall of mandates from the
appellate court;'"9 filing of the mandate in the trial court and
proceedings thereafter; 10 and other miscellaneous matters, many
of which will be treated in a subsequent article.
The proposed appellate rules are not immune to criticism.
Indeed, this discussion has at times been critical of some of the
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.

PROPOSED TENN. R. APP. P. 15.
Id. R. 16.
Id. R. 17.
Id. R. 18.
Id. R. 19.
Id. R. 20.
Id. R. 29.
Id. R. 30.
Id. R. 21.
Id. R. 22.
Id. R. 25.
Id. R. 26.
Id. R. 34.
Id. R. 35.
Id. R. 38.
Id. R. 39.
Id. R. 40.

608. Id,R.41.
609.
610.

Id. R. 42.
Id. R. 43.
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rules. However, it is also important to recognize the difficulties

involved in drafting the rules. It is to be hoped that this discussion has furthered an understanding of those difficulties and will
result in helpful criticism of the rules before their submission to
the Tennessee General Assembly.
It should be unmistakably clear that further significant reform cannot await the passage of another one hundred years.
Only ongoing procedural reform will permit the evolutionary
growth in the law that the judgment of time dictates about the
judgment of today.

